We study the capital structure changes of drug firms after an investment-opportunity shock brought about by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that the shock led drug firms to make their capital structures less constraining by decreasing leverage, shortening debt maturity, increasing unsecured debt, and reducing convertible debt. New debt covenants became less restrictive and firms raised equity to preserve borrowing capacity. Our results support the view that firms actively manage their capital structures to bolster financial flexibility and increase debt capacity in response to new investment opportunities.

This study investigates whether investors see through materially misstated earnings, and whether they anticipate earnings restatements. For firms that restate at least one annual report, we find that investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings at the time of initial earnings announcements. Investors react positively to the component of the favorable earnings surprise that will subsequently be restated, and they attach the same valuation to it as to the true earnings surprise. We also find that investors anticipate the subsequent downward restatements and start marking stock prices down several months before a restatement announcement, so that the full impact of a restatement is about three times as large as the restatement announcement effect. Indeed, we show that investors punish restating firms because the stock price gains that shareholders enjoy when firms initially announce overstated earnings are more than reversed by the time of the restatement announcement.

Do threats of pharmaceutical price regulation affect subsequent research and development (R&D) spending? This study uses the Clinton administration’s Health Security Act (HSA) of 1993 as a natural experiment to study this issue. We link events surrounding the HSA to pharmaceutical stock price changes and then examine the cross-sectional relation between firms’ stock price changes and their subsequent unexpected R&D spending changes. Results show that the HSA had significant negative effects on stock prices and firm-level R&D spending. Conservatively, the HSA reduced R&D spending by about $1 billion even though it never became law.

There is a great deal of misinformation surrounding the economics of pharmaceutical importation and price regulation. Among economists, the principles governing the relationships between prices, innovation, and pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) investment are incontrovertible. Unfortunately, faulty, non-economic analyses abound on these fundamental relationships, reinforcing economic illiteracy and leading to unfounded U.S. public policy.

Effective public policy debate requires that all parties to the debate be informed and aware of the potential costs and benefits associated with new policies, or changes in existing policies. This has not yet occurred for pharmaceutical importation and price regulation policy. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide a positive (in contrast to a normative) economic analysis of pharmaceutical importation and price regulation.

Recent models of herding suggest that speculators may rationally trade on information unrelated to fundamentals when their trading horizons are short. This study provides an empirical example where this appears to be the case. Johnson Redbook's weekly retail sales figures predicted bond returns for a short time after a significant number of bond traders began purchasing and trading on the data. The significant relationship between the data and bond returns disappeared just after the Wall Street Journal started to report it. Meanwhile, there was little or no change in the relationship between the data and retailers' stock returns, perhaps because the data have long been followed by retail stock analysts, Johnson Redbook's original investor clientele.

This paper develops a specialized principal-agent model of the investor-investment advisor relationship and embeds the standard advisory compensation schedule in the model. Advisors are endowed with information-gathering abilities and investors are endowed with funds. Information-gathering services are traded indirectly through the investor's receipt of portfolio returns net of advisory fees. Model results show that the parameters of the compensation schedule are both a function of the idiosyncracies of an advisor's information services and the degree of risk sharing between the advisor and investor. Several predictions of the model are supported using data on mutual fund advisors. Unsupported predictions may be due to self-selection of advisors by risk tolerance.