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Since July 1996, 815 new names on features on bodies in the Solar System have been assigned by the WGPSN and approved at the IAU General Assembly in Kyoto in 1997. Of these names, 666 were for Venus, 17 for Mars, 3 for the Moon, 125 for the Galilean satellites, 3 for the Uranian satellite Miranda, and 1 for the minor planet Ida. 71 additional names mostly on Venus have been selected and have been given or are awaiting provisional approval by the IAU Executive Committee (EC). These names are up for final approval at the next IAU General Assembly.
This paper presents research funded under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) MetaMaterials program for design and development of nanoparticle based, mesoscale electromagnetic and optical materials. Specifically, we present results of formulation and near infrared measurement-model validation for photoassisted, self-assembled multilayer metallic nanoparticle films. The multilayer films may be used as optical filters and absorbers. We demonstrate that nanoparticles can be formed in advanced polymer films that exhibit new electromagnetic constitutive properties. Metal nanoparticle films are produced from a single homogeneous resin containing a soluble precursor. Films cast from doped resins are exposed to UV radiation followed by a controlled thermal cure. The combination of UV exposure and thermal curing creates a multiphase material composed of low volume fractions of dispersed metallic Pd clusters (10–20 nm in size) and high concentrations of Pd nanoparticles which form surface and embedded metallic layers in the films. The layer separation is a function of UV exposure. These materials show significant absorption in the optical and near IR region of the spectrum. Furthermore, these films exhibit mechanical properties similar to bi-metallic layers, specifically, the films display reversible bending with exposure to light and an accompanying rapid temperature increase. This paper presents formulation processes, optical-mechanical measurements and measurement model comparison.
Controlled-shape BaTiO3-based microparticles were synthesized with the use of diatom microshells (frustules) as templates. The SiO2-based frustules of Aulacoseira diatoms were first converted into MgO-based replicas via a gas/solid displacement reaction at 900°C. A BaTiO3 coating was then applied to the MgO-bearing frustules by a sol-gel process. After firing at 700°C for 1.5 h, a conformal nanocrystalline coating of BaTiO3was generated on the surfaces of the MgO-bearing frustules. The underlying MgO scaffolds were then selectively dissolved away to yield freestanding 3-D BaTiO3-based replicas of the original Aulacoseira diatom frustules. This work demonstrates that microparticles with well-controlled 3-D morphologies and non-natural multicomponent ceramic compositions can be produced by merging the self-assembly ability of biomineralizing micro-organisms with synthetic chemical tailoring.
The three-dimensional nanostructured SiO2-based microshells of diatoms have been converted into nanocrystalline BaTiO3 via a series of shape-preserving reactions. The microshells, obtained as diatomaceous earth, were first exposed to a surfactant-induced dissolution/reprecipitation process [C.E. Fowler, et al., Chem. Phys. Lett.398, 414 (2004)] to enhance the microshell surface area, without altering the microshell shape. The SiO2 microshells were then converted into anatase TiO2 replicas via reaction with TiF4 gas and then humid oxygen. Hydrothermal reaction with a barium hydroxide-bearing solution then yielded three-dimensional nanocrystalline microshell replicas composed of BaTiO3. The enhanced surface area of the surfactant-treated microshells resulted in faster conversion into phase-pure BaTiO3 at 100 °C.
As one-third would go out triennially, there would always be divisions holding their places for unequal terms and consequently acting under the influence of different views and different impulses.
James Madison Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787
Among those “different views and different impulses” is the impulse to campaign for reelection. In a cyclical view of the matter, the impulse would be strongest in the class for which election day was closest at hand.
Richard F. Fenno The United States Senate: A Bicameral Perspective
Political scientists have devoted substantial energy to describing the roles played by the major political parties as well as political action committees (PACs) in funding congressional campaigns. Mirroring the assumption succinctly expressed by Madison in The Federalist Number 10 that self-interest motivates political behavior, the national parties and PACs have a strong incentive to provide financial support to their preferred candidates (Herrnson, 1989; Eismeier and Pollack, 1986a, 1986b). Under existing campaign regulations, we can readily observe similar benefit-seeking behavior among politicians, especially incumbents who attempt to exploit their office to garner financial support (Jacobson, 1989; Sabato, 1985). Although a myriad of factors may influence the ability of incumbents to acquire campaign contributions (see Munger, 1989; Poole and Romer, 1985; Gopoian, 1984), the conventional wisdom and empirical research suggest the motivation for legislators to engage in those market exchanges is primarily to protect their reelection prospects (Fiorina, 1989; Mayhew, 1974).
In recent years the more prominent face of the Senate has been its individualistic one. The contemporary institution is a collection of entrepreneurs, each one in business for himself or herself, each one with a personal agenda and goals.
Richard F. Fenno Learning to Legislate: The Senate Education of Arlen Specter
The contemporary debate that surrounds the conduct of congressional elections has its origins in an enduring argument about the importance of money in politics. Among his numerous sage observations about the American political scene, the late Samuel Clemens noted, “Ours is the best Congress money can buy!“ Nonetheless, although a burgeoning literature has emerged examining campaign contributions from organized interests, the lack of a robust, theoretical paradigm that accounts for the dynamics of legislator and interest-group interaction in the context of funding elections is troubling. Arguments over the nature and consequences of proposed changes in the approach to financing congressional elections are often waged without an underlying point of theoretical reference. Reform proposals are presented and bandied about with little consideration for their impacts relative to each other, or collectively, on the political system.
This volume seeks to provide a theoretical yardstick for evaluating those proposals. We contend that the behavior of legislators in seeking financial support for their reelection campaigns can be viewed in the same fashion as profit-seeking firms. Senators are members of a highly exclusive legislative body, whose policy imperatives have farreaching economic and social consequences.
When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or the ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to the common interest of the people, the legislative is altered: for, if others than those whom society hath authorized thereunto, do chuse, or in another way than what society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people.
John Locke The Two Treatises of Government
Adequate and fair representation has been at the center of the democratic debate in the United States since the Founding. In the intervening two centuries, a variety of disputes have arisen regarding the representative nature of the system, often attacking its real or perceived inequitable outcomes. Although the struggle for electoral participation by women and minorities has dominated the debate over representative democracy in the United States since the Civil War, how money affects elections and, therefore, the creation of public policy is also an important question. In this volume, we examine the role of money in campaigns for the contemporary U.S. Senate. Given the centrality of the Senate in policy making, combined with the tremendous powers enjoyed by individual Senators, it is appropriate to delineate the role played by money in contemporary Senate elections. In order to fully test the impact of rent seeking in the campaign-finance system on the political system, we also examine how rent-seeking behavior affects electoral outcomes.
Each, in consequence, has a greater regard for his own safety or happiness, than for the safety or happiness of others; and, where these come in opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own.
John C. Calhoun Disquisition on Government
Personal abuse, constant tension, limited financial return, disorganized and dislocated personal life, and a multitude of uncertainties all serve to discourage good men from service in Congress.
Former Congressman Frank E. Smith Congressman From Mississippi
Economists have long held that potentially contestable assets will attract investment in direct proportion to their production capabilities. A standard assumption in the public choice literature is that the relationship between politicians and economic interests can be modeled in a manner similar to market exchanges. Presumably, politicians are in a position to extract rents from interested parties by providing selected benefits such as regulatory policies favorable to industry or other stakeholders in the political process. Our analysis demonstrates how the concept of rent seeking enhances understanding of political-action-committee (PAC) strategies, since PACs possess the capability of allocating financial resources to candidates as differential rents. Among legislators, the ability to produce policy outputs for particularized interests can be viewed as an exercise that allows members to place an implicit price on outputs. Benefit-seeking interests can bid for outputs in an effort to gain additional remuneration in the market through government subsidy or other implicit wealth transfer, such as monopoly regulation.
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, [which] grow up of necessity in civilized nations and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
James Madison Federalist, Number 10
The previous chapter demonstrated the encroachment of rent-seeking behavior throughout the Senate term and identified indicators of efficiency in rent seeking by Senators. In this chapter, we analyze the allocations of economic interests to incumbent Senators through political-action-committee (PAC) contributions. In particular, we are concerned with identifying the sources from which Senators obtain their rents and identifying the criteria by which PACs allocate campaign contributions as variable benefits.
Rent provision by economic interests
In order to examine the subtleties of the relationships between legislators and organized interests in the context of rent seeking, it is important to delineate the constraints and facilities that will affect a legislator's ability to garner rents. Presumably, organized interests seek the lowest-cost, highest-yield providers of policy options. The degree to which a legislator can provide sufficient policy to an interest at a competitive price with other members of the policy oligopoly will dictate the amount of rents the legislator will obtain in the aggregate. Therefore, member attributes that affect the costs of providing different types of policy should influence the decision by cash-providing interests to provide substantial rents to that member.
Targeting rent provision by major interests
Other factors impact on the ability of legislators to provide policy outputs to benefit-seeking interests.
A central political issue in American politics during the 1990s is the need for political campaign reform. The authors examine US Senate elections to determine the role money plays in Senate elections; their analysis indicates that the system of campaign finance resembles a market, with legislators as the recipients of financial largesse based on their institutional positions and political vulnerability. This rent-seeking relationship between economic interests and legislators has transformed the dynamic of Senate elections. The authors assess the potential impact of several electoral reform proposals. Spending limits and public funding proposals, they argue, will not have the impact expected by reform advocates. Term limit and public funding proposals would disrupt the rent-seeking relationship between legislators and economic interests. These proposals also face political and constitutional barriers to implementation.