Corruption is a current and complex problem with significant effects on trade. For example, at the time of writing the US Justice Department was intervening in a case against a large a pharmaceutical company. It was alleged that the company was responsible for a scheme of drug price increases in the US, as it “ … bribed doctors and their staffs to increase sales.” The price of the drug, addressing infant seizure disorder, had increased 97,000% since the year 2000. Also, many of the affected sales were driven by Medicare reimbursements.1 This case suggests that corruption may:Corruption is also a concern in a global perspective. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres, when addressing the UN Security Council on the issue of corruption in post-war territories, stated that “Corruption robs schools, hospitals and others of vitally needed funds,” with negative effects on people’s rights, foreign investment, and the economy. Based on the World Economic Forum, the cost of corruption is at least $2.6 trillion, or five percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP). According to the World Bank, businesses and individuals pay more than $1 trillion in bribes every year.2 Finally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), through its Clean Government Initiative, has identified at least four negative effects of corruption, namely:The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) builds upon international instruments on corruption. It addresses them differently, by adhering to their principles, encouraging their observance, or mandating their ratification or accession. The list of instruments includes (Art. 26.6)

The Chapter on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (formerly Trans-Pacific Partnership) complements the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO TBT Agreement) and can only be read in light of the TBT WTO rules, bodies, jurisprudence and practice. The CPTPP TBT Chapter incorporates (through Art. 8.4) the most relevant provision of the WTO TBT Agreement. But it clarifies that the CPTPP dispute settlement system may not be used on claims exclusively based on the WTO agreement. The definitions developed in the WTO TBT Agreement have also been incorporated into the Chapter (Art. 8.1.1).

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) market for textiles is large. For example, the eleven Parties – without the US – buy 21% of world imports under Harmonized System (HS) Chapter 60 comprising knitted or crocheted fabrics (Table 8.2). Chapter 60 includes both final products and components in a vast range of goods. In other words, a producer in the CPTPP zone able to meet the rule of origin for Chapter 60 will automatically obtain preferential access (lower import taxes and simplified procedures) to 20% of the world buyers. This can boost both domestic and foreign investment.

International trade is multidisciplinary with a large variety of stakeholders. This book, a chapter-by-chapter assessment of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP; earlier the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP), follows this reality. By assessing and digesting each CPTPP chapter, the book focuses on the practical implications of this modern free trade agreement.

This contribution is about Mexico's decisions on whether or not to use those provisions in international trade law, both multilateral and regional (WTO and preferential trade agreements), allowing it to retaliate. I analyse only cases where Mexico is the complainant. It has been faced with a decision five times on whether or not to take retaliation.

Section 1 presents the observations and provides the relevant data. Those cases where Mexico decided to retaliate allow us to measure the extent to which this choice enhanced the complainant's bargaining power. Also, it presents the selection of goods Mexico chose for retaliation. The cases where Mexico decided not to retaliate complement the picture by providing the political economy considerations. Section 2 presents our analysis of the data. We argue that the chocolate cake scenario – the defendant retains more chocolate by facing retaliation than by complying with the law of the contract or compensating otherwise – significantly diminishes the effectiveness of retaliation and provides negative economic incentives for compliance and compensation. The sensitivity of the goods/services subject to the dispute influences the position of the defendant and this has a direct impact on the use or otherwise of retaliation and on the outcome of the case. But more data would be needed to better understand how far this conclusion can be taken. Also, Mexico decided not to resort to retaliation in a number of cases, preferring a more amicable position, where the defendant has greater control of the outcome. The contribution also touches upon the selection of the goods subject to retaliatory measures and presents some relevant considerations.