The 1819–1822 overland Arctic expedition led by John Franklin was one of the most disastrous in polar history. In 1821, 20 men travelled to the Arctic Ocean by way of the Coppermine River; only nine of them survived. John Richardson's expedition journal, as published by C. Stuart Houston in 1984, is incomplete. There are no entries between 7 and 29 October 1821, even though five of the 11 deaths (some or possibly all of them by murder) occurred during this critical period. The omission of these events from the journal on which Houston's edition was based has raised suspicions that the account published in Franklin's 1823 narrative may be inaccurate. This article prints the ‘missing’ journal entries, which were located in the files of the Colonial Office, and analyses the differences between these previously unknown entries and the 1823 account.

Explorer Joseph Elzéar Bernier's famous 1909 sector claim on Melville Island is often described as a key moment in the evolution of Canada's sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago. Writers such as Yolande Dorion-Robitaille and Marjolaine Saint-Pierre have argued that Bernier was unfairly deprived of the credit he deserved for his sovereignty contributions. Alan MacEachern has recently stated in Polar Record that civil servants in the 1920s were to blame for this supposed unfair treatment. In particular, he sees Oswald Finnie of the Department of the Interior as a man who was determined at all costs to rewrite the historical record. This article contests MacEachern's depiction of Finnie and his colleagues, based on a range of primary source documents. It also emphasises the little-known but very significant role played by James White, who first placed the sector lines on an official map five years before Bernier's 1909 proclamation. The article thus clarifies the complicated relationship between White's 1904 map, Bernier's 1909 claim, an earlier sector claim made by Bernier in 1907, and the views on the sector theory held by influential members of the Canadian civil service at the time when an official sector claim was made by Ottawa in 1925.

Many writers have presented Joseph Elzéar Bernier (1852–1934) as a hero whose key role in establishing Canada's sovereignty over the Arctic islands was unjustly downplayed by the government he served. According to this view, the sector claim that Bernier made on 1 July 1909 is the true foundation of Canada's title to the archipelago. This article draws on government files to assess civil servants’ attitude to his sovereignty-related activities. It also describes the role played by James White, whose more sophisticated and effective sector concept predated Bernier's and served as the basis for the official sector claim made in June 1925. The evidence indicates that government officials in the 1920s were well justified in their doubts about Bernier's pretensions. However, even though they rejected his version of the sector theory and resented the campaign of self-glorification on which he embarked after his retirement, their personal relations with him were good, and they took considerable trouble to ensure what they considered to be an appropriate degree of recognition for him. The article therefore clarifies the differences between Bernier's rhetoric and reality, particularly with regard to the sector principle.

Few aspects of Canada's Arctic sovereignty claims have been more misunderstood than the sector theory, which many writers believe originated with and was put forward on Canada's behalf (whether officially or unofficially) by explorer Joseph Elzéar Bernier. However, several Canadian government officials in the 1920s were both shrewd and accurate in their assessment of Bernier's pretensions. This note focuses on the views of civil servant Oswald Sterling Finnie, as recorded in previously unexamined government documents. In the years following Bernier's retirement from government service in 1925, the explorer embarked on a campaign to win the place in history he felt he deserved, only to be thwarted by Finnie and his colleagues. The note also clarifies the differences between Bernier's 1907 and 1909 sector claims and the official sector claim made in 1925.

This article examines the evolution of Canadian Arctic policy during Sir Wilfrid Laurier's years as prime minister (1896–1911). Explorer Joseph Elzéar Bernier, who commanded three government expeditions in this period, vigorously promoted the idea that he himself had roused the sluggish government to action. He also alleged that Laurier had promised to sponsor a Canadian voyage to the North Pole, a promise that was later broken. However, archival documents show that neither of these claims is true. Instead, Laurier and other members of his government first showed their determination to assert Canada's northern sovereignty in 1897, a year before Bernier came on the scene. Although Bernier hoped that his first northern voyage might be turned towards the pole, there was no promise from Laurier. Subsequent policy developments were often haphazard due to interdepartmental conflicts and personality clashes, but by the end of the Laurier years a reasonably effective Arctic programme had been created. Though Bernier played an important part in carrying out the government's agenda, many of his actions (most notably his famous July 1909 sector claim) were aimed more at enhancing his own fame than at securing Canada's title to the Arctic. The article places Bernier's Arctic career in its proper context, and at the same time highlights the contributions of other men who lacked his flair for publicity. It thus provides a more accurate factual basis for future work on the period.

Joseph Elzéar Bernier's well known sector claim of 1 July 1909 was predated by a similar, but until now unknown, proclamation in 1907. Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier, although eager to assert Canadian sovereignty, was unwilling to countenance the first claim because he did not think that the right time for such a gesture had yet come. However, in 1909 Bernier's action was welcomed, but only as a convenient way to counter the widely publicised American claim made by Robert Peary. In the eyes of government officials, neither of Bernier's proclamations held any real importance for Canada's northern sovereignty which rested primarily on the 1880 transfer of ownership from Britain. Bernier believed that his achievements had never been sufficiently recognised, but in fact the problem was that he himself overrated their significance.

Confusion has long existed on the subject of Vilhjalmur Stefansson's citizenship. A Canadian (that is, a British subject) by birth, Stefansson was brought up and educated in the United States. When his father became an American citizen in 1887, according to the laws of the time Stefansson too became an American. Dual citizenship was not then permitted by either the British or the American laws. Therefore, Stefansson was no longer a British subject. After he took command of the government sponsored Canadian Arctic Expedition in 1913, Stefansson was careful to give the impression that his status had never changed. Although Stefansson swore an oath of allegiance to King George V in May 1913, he did not take the other steps that would have been required to restore him to being Canadian. But, by an American act passed in 1907, this oath meant the loss of Stefansson's American citizenship. In the 1930s American officials informed Stefansson that he must apply for naturalisation in order to regain it. From 1913 until he received his American citizenship papers in 1937, Stefansson was a man without a country.

It is widely believed among historians that in 1920, the Danish explorer Knud Rasmussen and the Danish government challenged Canada's sovereignty over Ellesmere Island. This paper draws on a wide range of Canadian and British government files and private papers to contest this view. It demonstrates that Prime Minister Arthur Meighen and others in Ottawa were initially convinced by Vilhjalmur Stefansson that Denmark harboured territorial ambitions in the north, but most realised in the spring of 1921 that they had been mistaken. However, one civil servant, J. B. Harkin, stubbornly maintained his belief in the Danish threat. After Mackenzie King's Liberals came to power, Harkin was able to obtain a hearing for his views. It was largely due to Harkin's persistence that the first Eastern Arctic Patrol went north in 1922.

This article critically examines the assumption that the men of Sir John Franklin's last Arctic expedition died because, influenced by the characteristic British cultural prejudices of their time, they refused to employ Inuit survival skills. Since no detailed records from this expedition have ever been found, there is no direct evidence about the attitudes held or actions taken by its members. The article therefore draws on another source: the very extensive British periodical and newspaper coverage of the Franklin search. The writers who contributed to this literature knew even less than is now known about the events of the last Franklin expedition, but their speculations about the probable fate of the lost explorers reflect the beliefs about the Arctic and its people that prevailed at the time. Especially during the early 1850s, the great majority of periodical writers believed that Franklin and his men had gone native in order to survive. It is therefore evident that there was no cultural stigma attached to adopting the Inuit way of life in times of need.

This article compares the representations of aboriginal people, and especially the Yellowknife leader Akaitcho, in the journal written by John Franklin during his first expedition (1819–1822) and the narrative he published in 1823. In the introduction to his 1995 Champlain Society edition of Franklin's journal, Richard Davis claims that when revising the journal for publication, Franklin changed his original entries so as to present an unfavourable, stereotyped image of Akaitcho to the British reading public. However, comparison of the relevant passages shows that, while Franklin evidently viewed Akaitcho with distrust during much of the expedition, he later, and on reflection, changed his opinion so that it became much more favourable, and accordingly altered the journal entries in order to do Akaitcho justice. These facts cast doubt on the interpretation of the first Franklin expedition put forward by Davis and others.

Since the 1970s, a number of writers have endorsed the belief that Dr John Richardson very probably committed discreditable, and possibly even criminal, acts during the first Franklin expedition (1819–1822). These acts, they allege, were concealed from the public by Franklin and Richardson, who inserted a fabricated account into Franklin's 1823 narrative. This paper examines the evidence and arguments put forward by the originator of this theory, the historian Richard Glover. It concludes that Glover was motivated primarily by a desire to vindicate the good name of another explorer, Samuel Hearne. Richardson had suggested that Hearne's narrative was not an entirely reliable account of his travels, and in Glover's view, these remarks had seriously damaged Hearne's reputation. Glover therefore sought to characterise Richardson as a deceitful man of exceptionally poor judgement, upon whose claims no reliance could be placed. Later writers, engaged in a re-evaluation of Britain's imperial activities in the Canadian north, have accepted and expanded on Glover's theories. However, an examination of the primary sources cited by Glover and others demonstrates that there is no solid basis for the revisionist version of the 1819–1822 expedition.