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This work compares dose-volume constraints (DVCs) and tumour control predictions based on the average intensity projection (AVIP) to those on each phase of the four-dimensional computed tomography.
Materials and methods:
In this prospective study plans generated on an AVIP for nine patients with locally advanced non-small-cell lung cancer were recalculated on each phase. Dose-volume histogram (DVH) metrics extracted and tumour control probabilities (TCP) were calculated. These were evaluated by Bland–Altman analysis and Pearson Correlation.
The largest difference between clinical target volume (CTV) on the individual phases and the internal CTV (iCTV) on the AVIP was seen for the smallest volume. For the planning target volume, the mean of each metric across all phases is well represented by the AVIP value. For most patients, TCPs from individual phases are representative of that on the AVIP. Organ at risk metrics from the AVIP are similar to those seen across all phases.
Utilising traditional DVH metrics on an AVIP is generally valid, however, additional investigation may be required for small target volumes in combination with large motion as the differences between the values on the AVIP and any given phase may be significant.
This paper addresses longstanding questions about how promise and obligation, two of the key conceptual building blocks for psychological contract research, are conceptualized and operationalized: How do employees understand these concepts? Would their understandings be congruent with the researchers’ and how would this knowledge inform future psychological contract research? Drawing on interviews with 61 Chinese workers from diverse backgrounds, our results suggest the concepts have distinct meanings for participants in terms of three criteria (defining characteristics, key features and manifestations in employment). We argue that promise and obligation are likely to serve different functions in employment relationship and have different meanings for researchers versus participants, and accordingly we highlight the challenges of using them to conceptualize and operationalize psychological contracts in China and beyond.
An examination of the literature on inland transport in Britain in the early modern period might lead one to believe that the most important method of conveying goods was by road. In the last twenty years there has been a plethora of articles on the role of road transport, including important pieces by John Chartres, Gerard L. Turnbull, Michael J. Freeman and, most recently, Dorian Gerhold. The effect of this research has been to disprove the idea that road travel was at best difficult, and at worst, in winter, near impossible, when mud, inclines, potholes and other hazards prevented mobility. It is now clear that there was a network of carriers, for both short-distance local travel and long distances, which provided regular and reasonably reliable journey times for a range of commodities. Road transport grew in significance over the period. Coastal shipping was equally important, however, and the aim of this paper is to highlight its role in the transport developments which preceded the coming of the railways.
The pendulum has swung too far in one direction, and the bias in the literature in favour of road transport might be mistaken as a sign of the relative unimportance of coastal shipping. This essay sets out to correct that impression. It isolates economic variables relevant to transport and reassesses the relative importance of coastal shipping in light of those factors. Material is drawn chiefly from secondary sources. Little primary research has been done since T.S. Willan wrote his masterpiece over fifty years ago, which is a la-mentable reflection on the neglect of the coasting trade. Thus, a further aim of this review is to indicate some areas where further research might be profitable. Chartres, Turnbull and others have shown that road transport was a normal method of moving goods as early as the sixteenth century and that its importance increased with Britain's economic growth. By the eighteenth century there existed a reasonably well-integrated network of carriers capable of moving significant quantities of freight. The price of the service was not in all cases the only, or even the most important, consideration in choosing a transport mode. Sometimes speed, reliability of arrival time or regularity of service was of more importance to customers. There is no simple rule as to how prices, speed or reliability compared between different transport modes.
In the UK until recently the coastal trade was largely ignored when transport developments were discussed. Over the last decade or so much more research has been published on this topic, and the broad outlines of the structure of the industry, the commodities carried, the routes worked and the role of the coaster in industrialization are now known. This paper will review that literature in order to establish the broad parameters of the economics of the British coastal trade in the hope that it may suggest the sort of topics and angles which need to be researched on a European-wide basis.
An acceptable definition of what is meant by coastal trade is crucial, since there is no guarantee that the idea of coastal trade in one country will be the same as in the other twenty-five or so European states. In this regard the United Kingdom has an advantage over its continental neighbours because of its geographical make up. Britain is a series of islands and therefore was completely separate from all other countries, so coastal trade was internal trade, and this is a commonly used definition. For instance, the Customs Consolidation Act of 1876, section 140, stated that “all trade by sea from one part of the United Kingdom to any part thereof shall be deemed to be coasting trade.” To go foreign meant venturing into deeper water and abandoning the coastline. This is the definition I have used in my work and the one most commonly used in British writing on this topic. This definition does not fit other European countries so well. They had common boundaries and thus, whereas in Britain sticking to the coast ensured the ship stayed in British waters, on the mainland of Europe it was very easy to go into foreign waters by following the coastline. However, internal trade could be one definition of coasting trade.
In Britain the distinction between coasting and foreign trade was reinforced in law by the question of certificates of competency for masters and mates. Under the Mercantile Marine Act of 1850 both officers had to obtain such a certificate, but only if the ship was foreign-going. A new concept, the “home trade,” was introduced by the act.
This essay will examine the ways in which British coastal shipping businesses reacted to competition from railways. It is divided broadly into five sections. The first sketches the role of coastal shipping before the advent of the railways and explores the impact of steam on short-sea shipping. The second analyzes the part played by the short-distance early railways, which were perceived initially as at best minor threats to coastal shipping. Indeed, many were seen as beneficial because they enhanced the flow of goods to and from ports. The third section examines the threat from the long-distance national rail lines that began to appear in the 1840s. The fourth considers the range of responses, including attempts at intra- and inter-modal collusion; a search for technological improvement; a more positive market segmentation; and a re-appraisal of pricing methods. Finally, I will evaluate the success of these responses in securing market share for the coaster.
As a method of moving goods and people, coastal shipping has a long history. In the early modern period it was an important industry in Britain, even if estimates of its significance vary enormously. With an extensive coastline and many navigable rivers, Britain was particularly reliant on coasters to move coal, grain, ore and a wide range of agricultural and extractive goods. Despite having been virtually ignored by some recent historians, coastal shipping was crucial to British industrialization and its growing trade. Coasters linked the various regions into something approaching a national economy, carrying not only bulky, low-value products but also manufactures, such as linen, cheese, iron goods, and beer and spirits. They were ubiquitous, as a perusal of directories for port cities or early local newspapers reveals.
The value of the coaster was much enhanced with the advent of steam. Although there were earlier experiments, the first commercial steamboat service in the UK was inaugurated in 1812 by Henry Bell, who ran Comet on the Clyde and its estuaries between Glasgow and Gourock. This service, which spawned many others, began thirteen years before the pioneering Stockton and Darlington Railway (SDR) and eighteen before the Liverpool and Manchester (LMR). In other words, steam was exploited much earlier on water than on rails. The advantages of steam to water transport were enormous. Although largely confined to rivers, estuaries and coastal routes, steam provided a predictability that sailing ships lacked.
The aim of this article is to estimate the amount of work performed by coastal shipping in the period just before World War I and to compare its contribution with that of the railways and canals. Until recenüy, with honourable exceptions, the coastal trade in the railway era was either ignored or merited but scant coverage. The impression was given that the railways, like juggernaut's chariot, swept everything else away, rendering obsolete the coach, wagon, canal barge and coaster. By 1910 the railway network was virtually complete compared with, say, 1875, when many branch lines had yet to be constructed, or 1850, when only the basic network had been built, and it might be assumed that litde scope was left for the carriage of freight in coastal ships. Thus, the year 1910 should provide the least favourable case for the coaster and the most favourable for the railway in terms of total tonnage of goods carried. Passenger traffic will not be considered here; this is not to imply that coastal shipping did not carry people, but it seems indisputable that where coaster and railway competed, passengers preferred rail to sea travel. The main strength of the coastal passenger ship in 1910 was in services the railway could not provide in ferrying passengers to places like the Isle of Wight, Isle of Man, Channel Isles and the Scottish islands. This article will confine itself to considering the use made of the various types of transport in providing cargo-carrying services.
One measure of freight traffic which might be used is tonnage carried. At first sight this seems the obvious criterion; it is commonly used for foreign trade or modern lorry traffic, and the capacity of railway wagons or canal barges seems crucial. However, a more informative and accurate measure of total cargo movement performed is ton-mileage, as this takes into account not merely the tonnage of goods moved but also the distance consignments were carried. The value of ton-mileage has long been recognized by railway managers and statisticians. Historians, too, have emphasized its importance, notably Hawke, who used it as the measure of total railway output, and Cain, who said that “[t]on miles…are the only reasonable measure of railway output.“ Different forms of transport may be better suited for different lengths of journey.
Much is known of the extent, methods and significance of conferences as a means of regulating competition in overseas shipping. They were introduced among liner companies running to a fixed schedule in a particular trade. Tramp conferences were unlikely to succeed because such ships did not ply one regular route but rather worked whatever cargo and route was available, making mutual pricing a nightmare. Tramps also were often operated by merchants to carry their own goods and were not interested in collaborative action. Conferences in overseas trade appeared with the advent of the long-distance steamer which ensured reasonably reliable arrivals and departures. Sailing ships depended too much on fickle winds and tides to run to a strict timetable. Conferences were most likely to succeed where valuable or perishable commodities needed regular and rapid transit. For instance, the tea trade from the Far East, carried so famously by clipper ships until the 1870s, was confined to steamers belonging to the Far Eastern Freight Conference after its inception in 1879. Other cargoes could await the unscheduled but cheaper freighter.
The earliest conference in foreign trade was established in August 1875 for shipping from the United Kingdom to Calcutta. One had been projected in 1869 for the North Atlantic but failed to materialize, and some sailing ship brokers attempted to form rings to fix freight rates on the more regular routes. From that beginning conferences spread rapidly into most trades so that by 1895 they were “in all the major trades from Great Britain, with the exception of the North Atlantic,” and by 1913 they “regulated most of the cargo exported from the UK” except coal.
Although there were variations, the common features of conferences have been identified. A schedule of freight rates was agreed to which all members adhered. Deferred rebates were pioneered in 1877 by the Calcutta conference to encourage shipper's loyalty, since the rebate was conditional upon the merchant sending all goods only via conference ships in the qualifying period. This worked sufficiently well for it to be adopted by many later conferences. In most cases conference ships ran to a regular schedule of sailings to ensure that goods were not kept waiting for transportation. Within the conferences there were also often confidential pooling agreements which usually took the form of “joint purses” where all receipts were divided between the participants on some pre-arranged basis.
In 1988, the American Neptune published an article by Dwight E. Robinson on the British coastal fleet in the eighteenth century.2 It was a pioneering study in that before then very few pieces had been published on any aspect of the British coastal trade in this or any other maritime history journal. It reminded readers of the great importance of the British coastal trade, both quantitatively and qualitatively, from the earliest days of Britain and especially of its role as a nursery for seamen and in boosting Britain's naval power through training seamen in ship handling and navigation. It was also innovative in its methodology, as Robinson had to deal with the problem of double recording of ships and find a method to eliminate such double counting. He chose to use a computer database for this task, a relatively novel solution at the time. Furthermore, the article provided a quantitative assessment of the size of the British coastal trade in 1776, and was able to break this down by the nature of the cargo carried, between domestic coasting and that to near-continental ports, and also provided a ranking of which ports were the largest owners of coasters and therefore probably the most heavily engaged in operating coastal ships. This was important work and came up with revealing findings.
Robinson took maritime historians to task for ignoring “a comprehensive source of data” that would allow us to estimate “the extent and nature of the British domestic coasting fleet” in the eighteenth century.3 Given that the article was published over a decade ago, and that no subsequent book or article has appeared tackling the question of the size of the British eighteenth-century coasting fleet or drawing on the documentation to which Robinson referred, maritime historians appear to be either incorrigibly slow and lazy or totally disinterested in the British coasting fleet. Our object is to redeem the community of maritime historians. There are good reasons why the records in question have not been extensively used, and why Robinson overstated their comprehensiveness and value.
The records that Robinson used were the British Admiralty's thirtyeight “Registers of Protection from Being Pressed,” held in the National Archives in Kew on the western outskirts of London.
Maritime history has made some amazing strides in the past half century. From largely being the preserve of aniquarians and aficionados of ships, it has become an increasingly respected genre within the larger body of historical scholarship. Yet if there is one area that has been relatively ignored - with, as John Armstrong would likely put it, “a few honourable exceptions” - it would be the history of the trades in which merchant vessels engaged. In the early modern period we know a lot about the tobacco and timber trades, and the study of the slave trade in all its ramifications has been revolutionized by the work of a dedicated group of scholars. But virtually all the great trades of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries still await proper scholarly treatment.
There is, however, an “honourable exception” to this last generalization, for as the essays that follow demonstrate with grace and insight, we know quite a bit about the British coastal trade. That I can make this claim is due almost entirely to the work of a single remarkable scholar - John Armstrong. Although as John is always careful to remind us, his work has been entirely on the British trade, it is no less important for this focus. Moreover, although even in the United Kingdom this sector was far from homogeneous, I believe that readers of the essays in this volume will come away with an appreciation of the main characteristics of its various branches. As John has pointed out repeatedly, there remain many significant things that we still do not know. Yet what is striking to me - and I suspect that it will be to many other readers as well - is that thanks to John Armstrong's industry, imagination and hard work we know quite a bit about the British coastal trade.
For this reason, and many others besides, we are extremely happy to have this selection (and as the bibliography at the end of the book demonstrates, it is only a selection) of John Armstrong's writings in a single volume in the Research in Maritime History señes. Having worked on this book for the past few months and reacquainted myself with his body of work, I am convinced that all maritime historians will learn a great deal from the essays included here.
The period 1900 to 1914 has been characterized as one of continuing depression in the international shipping industry. James considered 1901 to 1911 to have been an acute depression in shipping, while Sturmey considered the period 1904 to 1911 to have been “the first truly international shipping depression.“ More recently Aldcroft, examining ocean freight rates, the earnings of half a dozen British liner companies and the movement of earnings per ton of four British shipping firms, has concluded that “during the first decade of the twentieth century British shipping was more depressed than at any time during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.” Aldcroft admits the statistical basis of his conclusions “are very weak,” and indeed he presents no new index of freight rates to support his case, relying on data from Angier and Isserlis.
No cognizance has been taken of coastal freight rates in this period, and indeed not much is known generally about the movement of coastal freight rates. It has been established that coastal liner companies followed the practice of the railways in charging on an eight-fold classification based on the value of the good and the difficulty of handling it and that the coastal liner charged less than the railway for virtually all commodities and routes. However, there has been no attempt to look at a series of coastal freight rates to see how they fluctuated over time. Freight rates charged by liner companies were only one aspect of the coastal trade. There was also the tramping coaster, not tied to any specific route but going wherever there was a cargo to be carried and working to no published schedule of sailings but departing as and when the cargo had been loaded. Although the liner companies carried the higher-valued cargoes, leaving the bulkier, lower-valued commodities to be hauled by tramps, liners were almost certainly a minority of the total number of ships in the coastal trade and carried a smaller aggregate tonnage of goods than the tramp ships. Thus, to concentrate only on liner freight rates is to ignore charges made on the major portion of coastal trade. The single most important cargo carried by the coaster in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was coal.
This book collects seventeen previously published essays by John Armstrong concerning the British coastal trade. Armstrong is a leading maritime historian and the essays provided here offer a thorough exploration of the British coastal trade, his specialisation, during the period of industrialisation and technological development that would lead to modern shipping. The purpose is to demonstrate the whether or not the coastal trade was the main carrier of internal trade and a pioneer of the technical developments that modernised the shipping industry. Each essay makes an original contribution to the field and covers a broad range of topics, including the fluctuating importance of the coastal trade and size of the coastal fleet over time; the relationship between coastal shipping, canals, and railways; a comparison between the coastal liner and coastal tramp trade; the significance of the river Thames in enabling trade; coastal trade economics; maritime freight rates; the early twentieth century shipping depression; competition between coastal liner companies; and a detailed study of the role of the government in coastal shipping. The book also contains case studies of the London coal trade; coastal trade through the River Dee port; and the Liverpool-Hull trade route. It contains a foreword, introduction, and bibliography of Armstrong's writings. There is no overall conclusion, except the assertion that coastal shipping plays a tremendous role in British maritime history, and a call for further research into the field.
The popular view of internal British nineteenth-century transport history in undergraduate texts may be characterized as the triumph of railways over older modes of travel, such as stagecoaches, horse-drawn wagons and canal boats. This is sometimes used as evidence of the supremacy of modern over preindustrial technology and as such contains more than a smidgen of Whig history. The railway is portrayed in Darwinian terms as the more advanced species that killed off other forms of transport by offering superior service, speed and lower prices. Thus, long-distance coaches and wagons ceased operations when a rail line was completed and were then relegated either to areas that lacked railways or to service as intra-urban, short-haul carriers between railway stations and factories or workshops. Canals entered an era of long-term, genteel decline, helped by the fact that some railways absorbed canal companies and at times even laid their tracks in drained canal beds. This can also be seen as progress, since new technology superseded the outdated.
Even a cursory glance at the tables of contents of established transport history texts, such as Dyos and Aldcroft, Barker and Savage or Bagwell reveals that substantial portions are devoted to the advent of the railway, its impact on other forms of transport and its effects on the society and economy. Moreover, there are a plethora of enthusiast books on the history of particular rail lines, classes of engine, towns, engineers and types of carriage. The sheer size of Ottley's massive bibliography, plus its supplement, gives some idea of the amount of information available on various aspects of railway history. In this obsession with the new technology of the iron rail, coastal shipping has been relatively ignored. The tacit assumption seems to have been that, like the horse-drawn wagon, coach or barge, coasters were obsolete and hence “naturally“ superseded by the railway. An excursion through the pages of the standard texts shows that the space devoted to coastal shipping is minuscule. In comparison to the nearly 13,000 items in Ottley's compilation, a bibliography on coastal shipping and trade from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries would contain only about 250 entries, even including fleet lists barren of all but the most basic factual information. Nor can it be claimed that such neglect was a phenomenon only of the “first generation” of transport history texts.
There is a large and diverse literature on the employment conditions and shorebased activities of the merchant seaman. One view, now rather out of favour, saw the mariner ashore as dissolute, easily led astray and a breed apart from civilized society. This view has been challenged, and seamen have been seen simply as “working men who got wet” with similar problems and experiences as any other group of wage labourers. Marxist and other writers have debated degrees of exploitation and how changes in technology, organization and capital intensity affected maritime labour. Recentiy there have been discussions about wage rates and the efficiency of labour markets, and Williams has shown the high level of concern, in government and outside, with the quality, skills and supply of merchant seamen in the mid-Victorian period. To review and criticize this body of literature adequately would require a whole essay in its own right, so this article cannot attempt that.
Two points emerge from a perusal of the extant literature. Firstiy, the vast majority of it deals with maritime labour conditions on sailing ships, and very little is devoted to exploring this topic on steamships. Even Sager, who sees the iron steamship as equivalent to an industrial factory bringing deskilling and alienation, devotes only one brief final chapter to employment circumstances in steam. The second point to emerge from the literature is that virtually all of it is about sailors in deep-water trades and almost none of it on coastal employment. Kaukiainen devotes some space to “peasant shipping,” by which he means essentially small sailing ships in the coastal trade. In this segment he believes working conditions were more egalitarian and democratic than in long, deep-water voyages because the crews were small, often related to one another or from the same village. Sager, too, believes small coastal craft were run on pre-industrial lines which minimized social distinctions and ensured close, informal working relationships. He, like Kaukiainen, is talking about small sailing craft in the coastal trade. No study has been made of the coastal steam sector of the market.
Terry R. Gourvish has argued that the railway companies in Britain were “never the exemplars of Victorian private enterprise,” as some now choose to characterize them. Indeed, from the outset they were fairly tightiy controlled in terms of maximum rates, service provisions, routes and other fundamental matters. He also explained why the railways needed to be involved with government from the outset: their capitalization was so large that no family or group of partners was likely to be able to raise such sums. Hence, the companies had to draw upon a large number of “professional” investors or rentiers. Most of these played no part in the management or direction of the business, and they therefore needed some protection for their capital from the possible profligacy of the executives and directors. To ensure that the maximum loss they were likely to incur was restricted to the capital they had invested, they needed limited-liability status for the firm. These two requirements, jointstock form and limited liability, required the enterprise to obtain either a royal charter or a private act of Parliament before 1844 when the law on joint-stock companies became much more liberal. Even then it was not until the late 1850s that limited liability was granted as simply and cheaply as corporate form. Hence, railway companies needed to approach Parliament for this protective legislation, as well as for compulsory purchase powers to obtain the land they needed. From then on, the railways continued to be tightiy constrained and regulated. Parliamentary trains; threats of nationalization; constraints on merger activity; rules regarding safety; constraints on pricing, especially from the 1870s; requirements for cheap, early workmen's trains; total government control during the First World War; and a complete restructuring by parliamentary edict just after the war were just some of the government's actions.
At first sight there appears to be no commonality between this experience and that of the British coastal shipping industry. The latter seems to be a fine example of private enterprise untrammelled by government intervention - competitive, technologically dynamic, low cost and evolving new services and types of vessel to cater for emerging trades, commodities and needs.
When launching a scholarly book, it is not unreasonable to ask why the academic community should have thrust upon it yet another fat volume. Surely there already is a sufficiency of tomes on maritime history? Quite obviously, the appearance of this publication suggests little sympathy with the latter view. It is not so much the absolute number of maritime histories as the topics they address. It is my contention that little has been written on the British coastal trade, especially on the crucial period of industrialization and urbanization between about 1750 and 1914. The coastal trade was called “the Cinderella trade” a few years ago because it was a neglected area of study despite the fact that it was the largest segment of nineteenth-century British maritime commerce. It remains a relatively underresearched area of maritime history, and not just in the UK: there is relatively little written on the cabotage of any country. There are, of course, some honourable exceptions, but these are relatively rare.
The aim of this volume is two-fold. First, it endeavours to show the current state of knowledge on the British coastal trade. In so doing it indicates those areas which have not been addressed or where there is an on-going debate which could benefit from fresh research. This is the second aim: to encourage new research. In this regard the volume offers a shopping list of possible research topics which would carry the subject forward. This is based upon my belief that there may be some benefits in having these articles together in one volume. Some, it must be admitted, first appeared in rather obscure journals and thus may be difficult to access, and others saw their initial light of day in collections which are not always easy to trace. Thus, bringing them together in a single volume may ease access. It may also show that there is a critical mass of research on the British coastal trade.
A further question which might fairly be put is why has this particular set of essays been chosen? Not all of my work has been included, even on the coastal trade. So what criteria have been used for inclusion or exclusion? Obviously, the economics of producing this volume and its structural integrity dictate a maximum, especially when printing and postal charges are taken into account.
The study of maritime freight rates has a substantial and honourable ancestry. Indeed, its honour was recently much enhanced by the award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to one of the subject's progenitors. As long ago as 1914 C.K. Hobson drew up “a freight index number” from 1870 to 1912 to calculate the contribution of shipping earnings to Britain's balance of payments. Isserlis in 1938 developed an index of tramp shipping freights from 1869 to 1914. In the early 1950s Alec Cairncross drew on the work of both Hobson and Isserlis to calculate three indices of freight rates - inward, outward and composite. The early interest in freights arose from a wish to calculate foreign exchange earnings from shipping as one component of Britain's invisibles, but later work has laid emphasis upon the theoretical benefits a reduction in ocean freight rates is likely to have had on international trade and hence regional specialization and economic growth. A lowering of freight rates is a social saving and could be calculated as a proportion of national income, as another Nobel Laureate, Robert Fogel, did with railway rates in America. In addition, assuming reasonably competitive markets, if freight rates fell they would likely have caused a commensurate drop in the delivered price of the commodity carried, which in turn should have spurred demand (assuming a degree of price elasticity). Hence, output would be expanded, perhaps extracting economies of scale, adopting new technology or improving methods of organization - and thus reducing unit cost. This may then have led to another beneficial spiral.
Similarly, a reduction in transport costs may have opened some markets previously closed to a particular good because the final price, including the freight charge, was too high to compete. These new markets would have created additional demand, again perhaps stimulating improved methods of production or extraction and hence lowering unit costs, and thus into the same beneficent loop. In addition, reductions in transport costs might have allowed local monopolies to be breached, bringing competition to rigid markets and hence reducing prices. It has been postulated that one important contributory factor in opening the American west to grain production was the relatively inexpensive transport provided by railways and steamships which enabled Midwest wheat to penetrate European, and especially English, markets. This was a classic effect of a long-term reduction in transport costs, part of which was transatiantic freights.
Of late there has been a revival of interest in the role of coastal shipping in the British economy and a preliminary attempt at cross-European comparisons. Nonetheless, there are still large gaps in our knowledge; indeed, it would be fair to say that it is a largely blank slate on which a few words have been written faintly. One thing which seems to be established is that the idea of a single coastal trade is misleading, for there were a range of coastal shipping services catering for a number of different types of customers. In other words, the coaster segmented the market by offering different sorts of services varying in speed, price, regularity, reliability and frequency. At the top end in terms of reliability and speed were the coastal liners. These were large, modern ships running to a regular timetable on a specified route, taking mixed cargoes, some of them small consignments, and charging premium prices. The ships were not merely modern but also well appointed, since they usually carried passengers as well as cargo. For those shippers with regular consignments of bulky goods in large enough volume to fill an entire vessel, there were the regular traders, ships dedicated to a limited range of routes or commodities. These craft frequently returned in ballast and relied on speed and frequency to deliver large cargoes efficientiy. The best examples of this segment of the market were the screw colliers which plied between the coal fields of the North East and the consuming regions of the South East. For large consignments which could fill a ship but which required movement less frequently and regularly, there was the steam tramp. They were much less predictable than regular traders, as cargoes had to wait until a ship of suitable size became available in the vicinity of the despatching port. Even less reliable was the sailing coaster, since not only was there no guarantee of a vessel being available when the cargo needed to be moved but also even when safely stowed the ship might be delayed by contrary, insufficient or dangerous winds.