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Brazil features regularly in global comparisons of large developing economies. Yet since the 1980s, the country has been caught in a low-level equilibrium, marked by lackluster growth and destructive inequality. One cause is the country's enduring commitment to a set of ideas and institutions labelled developmentalism. This book argues that developmentalism has endured, despite hyperactive reform, because institutional complementarities across economic and political spheres sustain and drive key actors and strategies that are individually advantageous, but collectively suboptimal. Although there has been incremental evolution in some institutions, complementarities across institutions sustain a pattern of 'decadent developmentalism' that swamps systemic change. Breaking new ground, Taylor shows how macroeconomic and microeconomic institutions are tightly interwoven with patterns of executive-legislative relations, bureaucratic autonomy, and oversight. His analysis of institutional complementarities across these five dimensions is relevant not only to Brazil but also to the broader study of comparative political economy.
Our aim was to develop a brief cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) protocol to augment treatment for social anxiety disorder (SAD). This protocol focused specifically upon fear of positive evaluation (FPE). To our knowledge, this is the first protocol that has been designed to systematically target FPE.
To test the feasibility of a brief (two-session) CBT protocol for FPE and report proof-of-principle data in the form of effect sizes.
Seven patients with a principal diagnosis of SAD were recruited to participate. Following a pre-treatment assessment, patients were randomized to either (a) an immediate CBT condition (n = 3), or (b) a comparable wait-list (WL) period (2 weeks; n = 4). Two WL patients also completed the CBT protocol following the WL period (delayed CBT condition). Patients completed follow-up assessments 1 week after completing the protocol.
A total of five patients completed the brief, FPE-specific CBT protocol (two of the seven patients were wait-listed only and did not complete delayed CBT). All five patients completed the protocol and provided 1-week follow-up data. CBT patients demonstrated large reductions in FPE-related concerns as well as overall social anxiety symptoms, whereas WL patients demonstrated an increase in FPE-related concerns.
Our brief FPE-specific CBT protocol is feasible to use and was associated with large FPE-specific and social anxiety symptom reductions. To our knowledge, this is the first treatment report that has focused on systematic treatment of FPE in patients with SAD. Our protocol warrants further controlled evaluation.
This chapter provides an overview of economic and behavioral economic approaches to behavior change. The chapter begins with a description of the traditional or neoclassical economic view of decision-making using expected utility theory as its basis. Attempts by an external party (e.g., a government or agency) to change behavior are viewed as justifiable in a limited number of circumstances, such as when there are externalities or coordination failures. When behavior change is warranted, neoclassical economics has focused on four options: provide information, increase incentives, reduce prices, or increase subsidies, or impose regulations. To be successful, the approach must change the net benefits of the promoted behavior. The chapter then describes the rationale behind behavioral economic approaches to behavior change, emphasizing the role that “nudges” play in behavior change. Examples are provided of common heuristics and associated decision errors that can result, and how nudges are designed to overcome these decision errors. The underlying rationale and steps for developing nudges are summarized. Current evidence suggests that some nudges can be effective in changing behavior, but more research is needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of many nudge strategies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the likely long-term impact of nudges in the field of behavior change.
Maternal obesity is an established risk factor for poor infant neurodevelopmental outcomes; however, the link between maternal weight and fetal development in utero is unknown. We investigated whether maternal obesity negatively influences fetal autonomic nervous system (ANS) development. Fetal heart rate variability (HRV) is an index of the ANS that is associated with neurodevelopmental outcomes in the infant. Maternal–fetal magnetocardiograms were recorded using a fetal biomagnetometer at 36 weeks (n = 46). Fetal HRV was represented by the standard deviation of sinus beat-to-beat intervals (SDNN). Maternal weight was measured at enrollment (12–20 weeks) and 36 weeks. The relationships between fetal HRV and maternal weight at both time points were modeled using adjusted ordinary least squares regression models. Higher maternal weight at enrollment and 36 weeks were associated with lower fetal HRV, an indicator of poorer ANS development. Further study is needed to better understand how maternal obesity influences fetal autonomic development and long-term neurodevelopmental outcomes.
There is little doubt about the customary character of the prohibition against torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In addition to being a core component of the Universal Declaration and the Covenant, the prohibition is found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 37(a)), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (Article 10), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Article 15). It also received extensive specialist treatment in the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), which led to State reporting to the Committee Against Torture, a source of inspiration to the Human Rights Committee when developing its revised General Comment 20 on Article 7.
The Charter of the United Nations ushered in a lasting global advance in the protection of human rights when in 1945 it pronounced a determination to ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’, and it made the solemn pledge to promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’. The Universal Declaration adopted just over three years later was a remarkable achievement in identifying and articulating for the first time the core set of rights warranting recognition, in spite of struggles by certain powers to cling to cherished aspects of their domestic systems. Those same rights were elaborated into binding form in a more challenging process over the ensuing eighteen years in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both adopted on the same day in December 1966 and known as ‘the twin Covenants’.
Article 24 was prompted by the realisation of how much the needs of children differ from those of adults. The purpose was to give the principles proclaimed in the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child status as legal norms binding on Covenant parties. There was some hesitance, however, because the Covenant’s provisions were to apply to all human beings, including children, and to dedicate a special article to children might raise doubts about this. Article 24 ultimately embodied the right ‘to such measures of protection as are required by [every child’s] status as a minor’.3 These are to be secured on the part of the child’s family, society and the State.
Article 26 was introduced in the chapter on Article 2. It enshrines a general right to equality before the law and, without discrimination, to the equal protection of the law. As a further stipulation applicable to equal protection, the law is required to prohibit discrimination and guarantee equal and effective protection against discrimination on the enumerated grounds. Equality before the law is intended to ensure equality in the application of the law, such as by courts or administrative bodies, to prevent arbitrariness. Equal protection of the law imposes a particular legislative burden on States. Most Article 26 individual petitions are under the equal protection limb. This chapter begins by differentiating the two.
Article 15 prohibits the retroactive application of criminal law, both in relation to criminal conviction (Article 15(1), first sentence) and greater severity of any sentence (second sentence). It also requires a more lenient penalty to be applied if one is introduced after the offence was committed (third sentence). Article 15(2) preserves the legitimacy of the trial and punishment of crimes ‘according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations’, prompted by concerns that the post-Second World War prosecution of war crimes may otherwise be called into question.
The right of peaceful assembly is ‘a fundamental human right, which is essential for public expression of one’s views and opinions and indispensable in a democratic society’. It is a distinct form of freedom of expression. As Humphrey put it, ‘[t]here would hardly be freedom of assembly in any real sense without freedom of expression; assembly is indeed a form of expression’. Similarly, to the Committee ‘the right of peaceful assembly … is a fundamental human right, being essential for public expression of one’s views and opinions and indispensable in a democratic society’.
Article 3 was introduced in discussion in the previous chapter, in sections ‘The Rights to Equality and Non-discrimination’ and ‘How the Key Equality and Non-Discrimination Provisions (Articles 2(1), 3 and 26) Differ from Each Other’.
The main Covenant provisions which prohibit discrimination based on sex are Article 2(1) (requiring States to ‘respect and ensure’ Covenant rights); Article 3 (referring to the ‘equal rights of men and women’ with respect to the enjoyment of Covenant rights (duplicating in large part the gender-specific coverage of Article 2(1))); and Article 26 (guaranteeing ‘equal’ protection of the law, and thereby ‘equal and effective protection against discrimination’ on grounds of sex).
The right to life is a jus cogens norm, described as ‘the supreme right of the human being’.
Article 6(1) opens by proclaiming ‘the inherent right to life’ of every human being. The guarantees in the two sentences which follow are that the right to life must be protected by law, and that that no one may be ‘arbitrarily’ deprived of life.