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25 results

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  • THE EURO–ARAB INVESTMENT TREATY THAT NEARLY WAS
  • Eileen Denza, Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen
  • Journal: International & Comparative Law Quarterly / Volume 69 / Issue 2 / April 2020
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 April 2020, pp. 267-299
  • Print publication: April 2020
  • View abstract

    This article documents how members of the European Economic Community and members of the Arab League negotiated a draft ‘mega-regional’ investment protection treaty from 1976 to the late 1980s—the first of its kind. The negotiations produced a full draft treaty and came tantalisingly close to completion but ultimately ran into the political sands. Had it been concluded, the Convention would have been the most significant investment protection treaty ever negotiated at the time, and one of the most significant to this day. Negotiations were conducted within the cloak of diplomatic confidentiality, however, so the effort has remained unknown to even specialised scholars and practitioners to this day.

Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy
  • Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy
  • The Politics of Investment Treaties in Developing Countries
  • Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen
  • Published online: 05 September 2015
  • Print publication: 21 August 2015
  • View description
    Modern investment treaties give private arbitrators power to determine whether governments should pay compensation to foreign investors for a wide range of sovereign acts. In recent years, particularly developing countries have incurred significant liabilities from investment treaty arbitration, which begs the question why they signed the treaties in the first place. Through a comprehensive and timely analysis, this book shows that governments in developing countries typically overestimated the economic benefits of investment treaties and practically ignored their risks. Rooted in insights on bounded rationality from behavioural psychology and economics, the analysis highlights how policy-makers often relied on inferential shortcuts when assessing the implications of the treaties, which resulted in systematic deviations from fully rational behaviour. This not only sheds new light on one of the most controversial legal regimes underwriting economic globalization but also provides a novel theoretical account of the often irrational, yet predictable, nature of economic diplomacy.

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