The use of targeted sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) has gone through significant transformation over the past twenty-five years. Following the devastating humanitarian consequences of the comprehensive trade embargo imposed on Iraq in 1990, a substantial review of the design and implementation of sanctions took place. Albeit with some delay, as a response to that policy debacle, the UN Security Council decidedly shifted towards the imposition of targeted, not comprehensive sanctions. In only two instances (the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and Haiti in 1994), the Security Council imposed new comprehensive measures for a period (following targeted ones), but the last time a comprehensive trade embargo was imposed by the UN was in 1994. Today, most international and all UN sanctions are targeted sanctions.

Despite this transformation in the use of sanctions, much of the scholarly, policy, and public discussion on the issue remains unchanged. Discussions often fail to distinguish between targeted and comprehensive measures and continue to concentrate exclusively on whether sanctions are able to change the behaviour of targets. Rarely is consideration given to other ways in which sanctions may affect the target or, for example, how they could influence the international norms they are being used to enforce. Explanations of how sanctions should influence a target remain focused on the political outcomes (gain) resulting from economic sanctions (pain), with the implicit assumption that more pain will yield greater gain. The perception that sanctions tend to be ineffective is also widely held, particularly in contrast with expectations about the use of military force. Given the reliance of international actors on targeted sanctions, it is important that conceptual, analytical, and empirical knowledge of sanctions keeps pace with these developments.

In the broader context of international sanctions, UN sanctions play a particularly important role. Although unilateral and/or regional sanctions are often important, only those sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are universally applied and legally binding. This is crucial, given that other countries and their commercial entities invariably diminish the impact of unilateral or regional restrictive measures. In addition, UN sanctions carry a legitimating power of their own.

The project has been co-directed by Professor Thomas J. Biersteker, Gasteyger Professor of International Security and Director of the Programme for the Study of International Governance at the Graduate Institute, Geneva (thomas.biersteker@graduateinstitute.ch), and the Honorable Sue E. Eckert, Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University (sue_eckert@brown.edu).

Academic researchers, sanctions experts, and practitioners with direct participation in one of the TSC events (conferences, workshops, planning meetings) include the following:

1. Scholars

2. John Agbonifo, Osun State University, Nigeria

3. Andrea Bianchi, The Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland

4. Alix Boucher, Center for Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, New York, USA

5. Jane Boulden, Royal Military College, Canada

6. Michael Brzoska, Hamburg University, Germany

7. Thomas Cargill, Chatham House, London, UK

8. Andrea Charron, University of Manitoba, Canada

9. Caty Clement, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland

10. Neta Crawford, Boston University, USA

11. Margaret Doxey, University of Trent, Canada

12. Chioma Ebeniro, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria

13. Kimberly Elliott, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, USA

14. Mikael Eriksson, Swedish Defense Research Institute, Sweden

15. Elena Gadjanova, The Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland

16. Francesco Giumelli, Groningen University, Netherlands

17. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland

18. Zuzana Hudáková, The Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland

19. George Lopez, University of Notre Dame, USA

20. Shawna Meister, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

21. Clara Portela, Singapore Management University, Singapore

22. Detlof Sprinz, Potsdam University, Germany

23. David Sylvan, The Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland

24. Masataka Tamai, Ritsumeikan University, Japan

25. Marcos Tourinho, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil

26. Mineko Usui, Komazawa Women's University, Japan

27. Alex Vines, Chatham House, UK

28. Peter Wallensteen, Uppsala University, Sweden

29. Takehiko Yamamoto, Waseda University, Japan

30. Policy practitioners

31. Richard Barrett, former Al-Qaida Monitoring Team, New York, UK

32. Paul Bentall, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, UK

33. David Biggs, UN Secretariat Sanctions Unit, New York, USA

34. Joshua Black, US Mission to the UN, New York, USA

35. Rico Carisch, former member, UN Panels of Experts, New York, Switzerland

36. Kiho Cha, UN Secretariat Sanctions Unit, New York, USA

37. Riccarda Chanda-Trippel, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

38. Jasmin Cheung-Gertler, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Canada

39. Peter Grk, Foreign Ministry, Slovenia

40. Ralf Heckner, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

41. Benno Laggner, Foreign Ministry, Bern, Switzerland

42. Christine Lee, former Al-Qaida Monitoring Team, Singapore

43. Loraine Rickard-Martin, former UN Secretariat, New York, Jamaica

44. Jennifer McNaughton, UK Mission to the UN, New York, UK

45. Eric Rosand, US Department of State, Washington, DC, USA

46. Daniela Schneider, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland […]

UN targeted sanctions, our subject of analysis, is a moving target. Throughout the five-year period of this research project, five new country case regimes and eleven new episodes were added to existing regimes, based on actions taken by the UN Security Council. Beyond the sheer number of cases, however, UN targeted sanctions as a policy tool and an instrument of global governance have changed in significant ways over the past quarter century. The instrument has been used for a growing variety of threats to international peace and security, beyond its initial focus on armed conflict and terrorism. The Security Council has subsequently added nuclear proliferation, non-constitutional changes of government, support for R2P, international criminal justice, and the maintenance of peacebuilding processes to its list of objectives in the use of sanctions.

Through these twenty-five years, new types of targeted sanctions have been developed. Since the early 1990s, when the Council relied most heavily on arms embargoes, broad trade restrictions, and occasionally on comprehensive sanctions, it has now refined its use of sanctions to focus largely on the targeting of individuals and entities, as well as on the specific economic sectors that support proscribed activities (often minerals or commodities). Relatively non-discriminating measures such as aviation bans and oil embargoes on an entire country have not been imposed by the UN since 1998. Arms embargoes continue to be utilized regularly and more frequently than any other type of targeted sanction, in spite of their overall ineffectiveness in constraining the use of violence by the targeted parties when used alone.

In the last two decades, substantial institutional learning by the UN and Member States with regard to sanctions design and implementation has taken place. Sanctions resolutions now routinely require the creation of a sanctions committee, committee guidelines, clearly articulated designations criteria, Member State reporting, the formation of Panels of Experts to monitor implementation, and most recently, articulated enforcement authorities. The UN Security Council has become more precise in its resolution language, with greater clarity in the resolution structure, more standardized use of terms, and greater detail in describing target groups and identifying information for individuals designated. Particularly in the non-proliferation cases, an enhanced focus on enforcement through the provisions authorizing inspection, seizure, and destruction of goods seized has been developed.