This article explores the reasons why mounted men-at-arms might dismount to fight, individually or collectively, focusing mainly on the late medieval period. The interface between mounted and dismounted combat is examined together with the factors that led either to success or failure. The grounds for dismounting were varied, but the handling of the horses and concern for their safety remained a continuous thread that impacted on the course of events and frequently decided the outcome of engagements. Although generally associated with English armies of the Hundred Years’ War, dismounting to fight was, in fact, a well-established practice throughout Western Europe. Yet, no matter how courageous or experienced, when those on foot faced cavalry, the outcome could never be certain, hence the deployment of anti-equestrian devices, such as pits, caltrops, and stakes, to try to equal the odds. The most effective defense against cavalry, however, was the judicious use of terrain, particularly hedges and vineyards, and an analysis will be made of how these specific features were utilized. The armor of the period reflected a nation's fighting preferences and in the most successful armies, men-at-arms transitioned easily between being on horseback or on foot and combined well with archers and other arms. The loss of this flexibility caused significant problems, as the English discovered to their cost.

The light lance or lancegay was one of the most ubiquitous weapons used throughout centuries of warfare in Europe and beyond, from ancient times well into the modern era. This article traces the development of the weapon during the medieval period in its broadest sense, though drawing on its earlier and later manifestations. It offers a detailed analysis of a major category of weapon that has received far less attention than more glamorous but shorter-lived arms such as the heavy war lance and the longbow. It demonstrates that the maneuvers of the light lance and the tactics commonly associated with Napoleonic and later periods were familiar to medieval warriors and outlined in contemporary literature. The lancegay was a flexible and enduring weapon, favored by all classes of society, that could be deployed quickly both on horse and foot. Despite some variation in nomenclature, it is possible to demonstrate how the lancegay was utilized by different groups during and beyond the medieval period. Its carriage and manipulation are examined together with the tactics and riding skills that enabled it to achieve its full potential within a light cavalry role.

It is widely accepted that siege warfare formed a significant part of medieval conflict, and one in which cavalry played only a minor role. This article argues that horsemen were in fact essential to the prosecution of a successful siege, and crucial for an effective defense. Cavalry could prevent an army from setting up a siege but also ward against that threat. Once a siege began the horsemen of both sides contested the struggle for supply, both in the vicinity of the siege, and also on its periphery. Cavalry was the most dangerous arm for a sally, but also the key to a successful response, and a vital component of a relieving force. Cavalry dominated the numerous skirmish actions that took place around a siege and was also the arm of pursuit, an army retreating from a failed investment being highly vulnerable to horsemen. Horses drove mills, carried provisions, pulled the artillery, and were present at sieges in considerable numbers, making them instrumental in the spread of disease due to the large amounts of waste they produced. However, their role in the transmission of bacillary dysentery, the great scourge of medieval siege warfare, was probably other than by water-borne infection. War horses were valuable animals and siege warfare offered opportunities for their capture, while its privations caused the animals great distress, not least because they required considerable maintenance. In good condition horses contended with the enemy and secured supplies but, if provisions failed, their excessive needs rapidly made them weak and ineffective, with drastic consequences both for themselves and their human counterparts. An analysis of several sieges during the later Hundred Years War examines these issues and considers whether the English were compromised by the number and quality of their mounted men-at-arms.