“Rational Shariah” is the name associated with Qābel’s worldview, which is explained in this chapter in the context of New Religious Thinking in Iran. The salient points of this worldview are examined, including the contextualization of Qurʾānic revelation, the“changeability” of verses, the sira ʿoqalā (or way of the wise), and contentious issues such as eating pork and drinking alcohol, and the criticism of contemporary juristic theory in Iran. This is conducted by a minute examination of his e-book and seminal work named Shariʿat-e ʿaqlāni, and it assesses the extent to which it is correct to label Qābel “excessive” in his jurisprudential worldview.

“Superstition” according to Qābel is any belief which does not have a logical or rational explanation. This resulted in him questioning many aspects of traditional Shiʿi belief, such as acceptance of Qurʾānic miracles. This is not to say that he denied miracles, simply that he explained them in an unconventional fashion, attempting to use cause and effect. The result was a very unusual and not entirely convincing conclusion. Moreover, his worldview of Rational Shariah also questioned traditional aspects of belief related to the Twelfth Imam in occultation. He rejected, without reservation, the claims made by President Ahmadinejād that there was some kind of contact or communication with the Hidden Imam. Moreover, he lambasted those who believed Ayatollah Khāmenei was infallible (a characteristic more commonly associated with the Imams). All of these beliefs were indicative of the superstition which the politicians attempted to use for their benefit. Qābel’s criticisms were well placed, but there is a certain incoherence in these arguments which demonstrates the limitation of Rational Shariah.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s a sociopolitical movement emerged in the Islamic Republic of Iran that flirted with notions of pluralism, democracy, and associated ideas such as freedom of thought and expression, gender equality, and choice in matters of religion and which rejected the monosemous rigidity propounded by a powerful clique known within Iran as “Principlists” (osul-garāyān).1 This reformist movement encompassed secular thinkers, lay religious intellectuals, politicians within the governmental structures, and recognized political parties which began to emerge at this time. More significantly, one of the strongest roots among reformists developed within the seminary (hawza), and clerical supporters in this movement regarded their aim as a legitimate expression of Islam. Ultimately, the various groups coalesced and became associated with the Green Movement, which emerged as a result of the perception that the presidential elections of 2009 had been rigged.

Demographic changes, globalization, and the war with Iraq (1980–88) resulted in a shift in how women in Iran articulated power relations. Qābel too added his voice to the debate about gender discrimination, and in 2004 he issued a fatwa that made the hijab desirable, rather than the state-endorsed, mandatory variety. But his espousal of women’s rights crossed other redlines; he believed in equality rather than complimentarity, that men should not beat their wives (in contradiction to common interpretations of Q. 4.34), and that women could act as prayer leaders in mixed congregations. This chapter examines how Qābel employed his Rational Shariah to make such far reaching conclusions.

Freedom of expression and freedom of belief have been burning issues in the Islamic Republic because they give an indication of the extent of support the has regime enjoyed. As a champion of reason and freedom Qābel instructed his readers to examine how sacred scripture dealt with the issues. In particular he focused on the issue of unbelief (kofr), and he argued that the original meaning was restircted, whereas it had been vastly expanded in subsequent years. His espousal of freedom of belief and expression endorsed freedom for non-Muslims, including atheists. He also discussed contentious issues suh as insulting the Prophet, and concluded that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda were no better than those in the West who defame the Prophet with “satirical” cartoons.

There has been a long tradition of seminarians (and former seminarians) who have argued for shariah reform based on a rational reading of sacred texts. This includes Jamāl al-Din Asadābādi (popularly known as al-Afghāni (d. 1897)), Shariʿat Sangalji (d. 1944), and Ahmad Kasravī (d. 1946). In many ways the trajectory of reform based on reason and logical argumentation is the consequence of the Osuli victory over Akhbāri literalism. The trend continued with the worldview of Ahmad Qābel, who advocated reform of “traditional” interpretations of Islam that made them compatible with modern human rights and reason, and which endorsed a form of religious secularity. The significance of Qābel’s vision of Islam lies both in its immediate Iranian context and the wider perspective of shariah in the Islamic world. In the Iranian context, Qābel constantly challenged the Principlists by crossing their redlines, such as velāyat-e faqih, hijab, their politicization of Imam Hosayn, and freedom of speech and belief, among others.

Velāyat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) is the political system governing Iran since 1979, and it was espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Montazeri in the early years of the revolution. This chapter discusses and analyzes the implications that this doctrine has with marjaʿiyat, the ideas surrounding the highest source of emulation and spirituality within Twelver Shiʿism. This chapter analyzes Qābel’s rejection of the political doctrine, and his relationships and perspsectives of the three most influentiual Ayatollahs during his life. Once again, Qābel was to cross the redline of what was acceptable in Iran by advocating a system that endorsed religious secularity.

In this biographical chapter Qābel’s life is divided into three stages: the early revolutionary years; the middle years when he received his ejtehād from his spiritiul mentor, Ayatollah Montazeri; and his final years which witnessed his more mature thoughts over a range of social, political, and religious issues. The chapter is written by examining the ten e-books which were largely assembled after his death. The main features of his works are also highlighted.

Imam Hosayn’s murder and defeat at Karbalā in 680 CE has resulted in a number of interpretations. The soteriological holds that veneration of Hosayn has salvific implications. However, this chapter focuses upon the politicization of Imam Hosayn from the early 1960s onward by looking at the speeches and works of Ayatollah Khomeini, Dr. ʿAli Shariʿati, and Ayatollah Mesbāh-Yazdi. Subsequently, the chapter turns to Qābel’s novel interpretation which rendered Hosayn a man of peace, eschewing any revolutionary view of creating an Islamic government. This chapter clearly demonstrates Qābel’s originality and his crossing of redlines.

Cultural erosion is one of the favorite topics of Ayatollah Khāmenei, and in order to protect Iran he endorsesd a prescriptive version of Islam over Iranian society, which Qābel characerized as a culture of sadness. He rejected both this and the mazhabi society and its rituals asociated with it. Moreover, he viewed the “Islamization” of the universities in Iran as nothing more than imposing gender segregation, which in reality did not achieve its goals. In explicitly articularting such criticisms, he crossed yet another redline in his advocacy of religious secularity. Indeed, his writings reveal that he considered the West more Islamic than Iran.