To assess experience, physical infrastructure, and capabilities of high-level isolation units (HLIUs) planning to participate in a 2018 global HLIU workshop hosted by the US National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center (NETEC).

An electronic survey elicited information on general HLIU organization, operating costs, staffing models, and infection control protocols of select global units.

The survey was distributed to site representatives of 22 HLIUs located in the United States, Europe, and Asia; 19 (86%) responded.

Data were coded and analyzed using descriptive statistics.

The mean annual reported budget for the 19 responding units was US$484,615. Most (89%) had treated a suspected or confirmed case of a high-consequence infectious disease. Reported composition of trained teams included a broad range of clinical and nonclinical roles. The mean number of HLIU beds was 6.37 (median, 4; range, 2–20) for adults and 4.23 (median, 2; range, 1–10) for children; however, capacity was dependent on pathogen.

Responding HLIUs represent some of the most experienced HLIUs in the world. Variation in reported unit infrastructure, capabilities, and procedures demonstrate the variety of HLIU approaches. A number of technical questions unique to HLIUs remain unanswered related to physical design, infection prevention and control procedures, and staffing and training. These key areas represent potential focal points for future evidence and practice guidelines. These data are important considerations for hospitals considering the design and development of HLIUs, and there is a need for continued global HLIU collaboration to define best practices.

This article describes implementation considerations for Ebola-related monitoring and movement restriction policies in the United States during the 2013–2016 West Africa Ebola epidemic.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and May 2017 with 30 individuals with direct knowledge of state-level Ebola policy development and implementation processes. Individuals represented 17 jurisdictions with variation in adherence to US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines, census region, predominant state political affiliation, and public health governance structures, as well as the CDC.

Interviewees reported substantial resource commitments required to implement Ebola monitoring and movement restriction policies. Movement restriction policies, including for quarantine, varied from voluntary to mandatory programs, and, occasionally, quarantine enforcement procedures lacked clarity.

Efforts to improve future monitoring and movement restriction policies may include addressing surge capacity to implement these programs, protocols for providing support to affected individuals, coordination with law enforcement, and guidance on varying approaches to movement restrictions.