Independents, or nonintegrated companies, played a significant role in finding and producing crude oil in California, just as they had in Texas. They were able to do so because the resources of majors, or integrated firms, were not decisive in the search for oil. As both majors and independents increased in number, the factors of risk and uncertainty persuaded independents and majors to cooperate with each other. The case of Ralph B. Lloyd demonstrates the argument. Lloyd was a forceful individual who used his preeminent leasing position to shape the development of the Ventura Avenue field—the largest in the coastal region—through symbiotic relations with Shell and Associated. Lloyd's role is not captured in the data that scholars often use to demonstrate the dominance of m ajors in the California oil industry.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism sponsored 165 research studies, which were carried out in the years 1964–7. Of these, 24 were published by the Commission and distributed widely through the services of Information Canada. Publication proceeded in two series: “Research Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” and “Research Documents of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.” The first series was comprised of studies which it was considered should be available in both official languages. The second series included studies judged to be of more specialized interest; these were published in the language of the author. Both series, listed in order of publication and by author and title, are set out in Table i.

This article assesses the extent to which bankers approached sovereign debt defaults during the interwar period according to norms established during the nineteenth century. Bankers treated postrevolutionary Mexico as a hybrid, that is, as a case of both developmental and revenue default, in Fishlow's taxonomy, in the interest of protecting the rights of bondholders generally. Their approach led them to reject the argument of US ambassador to Mexico (and former Morgan partner), Dwight W. Morrow, that a government could be financially insolvent. Bankers acted similarly during the debt crisis of the 1980s.

This article explores the contentious U.S. State Department–Foreign Bondholders Protective Council relationship in the context of interwar foreign economic policy and bureaucratic competition. U.S. officials created the council in 1933 to represent the interests of U.S. investors in the settlement of the numerous dollar bond issues that had gone into default. The article shows why the council failed to perform as U.S. officials expected and outlines the process by which they increasingly interposed themselves in debt negotiations. In doing so, it considers the limitations of using private organizations to accomplish the objectives of public policy.