Although still prevalent in many human societies, the practice of cousin marriage has precipitously declined in populations undergoing rapid demographic and socioeconomic change. However, it is still unclear whether changes in the structure of the marriage pool or changes in the fitness-relevant consequences of cousin marriage more strongly influence the frequency of cousin marriage. Here, we use genealogical data collected by the Tsimane Health and Life History Project to show that there is a small but measurable decline in the frequency of first cross-cousin marriage since the mid-twentieth century. Such changes are linked to concomitant changes in the pool of potential spouses in recent decades. We find only very modest differences in fitness-relevant demographic measures between first cousin and non-cousin marriages. These differences have been diminishing as the Tsimane have become more market integrated. The factors that influence preferences for cousin marriage appear to be less prevalent now than in the past, but cultural inertia might slow the pace of change in marriage norms. Overall, our findings suggest that cultural changes in marriage practices reflect underlying societal changes that shape the pool of potential spouses.

Laboratory-based studies indicate that a major evolutionary advantage of bipedalism is enabling humans to walk with relatively low energy expenditure. However, such studies typically record subjects walking on even surfaces or treadmills that do not represent the irregular terrains our species encounters in natural environments. To date, few studies have quantified walking kinematics on natural terrains. Here we used high-speed video to record marker-based kinematics of 21 individuals from a Tsimane forager–horticulturalist community in the Bolivian Amazon walking on three different terrains: a dirt field, a forest trail and an unbroken forest transect. Compared with the field, in the unbroken forest participants contacted the ground with more protracted legs and flatter foot postures, had more inclined trunks, more flexed hips and knees, and raised their feet higher during leg swing. In contrast, kinematics were generally similar between trail and field walking. These results provide preliminary support for the idea that irregular natural surfaces like those in forests cause humans to alter their walking kinematics, such that travel in these environments could be more energetically expensive than would be assumed from laboratory-based data. These findings have important implications for the evolutionary energetics of human foraging in environments with challenging terrains.

Research among non-industrial societies suggests that body kinematics adopted during running vary between groups according to the cultural importance of running. Among groups in which running is common and an important part of cultural identity, runners tend to adopt what exercise scientists and coaches consider to be good technique for avoiding injury and maximising performance. In contrast, among groups in which running is not particularly culturally important, people tend to adopt suboptimal technique. This paper begins by describing key elements of good running technique, including landing with a forefoot or midfoot strike pattern and leg oriented roughly vertically. Next, we review evidence from non-industrial societies that cultural attitudes about running associate with variation in running techniques. Then, we present new data from Tsimane forager–horticulturalists in Bolivia. Our findings suggest that running is neither a common activity among the Tsimane nor is it considered an important part of cultural identity. We also demonstrate that when Tsimane do run, they tend to use suboptimal technique, specifically landing with a rearfoot strike pattern and leg protracted ahead of the knee (called overstriding). Finally, we discuss processes by which culture might influence variation in running techniques among non-industrial societies, including self-optimisation and social learning.

In small-scale societies, punishment of adults is infrequent and employed when the anticipated cost-to-benefit ratio is low, such as when punishment is collectively justified and administered. In addition, benefits may exceed costs when punishers have relatively greater physical and social capital and gain more from cooperation. We provide examples from the Tsimane horticulturalists of Bolivia to support our claims.

Coall & Hertwig (C&H) bring attention to alternative accounts of grandparental investment from economics, evolutionary anthropology, psychology, and sociology, which have yet to be reconciled. We attempt to help integrate some of the disparate perspectives by expanding the scope of the evolutionary perspective, highlighting some gaps, and discussing problems with the authors' treatment of grandparents in traditional societies.

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life.

We would like to thank the commentators for their generous comments, valuable insights and helpful suggestions. We begin this response by discussing the selfishness axiom and the importance of the preferences, beliefs, and constraints framework as a way of modeling some of the proximate influences on human behavior. Next, we broaden the discussion to ultimate-level (that is evolutionary) explanations, where we review and clarify gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and then tackle the possibility that evolutionary approaches that exclude culture might be sufficient to explain the data. Finally, we consider various methodological and epistemological concerns expressed by our commentators.

The transfer of food among group members is a ubiquitous feature of small-scale forager and forager-agricultural populations. The uniqueness of pervasive sharing among humans, especially among unrelated individuals, has led researchers to evaluate numerous hypotheses about the adaptive functions and patterns of sharing in different ecologies. This article attempts to organize available cross-cultural evidence pertaining to several contentious evolutionary models: kin selection, reciprocal altruism, tolerated scrounging, and costly signaling. Debates about the relevance of these models focus primarily on the extent to which individuals exert control over the distribution of foods they acquire, and the extent to which donors receive food or other fitness-enhancing benefits in return for shares given away. Each model can explain some of the variance in sharing patterns within groups, and so generalizations that ignore or deny the importance of any one model may be misleading. Careful multivariate analyses and cross-cultural comparisons of food transfer patterns are therefore necessary tools for assessing aspects of the sexual division of labor, human life history evolution, and the evolution of the family. This article also introduces a framework for better understanding variation in sharing behavior across small-scale traditional societies. I discuss the importance of resource ecology and the degree of coordination in acquisition activities as a key feature that influences sharing behavior.

Four models commonly employed in sharing analyses (reciprocal altruism [RA], tolerated scrounging [TS], costly signaling [CS], and kin selection [KS]) have common features which render rigorous testing of unique predictions difficult. Relaxed versions of these models are discussed in an attempt to understand how the underlying principles of delayed returns, avoiding costs, building reputation, and aiding biological kin interact in systems of sharing. Special attention is given to the interpretation of contingency measures that critically define some form of reciprocal altruism.