This article addresses the manner in which accounts of profits are quantified when they are ordered against fiduciaries. Unlike previous scholarship, which has often sought to explain recent case law by reference to preconceived conceptual models, the present article addresses the topic by drawing on the reasoning adopted in the cases over a longer period, with a view to helping with the practical resolution of future cases, while also offering arguments drawn from that analysis as to the correct approach to the conceptual questions that arise.

This article considers the enforceability of arbitration clauses which are included in trust documentation. It focuses on two main questions. The first is whether internal trust disputes are capable of being settled by arbitration. The article offers arguments in favour of the arbitrability of such disputes. It then addresses the question of whether parties to an internal trust dispute can be forced to arbitrate, rather than litigate, where the trust documentation contains an arbitration clause. It is argued that there are real difficulties in the argument that such clauses can be enforced as arbitration agreements, under the ordinary arbitration statutes, but that the court could potentially enforce such a clause under its inherent jurisdiction to control its proceedings.

FHR bought a long lease for €211.5 million. Cedar Capital conducted the negotiations on FHR's behalf, but also received a €10 million commission from the vendor. On becoming aware of this commission, FHR sought to recover it from Cedar Capital. As its negotiating agent, Cedar Capital owed fiduciary duties to FHR, and had not obtained FHR's fully informed consent to the commission. Cedar Capital therefore had to account to FHR for the commission. However, applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch. 453, Simon J. held that the remedy was purely personal; FHR could not assert a proprietary constructive trust over the €10 million: FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2011] EWHC 2999 (Ch). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal as to remedy, distinguishing the facts from those in Sinclair v Versailles, but also casting some doubt on the correctness of that decision: [2013] EWCA Civ 17, [2014] Ch. 1. The Supreme Court was thus required to pass judgment on the voluminous debate as to whether English law should follow Lister & Co. v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, or Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 A.C. 324.

This article is concerned with the extent of a fiduciary's obligation to account for profits that have been made in breach of fiduciary duty. In particular, it responds to suggestions made recently by some senior judges that the courts ought to have a wide-ranging discretion to alter the degree to which a fiduciary must account for profits. It is well-settled that a fiduciary must account for profits that have been generated from his fiduciary position or in circumstances involving a conflict between the fiduciary's duty and his interest. The fiduciary need not account if the profit or conflict was properly authorised, in which case there was no breach of fiduciary duty. But in the absence of such authorisation, the fiduciary must account for all of the profit that has been made in breach of fiduciary duty, other than insofar as the court grants an equitable allowance to the fiduciary for work done in generating that profit. The question addressed here is whether the court ought to have a wider discretion to award an account of only part of the profits that a fiduciary has made in breach of fiduciary duty, leaving the remainder of the profits in the fiduciary's hands?

Documents or arrangements which have been falsely created will not be permitted to “prevent [a court] from getting at the real truth of the matter”: “if it [is] a mere cloak or screen for another transaction one [can] see through it”. Such documents or transactions are generally referred to as “shams”. The courts' ability to “see through” the false façade of a sham has been widely discussed in the context of documents or arrangements which purport to create licences, rather than leases, in an attempt to avoid statutory protections granted to residential lease-holders, and of transactions or arrangements which purport to avoid the payment of tax. However, there has been much less discussion of the way in which the concept of sham intersects with the law of trusts. The leading practitioner texts on trusts contain only short discussions, and the point has been discussed briefly in the practitioner literature. This article seeks to offer a broader, conceptual understanding of the way in which the sham doctrine applies to trusts.

INTito v. Waddell (No. 2), Megarry V.-C. famously described, and differentiated, the two dealing rules, the “self-dealing rule” and the “fair-dealing rule”, that apply to those occupying fiduciary positions: The self-dealing rule is … that if a trustee sells the trust property to himself, the sale is voidable by any beneficiary ex debito justitiae, however fair the transaction. The fair-dealing rule is … that if a trustee purchases the beneficial interest of any of his beneficiaries, the transaction is not voidable ex debito justitiae, but can be set aside by the beneficiary unless the trustee can show that he has taken no advantage of his position and has made full disclosure to the beneficiary, and that the transaction is fair and honest.