When, on 5 March 1824, British India formally declared war on the Burmese Empire, the Governor-General, Lord Amherst, strongly believed that this was to be a short defensive war with strictly limited ends. If all went well, the territorial results of such a war would be almost invisible, with little, if any, land passing under direct British control. In theory, the Burmese Empire, apart from the loss of some very recent conquests, would emerge almost unmarked, physically, from the contest. Not for Amherst were the grand plans for conquest or hegemony that moved a Wellesley or a Hastings. The end of the war, nearly two years later, not surprisingly, saw the Burmese lose most of their outlying possessions, and the British Empire correspondingly expanded. In view of the nature of the conflict in that two years, and the pressures built up during it, what is surprising is that the Burmese did not lose Pegu, that part of the Burmese Empire with which the British had had most contact, and had assessed as the richest province.