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Hip and knee arthroplasty infections are associated with considerable healthcare costs. The merits of reducing the postoperative surveillance period from 1 year to 90 days have been debated.
To report the first pan-Canadian hip and knee periprosthetic joint infection (PJI) rates and to describe the implications of a shorter (90-day) postoperative surveillance period.
Prospective surveillance for infection following hip and knee arthroplasty was conducted by hospitals participating in the Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program (CNISP) using standard surveillance definitions.
Overall hip and knee PJI rates were 1.64 and 1.52 per 100 procedures, respectively. Deep incisional and organ-space hip and knee PJI rates were 0.96 and 0.71, respectively. In total, 93% of hip PJIs and 92% of knee PJIs were identified within 90 days, with a median time to detection of 21 days. However, 11%–16% of deep incisional and organ-space infections were not detected within 90 days. This rate was reduced to 3%–4% at 180 days post procedure. Anaerobic and polymicrobial infections had the shortest median time from procedure to detection (17 and 18 days, respectively) compared with infections due to other microorganisms, including Staphylococcus aureus.
PJI rates were similar to those reported elsewhere, although differences in national surveillance systems limit direct comparisons. Our results suggest that a postoperative surveillance period of 90 days will detect the majority of PJIs; however, up to 16% of deep incisional and organ-space infections may be missed. Extending the surveillance period to 180 days could allow for a better estimate of disease burden.
An analysis of a cluster of New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase-l-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae (NDMl-Kp) and a retrospective case-cohort analysis of risk factors for acquisition in contacts of NDM1-Kp-positive patients.
A 1,100-bed Canadian academic tertiary care center.
Two index patients positive for NDMl-Kp as well as 45 contacts (roommates, ward mates, or environmental contacts) were investigated.
Retrospective chart reviews of all patients colonized or infected with NDM1-Kp as well as contacts of these patients were performed in order to describe the epidemiology and impact of infection prevention and control measures. A case-cohort analysis was conducted investigating 45 contacts of NDM1-Kp-positive patients to determine risk factors for acquisition of NDM1-Kp. Rectal swabs were screened for NDMl-Kp using chromogenic agar. Presence of blaNDM-1 was confirmed by multiplex polymerase chain reaction. Clonality was assessed with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) using restriction enzyme XbaI.
Two index cases carrying NDM1-Kp with different PFGE patterns were identified. Nosocomial transmission to 7 patients (4 roommates, 2 ward mates, and 1 environmental contact) was subsequenüy identified. Risk factors for acquisition of NDM1-Kp were a history of prior receipt of certain antibiotics (fluoroquinolones [odds ratio (OR), 16.8 (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.30-58.8); P = .005], trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole [OR, 11.3 (95% CI, 1.84-70.0); P = .01], and carbapenems [OR, 16.8 (95% CI, 1.79-157.3); P = .04]) and duration of exposure to NDM1-Kp-positive roommates (26.5 vs 6.7 days; P< .001).
Two distinct clones of NDM1-Kp were transmitted to 7 inpatient contacts over several months. Implementation of contact precautions, screening of contacts for NDM1-Kp carriage, and attention to environmental disinfection contributed to the interruption of subsequent spread of the organism. The appropriate duration and frequency of screening contacts of NDMl-Kp-positive patients require further study.
To review the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infection control practices, the types of exposure to patients with SARS, and the activities associated with treatment of such patients among healthcare workers (HCWs) who developed SARS in Toronto, Canada, after SARS-specific infection control precautions had been implemented.
A retrospective review of work logs and patient assignments, detailed review of medical records of patients with SARS, and comprehensive telephone-based interviews of HCWs who met the case definition for SARS after implementation of infection control precautions.
Seventeen HCWs from 6 hospitals developed disease that met the case definition for SARS after implementation of infection control precautions. These HCWs had a mean age ( ± SD) of 39 ± 2.3 years. Two HCWs were not interviewed because of illness. Of the remaining 15, only 9 (60%) reported that they had received formal infection control training. Thirteen HCWs (87%) were unsure of proper order in which personal protective equipment should be donned and doffed. Six HCWs (40%) reused items (eg, stethoscopes, goggles, and cleaning equipment) elsewhere on the ward after initial use in a room in which a patient with SARS was staying. Use of masks, gowns, gloves, and eyewear was inconsistent among HCWs. Eight (54%) reported that they were aware of a breach in infection control precautions. HCWs reported fatigue due to an increase number and length of shifts; participants worked a median of 10 shifts during the 10 days before onset of symptoms. Seven HCWs were involved in the intubation of a patient with SARS. One HCW died, and the remaining 16 recovered.
Multiple factors were likely responsible for SARS in these HCWs, including the performance of high-risk patient care procedures, inconsistent use of personal protective equipment, fatigue, and lack of adequate infection control training.
The four hospitals assessed in this study use active surveillance cultures for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and contact precautions for MRSA-positive patients as part of routine infection control practices. The objective of this study was to determine whether nosocomial acquisition of MRSA decreased in these hospitals during an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) when barrier precautions were routinely used for all patients.
Retrospective cohort study.
Three tertiary-care hospitals (a 1,100-bed hospital; a 500-bed hospital; and an 823-bed hospital) and a 430-bed community hospital, each located in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
All admitted patients were included.
The nosocomial rate of MRSA in all four hospitals combined during the SARS outbreak (3.7 per 10,000 patient-days) was not significantly different from that before (4.7 per 10,000 patient-days) or after (3.4 per 10,000 patient-days) the outbreak (P = .30 and P = .76, respectively). The nosocomial rate of MRSA after the outbreak was significantly lower than that before the outbreak (P = .003). Inappropriate reuse of gloves and gowns and failure to wash hands between patients on non-SARS wards were observed during the outbreak. Increased attention was paid to infection control education following the outbreak.
Inappropriate reuse of gloves and gowns and failure to wash hands between patients may have contributed to transmission of MRSA during the SARS outbreak. Attention should be paid to training healthcare workers regarding the appropriate use of precautions as a means to protect themselves and patients.
To identify risk factors associated with the development of surgical-site infection (SSI) following total knee arthroplasty (TKA).
A case-control study.
A 1,100-bed, university-affiliated, tertiary-care teaching hospital.
Case-patients with SSI occurring up to 1 year following primary TKA performed between January 1999 and December 2001 were identified prospectively by infection control practitioners using National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) System methods. Three control-patients were selected for each case-patient, matched by date of surgery. Stepwise logistic regression analysis was used to determine the relation of potential risk factors to the development of infection.
Twenty-two patients with infections (6 superficial and 16 deep) were identified. Infection rates per year were 0.95%, 1.07%, and 1.19% in 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively. Logistic regression analysis identified two variables independently associated with the development of infection: the use of closed suction drainage (odds ratio [OR], 7.0; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 2.1-25.0; P = .0015) and increased international normalized ratio (INR) (OR, 2.4; CI95, 1.1-5.7; P = .035). Factors not statistically associated with the development of infection included age, NNIS System risk index score, presence of various comorbidities, surgeon, duration of procedure or tourniquet time, type of bone cement or prosthesis used, or receipt of blood product transfusions.
The use of closed suction drainage and a high postoperative INR were associated with the development of SSI following TKA. Avoiding the use of surgical drains and careful monitoring of anticoagulant prophylaxis in patients undergoing TKA should reduce the risk of infection.
To describe the investigation and management of an outbreak due to multiresistant Acinetobacter baumannii and to determine risk factors for acquisition of the organism.
A 14-bed regional burn unit in a Canadian tertiary-care teaching hospital.
Case-control study with multivariate analysis of potential risk factors using logistic regression analysis. Surveillance cultures were obtained from the hospital environment, from noninfected patients, and from healthcare providers.
A total of 31 (13%) of 247 patients with acute burn injuries acquired multiresistant A. baumannii between December 1998 and March 2000; 18 (58%) of the patients were infected. The organism was recovered from the hospital environment and the hands of healthcare providers. Significant risk factors for acquisition of multiresistant A. baumannii were receipt of blood products (odds ratio [OR], 10.8; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 3.4 to 34.4; P < .001); procedures performed in the hydrotherapy room (OR, 4.1; CI95, 1.3 to 13.1; P = .02); and increased duration of mechanical ventilation (OR, 1.1 per day; CI95, 1.0 to 1.1; P=. 02).
Improved compliance with hand hygiene, strict patient isolation, meticulous environmental cleaning, and temporary closure of the unit to new admissions.
Acquisition of multiresistant A. baumannii was likely multifactorial, related to environmental contamination and contact with transiently colonized healthcare providers. Control measures addressing these potential sources of multiresistant A. baumannii were successful in terminating the outbreak. Ongoing surveillance and continued attention to hand hygiene and adequate environmental cleaning are essential to prevent recurrent outbreaks due to antibiotic-resistant bacteria in burn units.
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