Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Home
  • Home

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Send to Kindle
  • Send to Dropbox
  • Send to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

47 results

Page 1 of 3

  • 7 - Japan, 1914–18
    • By Ian Nish, The London School of Economics
  • Edited by Allan R. Millett, Ohio State University, Williamson Murray, Ohio State University
  • Book: Military Effectiveness
  • Published online: 05 June 2012
  • Print publication: 09 August 2010, pp 229-248
  • View extract

    Summary

    Introduction

    With the Restoration of imperial authority in Japan in 1868, the emperor assumed supreme command over both the army and the navy. Although these forces were not yet constituted, the principle of imperial authority was established at the outset. In the atmosphere of the Restoration the Japanese army, which had existed in the form of clan forces from time immemorial, was speedily brought into line with European armies. The professional warrior class (samurai), though not excluded from service in the new national army, often chose to seek other occupations, after being pensioned off. The army was to become a conscript one, drawn from males of every class, though conscription did not in practice affect all classes equally. Active service became obligatory for all aged over 20 and lasted for three years. Service with the reserve was compulsory for those who had completed their stint with the colors and lasted over four years. The army in 1914 exceeded half a million men.

    By his prerogative the emperor had to appoint the minister of war, who was responsible for military administration (gunsei), and the chief of the general staff, who was responsible for military command (gunrei). The latter had by convention the right of direct access to the throne and was therefore separate from, and independent of, the civilian ministers of state. It was already the practice before 1914 for the minister of war (as also the minister of marine) not to be a civilian.

  • Introduction by Ian Nish
  • Kume Kunitake
  • Edited by Chushichi Tsuzuki, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, R. Jules Young
  • Book: Japan Rising
  • Published online: 04 August 2010
  • Print publication: 16 April 2009, pp xi-xxix
  • View extract

    Summary

    This is an introduction to the journey of the Iwakura Embassy which was sent out by the Japanese government in 1871. It was an ambitious journey round the globe and lasted for nineteen months. The chronicler of the Mission, Kume Kunitake, skilfully indicates both the wonderment of the visitors at what they saw and the hard-working intensity of their programmes. On the other side, it shows the open-heartedness of the countries visited whose citizens were ready to show off their wares and share their technology with their unfamiliar visitors from Japan.

    Kume Kunitake (1839–1931) was chosen by Prince Iwakura as his secretary for the journey. Kume, a young Confucian scholar from a samurai background, was born in the domain of Saga in the island of Kyushu, not far from Nagasaki. That port was the access-point for foreign traders, whether from China, Korea or the Netherlands, in the days of Japan's seclusion from the rest of the world. Through his father's bureaucratic connections with trade, Kume would presumably have become acquainted with some of the ways of the non-Japanese world. His experiences by the age of thirty-two were such that he was neither bewildered nor star-struck by what he discovered as the Embassy travelled round the world's capitals and met the world's leaders. On the contrary he makes shrewd observations throughout. It was Kume's task to take notes and, on his return to Japan, to edit them for publication.

  • An Overview of Relations Between China and Japan, 1895–1945
  • Ian Nish
  • Journal: The China Quarterly / Volume 124 / December 1990
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2009, pp. 601-623
  • Print publication: December 1990
  • View extract

    The relationship between China and Japan is a many-layered cake, impossible to eat all at once. This article will concentrate on the diplomatic layer of the relationship. Diplomatic history is essentially about the decisions of governments and the documents that are subsequently exchanged. Each of these aspects has its difficulties for the historian of East Asia. For substantial parts of the period under review “government” in a western sense hardly existed in China, while in Japan even the considered decisions of the government in Tokyo frequently failed to reflect the situation on the ground. In Japan's relations with China there was often a dual – if not a multiple – diplomacy at work where the army (among others) had an independent hand in fashioning “policy.”

Page 1 of 3