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15 results

  • Chapter 4 - The Hot Stove Effect

  • from Part I - Historical Review of Sampling Perspectives and Major Paradigms
  • Edited by Klaus Fiedler, Universität Heidelberg, Peter Juslin, Uppsala Universitet, Sweden, Jerker Denrell, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    Sampling in Judgment and Decision Making
    Published online:
    01 June 2023
    Print publication:
    15 June 2023, pp 90-112

  • Summary

    People revisit the restaurants they like and avoid the restaurants with which they had a poor experience. This tendency to approach alternatives believed to be good is usually adaptive but can lead to a systematic bias. Errors of underestimation (an alternative is believed to be worse than it is) will be less likely to be corrected than errors of overestimation (an alternative is believed to be better than it is). Denrell & March (2001) called this asymmetry in error correction the “Hot Stove Effect.” This chapter explains the basic logic behind the Hot Stove Effect and how this bias can explain a range of judgment biases. We review empirical studies that illustrate how risk aversion and mistrust can be explained by the Hot Stove Effect. We also explain why even a rational algorithm can be subject to the same bias.

  • Chapter 1 - The Theoretical Beauty and Fertility of Sampling Approaches

  • from Part I - Historical Review of Sampling Perspectives and Major Paradigms
  • Edited by Klaus Fiedler, Universität Heidelberg, Peter Juslin, Uppsala Universitet, Sweden, Jerker Denrell, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    Sampling in Judgment and Decision Making
    Published online:
    01 June 2023
    Print publication:
    15 June 2023, pp 3-34

  • Summary

    The threefold purpose of this initial chapter is to provide a review of the historical origins and the methodological beauty of sampling approaches to judgment and decision-making, to illuminate the most prominent recent developments, and to provide a preview of all chapters included in this volume. Accordingly, the chapter is organized into three parts. The historical review in the first part highlights the progress from purely intra-psychic to cognitive-ecological perspectives on adaptive cognition, conceived as a genuine interaction between environmental constraints and adaptive agents’ sampling strategies. The review of novel trends in the second part testifies to the fertility of sampling approaches and the impressive amount of progress it has inspired in terms of functional-level applications in various areas, but also in terms of mechanistic and computational modeling. A preview of all 22 chapters of the present volume in the final part is organized into six sections, covering the full spectrum of these innovative developments in rationality research during the last 15 years.

Sampling in Judgment and Decision Making
  • Edited by Klaus Fiedler, Peter Juslin, Jerker Denrell
  • Published online:
    01 June 2023
    Print publication:
    15 June 2023
  • Sampling approaches to judgment and decision making are distinct from traditional accounts in psychology and neuroscience. While these traditional accounts focus on limitations of the human mind as a major source of bounded rationality, the sampling approach originates in a broader cognitive-ecological perspective. It starts from the fundamental assumption that in order to understand intra-psychic cognitive processes one first has to understand the distributions of, and the biases built into, the environmental information that provides input to all cognitive processes. Both the biases and restriction, but also the assets and capacities, of the human mind often reflect, to a considerable degree, the irrational and rational features of the information environment and its manifestations in the literature, the Internet, and collective memory. Sampling approaches to judgment and decision making constitute a prime example of theory-driven research that promises to help behavioral scientists cope with the challenges of replicability and practical usefulness.