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The influence of the extant plays has been so immense and far-reaching that it is easy to forget that other tragic versions of these characters existed. This is true above all in the case of Euripides’ Medea, whose terrible, tortured act of infanticide is to many modern readers and audiences the single defining aspect of her tragic characterisation. The final chapter destabilises this preconception by drawing together evidence for the full range of tragic Medeas, including a play in which she is not guilty of the act that has come to define her, the killing of her own children. Wright recovers a more accurate picture of Medea on the tragic stage, and suggests that what ‘made Medea Medea’ for the ancient audiences was not her infanticide, but rather the sheer range and malleability of stories in which she featured. This survey offers an important corrective to widespread conceptions of this iconic figure, and powerfully demonstrates how the legacy of a single surviving version has distorted our understanding of the kinds of female characters with which ancient tragic audiences would have been familiar.
OBJECTIVES/GOALS: We use a tissue engineered, biomimetic, 3D model to study the pathogenesis of breast implant-associated anaplastic large cell lymphoma (BIA-ALCL) by comparing the effect of silicone implant shell on proliferation of patient-derived BIA-ALCL to its precursor T cells within the breast microenvironment. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: Patient-derived breast tissue was processed for component adipocytes, ductal organoids, and stromal vascular fraction. These were suspended within 50 µl of 0.3% type I collagen matrix to which was added 200,000 cells/mL of either patient-derived BIA-ALCL cells or T progenitor cells. These were then plated into 6mm wells. As a control, both BIA-ALCL cells and T progenitor cells were suspended within type I collagen alone at the same seeding density without breast components. Before plating, wells were lined circumferentially with either textured, smooth, or no implant shell. These were 1cm by 2cm pieces dissected from the whole implant. Wells were imaged using confocal microscopy over 8 days. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: Unstimulated T progenitor cell count showed no significant increase in any of the conditions tested. The change in cell count over 8 days was 3.85% in each condition (p = 0.3352). A Tukey’s multiple comparison test comparing each condition revealed no significant increase in cell count over 8 days for all six conditions. Notably, our previous studies have shown proliferation of BIA-ALCL cells to be significantly more robust in the biomimetic platform compared to collagen-only groups, regardless of implant shell type (p < 0.01). BIA-ALCL cells grew nearly 30% faster in textured and smooth shell biomimetic groups compared to biomimetic wells lacking implant shell. DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: Towards elucidating BIA-ALCL’s etiopathology, we show that silicone implant shell has a significant effect on proliferation of BIA-ALCL cells, but not their precursor T cells. If breast implant silicone shell is not a sufficient stimulus for T cell proliferation, co-stimulatory factors are required.
Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time1 begins with a famous anecdote about a “little old lady” who challenges a scientist’s public lecture on astronomy, insisting that in fact the earth is flat and rests on the back of a giant tortoise. When the scientist asks what holds the tortoise in its place, the lady is ready for him: “You’re very clever, young man, very clever … but it’s turtles all the way down!” Too often, it seems to us, both the guiding assumption and core insight of sociopsychological accounts of mass opinion is that “it’s groups all the way down.”
There is little doubt that, in the abstract, Americans are wary about the number of immigrants coming into the United States.1 Gallup began asking in 1965 whether the level of immigration should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. For most of the last half century, support for increasing immigration hovered in the single digits or low teens. As of 2019, it has never exceeded 30%.2 Wariness about rising levels of immigration is evident even when surveys clarify that they are asking about legal rather than illegal immigration, a distinction to which we return at length in Chapter 4. For example, a Fox News3 poll conducted in April 2013 asked a national sample “Do you think the United States should increase or decrease the number of LEGAL immigrants allowed to move to this country?” The majority, 55%, said the number should be decreased, compared to 28% who said it should be increased, with 10% volunteering that the number should not be change and 7% unsure. These numbers were little changed from earlier polls conducted in 2007 and 2010, though other time series do show marked increases in support for preserving and even increasing legal admissions in the last several years.4 Despite recent rises in public support for increasing immigration and drops in support for decreasing it, Peter Schuck’s pithy phrase remains true of a broad cross-section of the public: “Americans do not oppose immigration in principle, in general, or unalterably, but they do want less of it (or at least no higher).”5
In this chapter, we develop a framework for understanding how Americans’ opinions about immigration policy issues emerge from their conceptions of civic fairness. We then review leading theories of immigration attitudes that are premised on group-centrism, with an eye to considering (1) what questions they leave open about the relative influence of considerations rooted in political values and group allegiances and animosities, (2) what challenges they pose to the civic fairness framework, and (3) where they lay claim to empirical phenomena that could also be explained by conceptions of civic fairness. Finally, from this discussion we derive several hypotheses that guide the empirical tests in the chapters that follow. These hypotheses apply to situations where values collide with group loyalties to race and nation, which is to say instances in which the civic fairness and group-centrist perspectives make distinct predictions about what immigration policy alternatives Americans will choose.
What does a nation of immigrants want from its immigration policy, and why? The evidence from decades of public polling defies simple answers. Scholars and journalists reflexively label people as “pro-immigrant” or “anti-immigrant” and seek to situate them along a spectrum running between these two poles. But most Americans hold seemingly idiosyncratic mixes of “pro-” and “anti-immigrant” opinions across the range of controversies that make up contemporary immigration debates. Their opinions about specific policies routinely deviate from their more general feelings about immigrants and immigration and confound familiar explanations based on “economic” or “cultural” threat. Their views about different facets of immigration policy diverge to the point that the great majority of Americans at once endorse some policies that would greatly expand immigrant admissions and rights and others that would sharply curtail them.
Chapter 1 showed that much of the American public differentiates sharply between its views on the appropriate level of legal immigration and its views about how to address the status of the estimated 11 million illegal immigrants living in the United States. Americans certainly like legal immigration more than illegal immigration, and enforcement measures to stem the flow of illegal immigration or prompt some illegal immigrants to return to their countries of origin tend to be very popular as long as they do not involve heavy-handed or sweeping attempts at mass deportation.1 And illegal immigrants themselves are unfailingly viewed more “coldly” than immigrants generally. On the other hand, as we documented in Chapter 1, the most salient policy proposal for dealing with illegal immigrants already in the country – furnishing some sort of earned legal status or a “path to citizenship” for some or all in this group – receives overwhelming support in many polls.
The previous chapters demonstrated that liberal assimilationist norms are among the most powerful influences on American public opinion about immigration. Here, we examine two competing accounts of why this is so. As in the earlier chapters, we adjudicate between civic fairness and group-centrism. But having repeatedly shown that support for assimilation generally overrides ethnic group-centrism, we turn our attention to a different variety of group-centrism – one predicated on feelings of attachment to fellow members of the national ingroup and solidarity with immigrants who are seen as belonging within it.
Civic fairness and group-centrism both expect significant ethnic biases in White’s immigration policy opinions in everyday politics. What they differ on is why. Group-centric models tied to racial identities and prejudices argue that negative stereotypes flow out of defensiveness of white dominance and fear and loathing of minority groups. The civic fairness model argues that negative stereotypes may also serve a heuristic purpose for a far wider universe of people, “filling in the blanks” about whether immigrants are likely to meet criteria tied to civic fairness. Both of these interpretations imply that prejudice plays a role in the formation of opinions about immigration. They disagree about what kind of prejudice is at work: group-centric prejudice is motivated simply by one’s (explicit or implicit) dislike of Latinos, whereas civic fairness-driven prejudice occurs because people assume that Latinos violate civic fairness norms. Accordingly, our goal now is to illustrate how civic fairness plays a role in the anatomy of ethnic discrimination itself.
What do Americans want from immigration policy and why? In the rise of a polarized and acrimonious immigration debate, leading accounts see racial anxieties and disputes over the meaning of American nationhood coming to a head. The resurgence of parochial identities has breathed new life into old worries about the vulnerability of the American Creed. This book tells a different story, one in which creedal values remain hard at work in shaping ordinary Americans' judgements about immigration. Levy and Wright show that perceptions of civic fairness - based on multiple, often competing values deeply rooted in the country's political culture - are the dominant guideposts by which most Americans navigate immigration controversies most of the time and explain why so many Americans simultaneously hold a mix of pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant positions. The authors test the relevance and force of the theory over time and across issue domains.
Do increasing, and increasingly diverse, immigration flows lead to declining support for redistributive policy? This concern is pervasive in the literatures on immigration, multiculturalism and redistribution, and in public debate as well. The literature is nevertheless unable to disentangle the degree to which welfare chauvinism is related to (a) immigrant status or (b) ethnic difference. This paper reports on results from a web-based experiment designed to shed light on this issue. Representative samples from the United States, Quebec, and the “Rest-of-Canada” responded to a vignette in which a hypothetical social assistance recipient was presented as some combination of immigrant or not, and Caucasian or not. Results from the randomized manipulation suggest that while ethnic difference matters to welfare attitudes, in these countries it is immigrant status that matters most. These findings are discussed in light of the politics of diversity and recognition, and the capacity of national policies to address inequalities.