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29 results

Page 1 of 2

  • 2 - Freedom and Ethical Necessity

  • Edited by James A. Clarke, University of York, Gabriel Gottlieb
  • Book:
    Practical Philosophy from Kant to Hegel
    Published online:
    16 March 2021
    Print publication:
    18 March 2021, pp 28-44

  • Summary

    The paper examines a set of critical arguments presented by Johann August Heinrich Ulrich in his 1788 book Eleutheriology or On Freedom and Necessity against Kant’s conception of transcendental freedom and the categorical nature of moral imperatives. Ulrich’s arguments are worth examining for a number of reasons. Historically, his criticism of transcendental freedom is of interest partly for its novel interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason and partly for the use he makes of it in presenting an early version of the so-called problem of luck, which features centrally in the contemporary discussion of libertarian accounts of freedom. Structurally, Ulrich’s criticisms cleverly target the delicate balance Kant seeks to establish between transcendental freedom and the moral “ought” and help bring into view the relations between practical and theoretical claims in Kant’s defense of transcendental freedom. I argue that a Kantian response to Ulrich’s criticism of transcendental freedom is possible and that the basis for Ulrich’s rejection of Kantian categoricity – a naturalistic conception of ethical necessity – is flawed. By the same token, however, my argument shows the importance of Ulrich’s book when it comes to engaging with Kant’s philosophy.

  • Hegel on Addiction

  • Katerina Deligiorgi
  • Journal:
    Hegel Bulletin / Volume 40 / Issue 3 / December 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    29 March 2019, pp. 398-424
    Print publication:
    December 2019

  • The aim of this paper is to show how certain distinctive elements of Hegel's theory of action can provide a fresh philosophical perspective on the phenomenon of addiction. What motivates the turn to Hegel is a set of puzzles that arise out of contemporary medical and philosophical discussions of addiction. Starting with questions concerning ongoing attempts to define addiction, the paper examines the resources needed for addiction to be classed as a disorder, as it commonly is. Provisionally settling with the notion of akrasia, the paper turns to Hegel for a theory of agency that fills in the gaps of the account of akrasia used in the contemporary literature on addiction and helps resolve the puzzles that occasioned the paper.

Hegel
  • New Directions
  • Edited by Katerina Deligiorgi
  • Published by:
    Acumen Publishing
    Published online:
    05 February 2013
    Print publication:
    30 June 2006
  • Over the last decade renewed interest in Hegel's thought and its legacy, especially in Anglo-American philosophy, has combined with the publication of new critical editions of his work in German to underline the value of Hegel for contemporary philosophy. Hegel: New Directions takes stock of this re-evaluation and presents an assessment of current thinking on this seminal philosopher. In his volume, leading scholars, who have spearheaded the reappraisal, bring the history of philosophy into dialogue with contemporary philosophical questions. Drawing on a broad range of themes, the essays offer a critical and stimulating guide to Hegel's thought, whilst addressing central questions of recent philosophy in epistemology, ethics, political and social theory, religion, and aesthetics.

  • Introduction: On reading Hegel today

  • Edited by Katerina Deligiorgi, University of Sussex
  • Book:
    Hegel
    Published by:
    Acumen Publishing
    Published online:
    05 February 2013
    Print publication:
    30 June 2006, pp 1-16

  • Summary

    Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts.

    Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 11

    What is a timely reading of Hegel? In what ways does Hegel's philosophy speak to current concerns? These are the guiding questions for the essays gathered in this volume, which explore different aspects of Hegel's thought in the context of contemporary philosophical debates. The thematic range and variety of perspectives represented here are signs of the fertility of the continuing engagement with his ideas. It is the purpose of this Introduction to examine the reasons for this sustained interest and to look at some of the different ways in which Hegel is read today.

    Agreement about Hegel's lasting significance is more easily secured than agreement about the nature of his achievement. There is little dispute over the plurality of projects – including monism, pluralism, metaphysical apriorism and pragmatism – that have claimed Hegelian inspiration. Such variety of interpretation is intimately related to the critical animus that continues to pervade evaluations of his legacy today. A clear lesson to be drawn from the reception history of Hegel's thought is that opposition to his ideas has been a vital force in instigating renewed engagement with his philosophy. This, in turn, goes some way towards explaining the diversity of approaches to his work. The question “why his constituency of friends and foes is so heterogeneous?” (Stern 2002: xii) must be addressed alongside the question why Hegel is the thinker “with the best and the worst reputation” (Pinkard 2002: 217).

  • Kant, Hegel, and the Bounds of Thought

  • Katerina Deligiorgi
  • Journal:
    Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain / Volume 23 / Issue 1-2 / January 2002
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    23 June 2015, pp. 56-71
    Print publication:
    January 2002
    • Article
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  • Hegel's relation to Kant is often portrayed in terms of epistemic impatience. For W.H. Walsh, for example, whereas Kant seeks to ‘demonstrate that certain kinds of thing [cannot] be objects of human knowledge’, and thus that there are ‘limits to men's cognitive aspirations’, Hegel issues the ‘demand that thought be free to range unchecked wherever it chooses’ and claims the ‘Absolute’ as an object of human knowledge. There are two flaws in this standard account. First, it underestimates the cognitive confidence of Kant's project of a critique of pure reason. Central to this project is the idea that reason has the resources to adjudicate its own claims and thus to know itself. Second, it neglects Hegel's conception of dialectic as the inner discipline of thought. I shall deal with each of these issues in turn. The first part of the paper examines the intellectual commitments entailed by the very idea of a critique of pure reason; the second part addresses the boundary-determining function of dialectic. A fuller understanding of what is meant by ‘critique’ and ‘dialectic’ should enable us not only to re-assess Hegel's relation to Kant, but also to retrieve their shared conception of philosophical reflection as rational self-knowledge. The aim of this paper therefore is to highlight the common ground between the two projects, rather than to emphasise their critical distance. I seek to show that Hegel shares Kant's conviction that ‘philosophy consists in knowing its bounds’ (seine Grenzen zu kennen), even though he accords such knowledge a different status from Kant.

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