Chapter Five discusses two things. First, it looks at the aftermath of the Futian Rebellion and at Xiang Ying’s efforts to calm things down. Xiang’s efforts were soon reversed by the arrival of the “three person group,” which implemented the radical new line coming out of the Comintern. Zhou Enlai would later try to control the sufan movement, but new leadership (Bo Gu) and the pressing need for soldiers and money would reignite efforts to suppress so-called counterrevolutionaries. Second, the chapter looks briefly at the Eyuwan Revolutionary Base Area, north of the Yangzi river, to show that the same logic of sufan applied there as well.

Up to this point the book has followed the development of the Donggu Revolutionary Base Area on the one hand and Mao’s efforts to build a party-army on the other. In Chapter Four these two strands of the story come together violently. Mao is determined to purge the southwest Jiangxi party organizations of all landlords and rich peasants. Soon an “AB (anti-Bolshevik) Corps” is “discovered,” even though it is nonexistent. Hundreds of people (Communist Party members) are tortured and killed. The culmination of this campaign is the Futian Rebellion.

The Conclusion reviews the arguments made in the previous chapters and argues the importance of the Donggu Revolutionary Base Area for understanding the Chinese revolution. It is impossible to ignore the conflicts between the local interests of the Donggu revolutionaries and Mao’s efforts to create a national revolution. It is also impossible to ignore the conflict between the Communist movement’s need for soldiers and money and the unwillingness of local society to provide either in sufficient quantity.

Chapter Two lays out the history of the Donggu Revolutionary Base Area. It emphasizes some of the unique characteristics of this place – its relative isolation nestled in the mountainous countryside of eastern Ji’an county, the close ties among a number of classmates, and the ties of kinship that made their alliance with local bandits possible. This core leadership group was able to stay together even after their original leader, Lai Jingbang, was killed. Lai was replaced by Li Wenlin, a graduate of Whampoa Military Academy, who led the Donggu Revolutionary Base area to expand to cover some 24 townships in the area.

This conflict led to a bloody purge of local Communists. Moreover, the “suppression of counterrevolutionaries” did not stop but continued and deepened when the Communist leadership moved from Shanghai to Jiangxi.

The Introduction lays out the basic theses of the book: that it was local revolutionaries, not Mao, who introduced Marxism and, more importantly, political organization, to the countryside, but Mao suppressed these local movements. Moreover, the party was remade by Mao as a far more hierarchical, disciplined, violent, and militarized party than anything imagined in 1927.

Chapter Three lays out Mao Zedong’s determination to build a revolutionary army. Party policy at the time argued for mobilizing the masses and the party leadership thought that Mao’s approach was too militaristic. Mao and Zhu De came into conflict over the scope of party control, and Mao was voted out. Zhou Enlai backed Mao, and he was restored to his position. The chapter ends with the Gutian Conference, at which Mao asserted his dominance over the military.

This final chapter looks closely at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017. This was a remarkable congress; there had not been such extensive personnel change since Deng Xiaoping took over from Hua Guofeng. Of greatest significance was the personalization of power as Xi elevated two allies to the Politburo who had never served on the Central Committee, as well as four other allies who were promoted from the alternate list of the Central Committee. China had generally avoided such “helicopter promotions” since the Maoist period, but here they were again, underlining the lack of institutionalization and the inability of party institutions to constrain Xi. At the same time, we have seen a renewed emphasis on ideology, combined with nationalism, as Xi has sought to reinvigorate Leninism. Can such a reinvigorated Leninism successfully fight the pathologies looked at in Chapter 4?