Most UK patent litigation takes place in England and Wales, where it is heard by either the Patents Court (larger, more complex and/or more valuable cases) or the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (smaller, less complex and/or less valuable cases). These are both specialised courts. It is normal in both courts for issues of infringement and validity of the patent to be heard together. The intellectual property bar in England and Wales consists of a considerable number of highly specialised and skilful advocates, most of whom have a Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) degree as well as a legal qualification. They are instructed by both large multinational firms and small boutique firms of lawyers, and they are well known for being innovative, particularly with regard to procedural questions. Although there is a reasonable volume of UK patent litigation, disputes concerning injunctions are relatively infrequent.

As Sir Richard Arnold capably explains elsewhere in this volume,2 when legislative changes are made to intellectual property laws, provision needs to be made for mediating discontinuities between the old and new regime. In the United Kingdom, this is typically done by so-called “transitional provisions,” which specify the extent to which the old law is maintained in relation to existing rights, interests and relationships, or how far (and from when) the new law becomes applicable. In intellectual property statutes, these typically provide that rights in existence before the change continue to subsist, and that rightholders benefit from expansion of rights but may be subject to broadened or altered exceptions and limitations. In EU law, general principles operate to produce similar effects (without the specific intervention of the legislator),3 though these are sometimes made explicit in EU IP legislation.4

Article 10(1) of the Berne Convention mandates a quotation exception that is broad in scope, one that is not limited by work, nor type of act, nor by purpose, and is only subject to the conditions in Article 10, namely, the work has been lawfully made available to the public, attribution, fair practice, and proportionality. We call this “global mandatory fair use.” This overlooked norm in international copyright law is unaffected by and distinct from the three-step test and, as such, potentially dislodges its dominance. In turn, this creates different possibilities for how to conceive of and assess copyright exceptions at the national level. To substantiate our argument, this chapter is structured in three parts.outlines our underpinning contention, namely, that Article 10(1) creates a global mandatory “fair use” type obligation.explains why this obligation is unaffected by the three-step test in international copyright law. Finally, in , we draw out the differences between Article 10(1) and the three-step test and illustrate the potential relevance of this for national law using the specific case of US “fair use.”

The single most important of the conditions for the availability of the exception is that the quotation be ‘compatible with fair practice’. As noted in Chapter 2, it was the introduction of the concept of fair practice that enabled the parties to agree on a quotation exception. Previous attempts to reach an international consensus, which had sought to limit quotation by reference to type of work, extent of taking or purpose had failed to provide a sufficiently flexible criterion. The concept of ‘fair practice’ (or ‘bons usages’) proved the magic solution.

Imagine an international instrument that does not merely oblige contracting parties to confer rights on copyright holders (permitting only optional, narrowly circumscribed, exceptions) but also mandates limitations. Imagine, too, that such an instrument requires parties to permit use of material that has been taken from existing works and incorporated in a later work, irrespective of the purpose of so doing, but only on the condition that the use is in accordance with fair practice. Imagine that the mandatory limitation allows the reuse of transformed versions of works, including parodies, and even the whole of a protected work. Imagine, indeed, a regime of global, mandatory, fair use.

An important starting point is our claim that Article 10 of the Berne Convention creates an obligation on Members of the Union to recognise a limitation on the copyright that allows for quotation. The proposition is based primarily on the language used: Article 10 begins with the words, ‘It shall be permissible … ’. This imperative language may be contrasted with Article 10(2) Berne, which, in relation to exceptions for education states: ‘It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union … to permit’. Similar permissive language is also found in Article 10bis in relation to reporting current events and Article 9(2), which allows exceptions to the reproduction right ‘in certain special cases’. The language of Article 10(1) is distinct and clearly reads as mandatory rather than permissive. Although there is barely any reference to the mandatory nature of the exception in the Stockholm travaux, the limitation is described in terms that reflect its basis in the entitlement of the user.

As has been argued, Article 10(1) Berne mandates a quotation exception that we describe as global, mandatory fair use. It is global because of the reach of Berne and TRIPS. It creates a mandatory exception because of the clear language of the provision and its travaux. It relates to ‘use’ that is not limited by type of work, type of act, or purpose and which ‘quotation’ should be understood broadly. Finally, it is ‘fair’ use because the conditions of Article 10 – namely, the work having been lawfully made available to the public, attribution, proportionality, and fair practice must be satisfied. In particular, the requirement of ‘fair practice’ embraces a range of normative considerations relating to economic and moral harm, distributive justice, freedom of expression and, in limited situations, custom.

Importantly, and in contrast with Article 10(2) and Article 10bis(2), the language of Article 10(1) Berne is not limited by purpose. It simply states ‘it shall be permissible to make quotations’. There is no limitation, even illustrative, such as ‘for purposes such as criticism or review’. Given that the provision is mandatory, it would thus be inappropriate for a Member to introduce any limiting purpose (or at least one which operates inflexibly). Quotation is permitted, if it complies with the remaining condition, whatever its purpose.

We turn now to the important question of what constitutes a ‘quotation’. Clearly, the breadth of the concept of ‘quotation’ will affect the scope of any quotation exception and so it is vital to identify what can be characterised as quotation. Our central argument in this chapter is that the concept of ‘quotation’ in Article 10(1) is far wider than the ‘typical’ case of textual quotation and that the attributes of ‘typical’ quotation must not be elevated to conditions for the availability of the exception.

In this chapter, we explore the history of Article 10(1) Berne, in order to enable the reader to understand the key stages in its evolution that inform or confirm our interpretation of the character and breadth of the provision. As we will see, several important features of Article 10(1) Berne, including the meaning, length and purpose of ‘quotation’, were explored as part of the travaux to the Stockholm revision of the Berne Convention. These travaux offer valuable guidance to clarify the meaning of the text (where its meaning is unclear) and to confirm a meaning deduced in the normal way from the ordinary meaning of the text, viewed in its context and in light of its object and purpose.

Until now, the international legal norm created by Article 10(1) Berne has been relatively dormant and its potential overlooked by scholars, policymakers, judges, practitioners and legislatures: it is now time to harness its potential in the shaping of permitted uses of copyright material. Moreover, despite its clear terms, only a minority of national legal systems have implemented Article 10(1) in full.