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Background: The CDC recommends a public health response when novel and targeted multidrug-resistant organisms (nMDROs), such as carbapenem-resistant organisms or Candida auris, are identified in healthcare settings in nonendemic areas. nMDRO responses are supported by healthcare-associated infection-antimicrobial resistance programs in 50 state and 6 local and territorial health departments. Annually, health departments report nMDRO responses to the CDC. We summarize nMDRO responses nationally and report our assessment of colonization screening positivity rates by healthcare setting and pathogen. Methods: We analyzed nMDRO response data reported by health departments for the period August 2019–July 2021; we excluded prevention efforts (ie, widespread screening based on facility-level risk factors). Among nMDRO responses in which colonization screening was performed, we calculated the proportion of responses in which screening detected additional cases of the index nMDRO and the colonization screening positivity, by healthcare setting and pathogen. Results: Among 2,051 nMDRO responses, 732 (36%) had ≥1 colonization screening (representing 44,845 colonization screenings), of which 24 (representing 17,467 colonization screenings) were prevention efforts and were excluded. Among the remaining 708 nMDRO responses, the healthcare setting most frequently included was acute-care hospitals (ACHs; 337 of 708, 48%); the least frequently included was long-term ACHs (LTACHs; 83 of 708, 12%). Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales were the most common index nMDRO prompting a response (408 of 708, 58%). Screening identified additional cases of the index nMDRO in 248 responses (35%) and 2,378 (9%) of 27,378 colonization screenings. Identification of the index nMDRO varied by pathogen and setting (Fig. 1). Overall, ventilator-capable skilled nursing facilities (vSNFs) were the facility type in which colonization screening most frequently identified additional cases of the index nMDRO (63 of 92 responses, 63%), and LTACHs had the highest colonization screening positivity (750 of 5,798, 13%). Similar colonization screening positivity was observed in ACHs (9%) and vSNFs (8%). On average, Candida auris and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB) had the highest colonization screening positivity rates across all healthcare settings: CRAB, 493 (12.6%) of 3,907 screened; Candida auris, 1,344 (11.7%) of 11,466 screened (Fig. 1B). More than one-half of responses identified ≥1 case of the index nMDRO. Conclusions: During public health nMDRO responses, additional cases were regularly identified through colonization screening. Responses in vSNFs and LTACHs and to environmental pathogens like Candida auris and CRAB detected additional cases in more than one-half of responses, suggesting that spread commonly occurred prior to detection of the first clinical case. The use of colonization screening is an effective strategy to detect unidentified nMDRO colonization, especially in high-acuity postacute-care settings.
Background:Candida spp can cause a variety of infections known as candidiasis, ranging from severe invasive infections to superficial mucosal infections of the mouth and vagina. Fluconazole, a triazole antifungal, is commonly prescribed to treat candidiasis but increasing fluconazole resistance is a growing concern for several Candida spp. Although C. albicans has historically been the most common cause of candidiasis, other species are increasingly common and antifungal resistance is more prevalent in these non-albicans species, including C. glabrata, C. parapsilosis, and C. tropicalis, which were the focus of this analysis. Methods: We used the PINC AI healthcare data (PHD) database to examine fluconazole resistance for inpatient isolates between 2012 and 2021 from 187 US acute-care hospitals with at least 1 Candida spp culture with a fluconazole susceptibility result over the entire period. We calculated annual percentage fluconazole resistance for C. glabrata, C. tropicalis, and C. parapsilosis isolates using the clinical laboratory interpretation for resistance. Results: We identified 4,264 C. glabrata, 2,482 C. parapsilosis, and 2,283 C. tropicalis isolates between 2012 and 2021 with susceptibility results. The percentage of C. glabrata isolates resistant to fluconazole doubled between 2020 and 2021 (14.6% vs 29.3%) (Fig. 1a). The percentage of C. parapsilosis isolates resistant to fluconazole steadily increased since 2017 (Fig. 1b), with an 82% increase in 2021 compared with 2020 (3.8% in 2020 vs 6.9% in 2021). Fluconazole resistance among C. tropicalis isolates varied over the years, with a 0.3% decrease in 2021 from 2020 (Fig. 1c). Of hospitals reporting at least 1 result each year 2020–2021, 44% observed an increase in the proportion of C. glabrata isolates resistant to fluconazole in 2021 compared to 2020. Conclusions: Our analysis highlights a concerning increase in fluconazole resistance among C. glabrata and C. parapsilosis isolates in 2021 compared with previous years. Further investigation of the observed increases in fluconazole resistance among these Candida spp could provide further insight on potential drivers of resistance or limitations in reported results from large databases. More analyses are needed to understand rates, sites of Candida infections, and risk factors (eg, antifungal exposure) associated with resistance.
Background:Candida auris is a multidrug-resistant yeast capable of invasive infection with high mortality and healthcare-associated outbreaks globally. Due to limited labratory capacity, the burden of C. auris is unknown in Bangladesh. We estimated the extent of C. auris colonization and infection among patients in Dhaka city intensive care units. Methods: During August 2021–September 2022 at adult intensive care units (ICUs) and neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) of 1 government and 1 private tertiary-care hospital, we collected skin swabs from all patients and blood samples from sepsis patients on admission, mid-way through, and at the end of ICU or NICU stays. Skin swab and blood with growth in blood-culture bottle were inoculated in CHROMagar, and identification of isolates was confirmed by VITEK-2. Patient characteristics and healthcare history were collected. We performed descriptive analyses, stratifying by specimen and ICU type. Results: Of 740 patients enrolled, 59 (8%) were colonized with C. auris, of whom 2 (0.3%) later developed a bloodstream infection (BSI). Among patients colonized with C. auris, 27 (46%) were identified in the ICU and 32 (54%) were identified from the NICU. The median age was 55 years for C. auris–positive ICU patients and 4 days for those in the NICU. Also, 60% of all C. auris patients were male. Among 366 ICU patients, 15 (4%) were positive on admission and 12 (3%) became colonized during their ICU stay. Among 374 NICU patients, 19 (5%) were colonized on admission and 13 (4%) became colonized during their NICU stay. All units identified C. auris patients on admission and those who acquired it during their ICU or NICU stay, but some differences were observed among hospitals and ICUs (Figure). Among patients colonized on admission to the ICU, 11 (73%) were admitted from another ward, 3 (20%) were admitted from another hospital, and 1 (7%) were admitted from home. Of patients colonized on admission to the NICU, 4 (21%) were admitted from the obstetric ward, 9 (47%) were admitted from another hospital, and 6 (32%) were admitted from home. In addition, 18 patients with C. auris died (12 in the ICU and 6 in the NICU); both patients with C. auris BSIs died. Conclusions: In these Bangladesh hospitals, 8% of ICU or NICU patients were positive for C. auris, including on admission and acquired during their ICU or NICU stay. This high C. auris prevalence emphasizes the need to enhance case detection and strengthen infection prevention and control. Factors contributing to C. auris colonization should be investigated to inform and strengthen prevention and control strategies.
Background:Candida auris, an emerging fungal pathogen, is frequently drug resistant and spreads rapidly in healthcare facilities. Screening to identify patients colonized with C. auris can prevent further spread by prompting aggressive infection prevention and control measures. The CDC recommends C. auris screening based on local epidemiological conditions, patient characteristics, and facility-level risk factors; such screening might help facilities in higher burden areas to mitigate transmission and those in lower-burden areas to detect new introductions before spread begins. To describe US screening practices and challenges, we surveyed a network of infection disease practitioners, comparing responses by local C. auris case burdens. Methods: In August 2022, we emailed a survey about C. auris screening practices to ~3,000 members of the IDSA Emerging Infection Network. We describe survey results, stratifying findings by whether the healthcare facility was in a region where C. auris is frequently identified (tier 3 facility) or not frequently identified (tier 2 facility), based on CDC assessment using existing multidrug-resistant organism containment guidance (https://www.cdc.gov/hai/containment/guidelines.html). Results: We received 253 responses (tier 3 facilities: 119, tier 2 facilities: 134); overall, 37% performed screening. Tier 3 facilities more frequently performed screening than tier 2 facilities (59% vs 17%). Among facilities that performed screening, tier 3 facilities, compared with tier 2 facilities, more frequently screened patients on admission (84% vs 55%) and used an in-house laboratory for testing (68% vs 29%), most often with culture-based methods. Tier 2 facilities more frequently screened patients already admitted in the facility (eg, in response to cases or as part of point-prevalence surveys) compared with tier 3 facilities (59% vs 49%). Among facilities performing screening, 72% had identified ≥1 case in the previous year (tier 3 facilities, 85%; tier 2 facilities, 33%). Barriers to screening included limited laboratory capacity, long testing turnaround times, and the perception that screening was not useful. Conclusions: Most facilities surveyed did not perform C. auris screening. However, most facilities that performed screening, including those in regions of higher and lower C. auris burden, detected cases during the previous year. Admission screening, which might help detect new introductions before spread begins, was uncommon in facilities in lower-burden areas. Improving ease of C. auris screening through access to in-house laboratory testing with rapid turnaround times might increase the adoption of C. auris screening by facilities, thereby increasing detection and preventing spread.
Background:Candida auris is a frequently drug-resistant yeast that can cause invasive disease and is easily transmitted in healthcare settings. Pediatric cases are rare in the United States, with <10 reported before 2022. In August 2021, the first C. auris case in Las Vegas was identified in an adult. By May 2022, 117 cases were identified across 16 healthcare facilities, including 3 pediatric cases at an acute-care hospital (ACH) with adult cases, representing the first pediatric cluster in the United States. The CDC and Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health (NVDPBH) sought to describe these cases and risk factors for C. auris acquisition. Methods: We defined a case as a patient’s first positive C. auris specimen. We reviewed medical records and infection prevention and control (IPC) practices. Environmental sampling was conducted on high-touch surfaces throughout affected adult and pediatric units. Isolate relatedness was assessed using whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Results: All 3 pediatric patients were born at the facility and had congenital heart defects. All were aged <6 months when they developed C. auris bloodstream infections; 2 developed C. auris endocarditis. One patient died. Patients overlapped in the pediatric cardiac intensive care unit; 2 did not leave between birth and C. auris infection. Mobile medical equipment was shared between adult and pediatric patients; lapses in cleaning and disinfection of shared mobile medical equipment and environmental surfaces were observed, presenting opportunities for transmission. Overall, 32 environmental samples were collected, and C. auris was isolated from 2 specimens from an adult unit without current cases. One was a composite sample from an adult patient’s bed handles, railings, tray table and call buttons, and the second was from an adult lift-assistance device. WGS of specimens from adult and pediatric cases and environmental isolates were in the same genetic cluster, with 2–10 single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) different, supporting within-hospital transmission. The pediatric cases varied by 0–3 SNPs; at least 2 were highly related. Conclusions:C. auris was likely introduced to the pediatric population from adults via inadequately cleaned and disinfected mobile medical equipment. We made recommendations to ensure adequate cleaning and disinfection and implement monitoring and audits. No pediatric cases have been identified since. This investigation demonstrates transmission can occur between unrelated units and populations and that robust infection prevention and control practices throughout the facility are critical for reducing C. auris environmental burden and limiting transmission, including to previously unaffected vulnerable populations, like children.
Background:Candida auris is an emerging multidrug-resistant yeast that is transmitted in healthcare facilities and is associated with substantial morbidity and mortality. Environmental contamination is suspected to play an important role in transmission but additional information is needed to inform environmental cleaning recommendations to prevent spread. Methods: We conducted a multiregional (Chicago, IL; Irvine, CA) prospective study of environmental contamination associated with C. auris colonization of patients and residents of 4 long-term care facilities and 1 acute-care hospital. Participants were identified by screening or clinical cultures. Samples were collected from participants’ body sites (eg, nares, axillae, inguinal creases, palms and fingertips, and perianal skin) and their environment before room cleaning. Daily room cleaning and disinfection by facility environmental service workers was followed by targeted cleaning of high-touch surfaces by research staff using hydrogen peroxide wipes (see EPA-approved product for C. auris, List P). Samples were collected immediately after cleaning from high-touch surfaces and repeated at 4-hour intervals up to 12 hours. A pilot phase (n = 12 patients) was conducted to identify the value of testing specific high-touch surfaces to assess environmental contamination. High-yield surfaces were included in the full evaluation phase (n = 20 patients) (Fig. 1). Samples were submitted for semiquantitative culture of C. auris and other multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE), extended-spectrum β-lactamase–producing Enterobacterales (ESBLs), and carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales (CRE). Times to room surface contamination with C. auris and other MDROs after effective cleaning were analyzed. Results:Candida auris colonization was most frequently detected in the nares (72%) and palms and fingertips (72%). Cocolonization of body sites with other MDROs was common (Fig. 2). Surfaces located close to the patient were commonly recontaminated with C. auris by 4 hours after cleaning, including the overbed table (24%), bed handrail (24%), and TV remote or call button (19%). Environmental cocontamination was more common with resistant gram-positive organisms (MRSA and, VRE) than resistant gram-negative organisms (Fig. 3). C. auris was rarely detected on surfaces located outside a patient’s room (1 of 120 swabs; <1%). Conclusions: Environmental surfaces near C. auris–colonized patients were rapidly recontaminated after cleaning and disinfection. Cocolonization of skin and environment with other MDROs was common, with resistant gram-positive organisms predominating over gram-negative organisms on environmental surfaces. Limitations include lack of organism sequencing or typing to confirm environmental contamination was from the room resident. Rapid recontamination of environmental surfaces after manual cleaning and disinfection suggests that alternate mitigation strategies should be evaluated.
To stop transmission of hepatitis B virus (HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections in association with myocardial perfusion imaging (MPI) at a cardiology clinic.
Outbreak investigation and quasispecies analysis of HCV hypervariable region 1 genome.
Outpatient cardiology clinic.
Patients undergoing MPI.
Case patients met definitions for HBV or HCV infection. Cases were identified through surveillance registry cross-matching against clinic records and serological screening. Observations of clinic practices were performed.
During 2012–2014, 7 cases of HCV and 4 cases of HBV occurred in 4 distinct clusters among patients at a cardiology clinic. Among 3 case patients with HCV infection who had MPI on June 25, 2014, 2 had 98.48% genetic identity of HCV RNA. Among 4 case patients with HCV infection who had MPI on March 13, 2014, 3 had 96.96%–99.24% molecular identity of HCV RNA. Also, 2 clusters of 2 patients each with HBV infection had MPI on March 7, 2012, and December 4, 2014. Clinic staff reused saline vials for >1 patient. No infection control breaches were identified at the compounding pharmacy that supplied the clinic. Patients seen in clinic through March 27, 2015, were encouraged to seek testing for HBV, HCV, and human immunodeficiency virus. The clinic switched to all single-dose medications and single-use intravenous flushes on March 27, 2015, and no further cases were identified.
This prolonged healthcare-associated outbreak of HBV and HCV was most likely related to breaches in injection safety. Providers should follow injection safety guidelines in all practice settings.
Background: Trained infection prevention and control (IPC) practitioners are critical to reducing healthcare-associated infections (HAI) and improving patient safety. Despite having HAI rates 3 times higher than high-income countries, many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) lack trained IPC professionals. During the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS) recognized this need and appointed and trained IPC focal persons at all district hospitals. Following the outbreak, MoHS requested assistance from the US CDC to develop and implement a comprehensive IPC training program for IPC specialists. Methods: The CDC, alongside its partners, convened a multidisciplinary team to develop an IPC certificate course. ICAP led the curriculum development process using a “backwards design” approach, starting with development of competencies and learning objectives, then designing an evaluation framework and learning strategies, and finally, identifying course content. The curriculum was based on existing resources, primarily designed for high-income countries, which were adapted to the Sierra Leone context and aligned with national IPC policies and guidelines. Additionally, an IPC steering committee, led by MoHS, was established to provide national leadership and oversight and make country-level decisions regarding accreditation and career pathways for IPC specialists. Results: The course includes three 2-week workshops over 6 months consisting of classroom didactics and hands-on activities. Topics include standard and transmission-based precautions, microbiology, laboratory, HAI, quality improvement, leadership, and scientific writing. Between sessions, participants conduct IPC activities at their work site and share results during subsequent workshops. Participants receive electronic tablets, which contain course content, assessment tools, and references, to upload their work into a cloud-based storage system for facilitators to provide feedback. They also receive in-person mentorship and connect with peers through a group messaging platform to share lessons learned. Participants’ knowledge and skills are assessed using a before-and-after test and observing them perform IPC practices using standardized checklists. The first cohort of 25 participants will complete the course in November 2019. Conclusions: The IPC certificate course is the first comprehensive, competency-based IPC training in Sierra Leone. Successes, challenges, sustainability, and lessons learned remain to be determined; however, based on similar models, the course has the potential to significantly improve IPC in Sierra Leone. Additionally, it is a model that can be replicated in other resource-limited settings.
Background: Candidemia is associated with high morbidity and mortality. Although risk factors for candidemia and other bloodstream infections (BSIs) overlap, little is known about patient characteristics and the outcomes of polymicrobial infections. We used data from the CDC Emerging Infections Program (EIP) candidemia surveillance to describe polymicrobial candidemia infections and to assess clinical differences compared with Candida-only BSIs. Methods: During January 2017–December 2017 active, population-based candidemia surveillance was conducted in 45 counties in 9 states covering ~6% of the US population through the CDC EIP. A case was defined as a blood culture with Candida spp in a surveillance-area resident; a blood culture >30 days from the initial culture was considered a second case. Demographic and clinical characteristics were abstracted from medical records by trained EIP staff. We examined characteristics of polymicrobial cases, in which Candida and ≥1 non-Candida organism were isolated from a blood specimen on the same day, and compared these to Candida-only cases using logistic regression or t tests using SAS v 9.4 software. Results: Of the 1,221 candidemia cases identified during 2017, 215 (10.2%) were polymicrobial. Among polymicrobial cases, 50 (23%) involved ≥3 organisms. The most common non-Candida organisms were Staphylococcus epidermidis (n = 30, 14%), Enterococcus faecalis (n = 26, 12%), Enterococcus faecium (n = 17, 8%), and Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella pneumoniae, and Stenotrophomonas maltophilia (n = 15 each, 7%). Patients with polymicrobial cases were significantly younger than those with Candida-only cases (54.3 vs 60.7 years; P < .0004). Healthcare exposures commonly associated with candidemia like total parenteral nutrition (relative risk [RR], 0.82; 95% CI, 0.60–1.13) and surgery (RR, 0.99; 95% CI, 0.77–1.29) were similar between the 2 groups. Polymicrobial cases had shorter median time from admission to positive culture (1 vs 4 days, P < .001), were more commonly associated with injection drug use (RR, 1.95; 95% CI, 1.46–2.61), and were more likely to be community onset-healthcare associated (RR, 1.91; 95% CI, 1.50–2.44). Polymicrobial cases were associated with shorter hospitalization (14 vs 17 days; P = .031), less ICU care (RR, 0.7; 95% CI, 0.51–0.83), and lower mortality (RR, 0.7; 95% CI, 0.50–0.92). Conclusions: One in 10 candidemia cases were polymicrobial, with nearly one-quarter of those involving ≥3 organisms. Lower mortality among polymicrobial cases is surprising but may reflect the younger age and lower severity of infection of this population. Greater injection drug use, central venous catheter use, and long-term care exposures among polymicrobial cases suggest that injection or catheter practices play a role in these infections and may guide prevention opportunities.
Background: In 2015, the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Labor, Health and Social Affairs (MoLHSA) of Georgia identified infection prevention and control (IPC) as a top priority. Infection control legislation was adopted and compliance was made mandatory for licensure. Participation in the universal healthcare system requires facilities to have an IPC program and infrastructure. To support facilities to improve IPC, MoLHSA and the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC) requested assistance from the US CDC to revise the 2009 National IPC guidelines, which were translated versions of international guidelines and not adapted to the Georgian context. Methods: An IPC guideline technical working group (TWG), comprising clinical epidemiologists, IPC nurses, head nurses, and infectious diseases doctors from the NCDC, academic and healthcare organizations and the CDC was formed to lead the development of the national IPC guidelines. Additionally, an IPC steering committee was established to review and verify the guidelines’ compliance with applicable decrees and regulations. The TWG began work in April 2017 and was divided into 4 subgroups, each responsible for developing specific guideline topics. A general IPC guideline template for low- and middle-income countries was used to develop 7 of the guidelines. Additional reference materials and international guidelines were used to develop all the guidelines. Drafts were shared with the subgroups and the steering committee during 2 workshops to discuss unresolved technical issues and to validate the guidelines. Results: The revised guidelines consist of 18 topics. In addition to standard precautions (eg, hand hygiene, personal protective equipment, injection safety, etc) and transmission-based precautions, the guideline topics include laundry, environmental cleaning and disinfection, decontamination and sterilization, occupational health and safety, biosafety in clinical laboratory, blood bank and transfusion services, intensive care unit, emergency room, and mortuary. They do not include healthcare-associated infection surveillance or organism-specific guidance. To supplement the guidelines, a separate implementation manual was developed. The guidelines were approved by MoLHSA in October 2019. The TWG continues to be engaged in IPC activities, assisting with guideline rollout, training, and monitoring, and drafting the National IPC strategy and action plans. Conclusions: The Georgian Ministry of Health developed national IPC guidelines using local experts. This model can be replicated in other low- and middle-income countries that lack country-specific IPC guidelines. It can also be adapted to develop facility-level guidelines and standard operating procedures.
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