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This chapter rounds off Section 2. In it, one of the authors, Jonathan Montgomery, begins by highlighting his view of the recurrent themes that arise from all eight chapters in this section.
Then, one of the editors, Alex Haslam, responds by substantially agreeing with Jonathan Montgomery. However, Haslam takes the opportunity to clarify one of the points that Montgomery makes with the intention of drawing attention to a key issue that runs like an artery through the body of this book. This concerns the nature of personalised healthcare and how this should best be understood and delivered. Haslam cautions that, in the process of developing personalised care, we should avoid the temptation to reduce peoples’ maladies to their individual conditions.
John Mearsheimer of Chicago, quondam soldier, US Air Force officer, and unmasker of the brilliant but flawed military theorist Sir Basil Liddell Hart – “the most famous and widely advanced military historian and theorist in the world” – is himself an enfant terrible. “I don't like authority,” Mearsheimer confesses. An odd remark is this to come from a West Point graduate: clearly no facile mind; indeed, an engaging intellectual, a gifted teacher and debater, the genial host, Mearsheimer is also the compulsive contrarian, courting controversy among liberals while complaining that the doors of Harvard are closed to him because of their intolerance. The latest example is an onslaught against the Israeli lobby in US foreign policy, which cuts directly across Mearsheimer's extensively articulated notion that domestic politics play a subordinate if not insubstantial role determining international relations.
Mearsheimer made a name for himself after the end of the Cold War with a merciless onslaught against “The False Promise of International Institutions.” Following a decade of disillusion after heightened expectations the United Nations was in no condition to meet, the polemic has withstood well the test of time and a barrage of attacks from fervent liberal internationalists. A magnum opus, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, takes the assault to higher ground and outlines an entire model of international relations. Here Mearsheimer asserts that “[t]he main causes of war are located in the architecture of the international system.”
The Bolsheviks had been conducting a fierce campaign to spread the revolution among invading Allied troops since the autumn of 1918 under the Central Executive Committee's Department of Propaganda, which was then moved over into the Communist International (Comintern) on 25 March 1919. The failure of the Allied war of intervention, signalled by the British decision to pull out by the end of 1919, effectively ensured the survival of Bolshevik rule in Russia and the greater part of its former empire. The Janus faces of Soviet foreign policy emerged: on the one side the face of appeasement and statecraft, the policy of accommodation to the capitalist world; on the other the contrasting face of violence and revolution to uproot and supplant capitalism in its entirety. The legitimacy of the October Revolution in Russia never depended exclusively on what it could do for Russia. France was on the front line against Fascism in 1934.
There are few questions as intriguing and as baffling as the reasons for the terror unleashed upon the U.S.S.R. from 1936. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the issue in the light of further research into the social, economic and political problems faced by Stalin from 1932.
Although many in the West have written on the Popular Front and its role in French or Spanish politics during the thirties, very little has been revealed about its origins. Indeed, one of the foremost historians of the Popular Front has expressed perplexity on this matter. Daniel Brower asks: ‘What brought on this change? Why had fascism suddenly assumed such threatening proportions in the eyes of Comintern leaders? To this day the answer remains obscure.’ The aim of this article is to throw some light on this question.
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