Par ‘globalisation’, nous entendons le déploiement mondialisé des activités des acteurs de l'économie maritime, sur terre(ports, logisticiens, chargeurs) et sur mer(armements maritimes, gestionnaires des flux), et la gestion des institutions publiques et des firmes(publiques ou privées) à l'échelle internationalisée puis mondiale, donc au-delà des simples intérêts nationaux des entreprises concernées. Un décideur globalisé prend en considération les marchés et les flux mondiaux et gère l'entité dont il a la responsabilité en fonction de ces données et des enjeux géo-économiques: il dispose d'informations, d'une vision et de mentalités, d'objectifs stratégiques, d'un modèle économique(business model) à l'échelle de cette mondialisation. La globalisation est bien plus large que l'internationalisation; l'économie-monde maritime a évolué de l'internationalisation à la globalisation, en fonction des mutations de l'environnement géopolitique, des systèmes productifs et des technologies, ainsi que de la configuration du commerce mondial.

UNE INTERNATIONALISATION SOUMISE AUX ALÉAS GÉOPOLITIQUES

Le transit maritime est contraint à une relative contraction de son extension internationale à cause des retombées géopolitiques de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les ports chinois se ferment, là où les compagnies maritimes participaient à l'économie des concessions. Le Japon vaincu doit replier ses flux orientés vers son ‘aire asiatique de co-prospérité.’

By contrast with the brilliant eighteenth century, the prevailing view in the literature is that Bordeaux in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a declining port. Nonetheless, most of the city's merchants never abandoned hopes of maintaining an international scope for their port, despite a new economic environment which appeared unfavourable to their interests. That is why it is useful to survey the international involvement of the port and its capacity to adapt to major maritime revolutions over two centuries. In this study we will focus on some aspects of the evolution of the harbour, such as the structure and features of Bordeaux's trade; the pattern of investments and their influence on the growth of trade; the logistic development of the port and connections with the hinterland; the relationship between foreign trade and industrial or business cycles; and links with France's constricting colonial empire. We also intend to place the port within an international and national framework of production, transport and logistics and examine how this affected Bordeaux's competitive position. After the Napoleonic wars, the nineteenth century was marked by a lengthy effort to re-establish trade links using traditional expertise and local comparative advantages. Despite an increasingly peripheral location in the twentieth century, the port tried to maintain its role as an international entrepot, especially in passenger traffic, and strengthened its colonial ties until the 1960s. In the last three decades of the century the port had to adjust to radically different national and international commercial climates.

International Links and Nineteenth-Century Port Modernisation

After two decades of war the trade of the port of Bordeaux, as elsewhere in Europe, was stagnant in 1815. Its activities during the Continental Blockade (1806-1814) were maintained only by neutral US vessels and the “regime of licences.” The city's merchants were no longer in touch directly with overseas markets. After these dark years, they had to face two challenges: to revive the former trading ties that had generated so much prosperity in the eighteenth century and to adapt to a new maritime environment dominated by British shipping. Since the merchants knew that it was impossible to restore all of Bordeaux's trading patterns, finding new markets was crucial if it was to remain among the main ports of France and Europe.

The myth of the omnipresence of the controllers of wealth is ineradicable in France, so evident appears to be the strength of capital: the autonomy of decisions made by politicians seems restricted by a ‘wall of money’, and major choices in economic policy seem to be imposed by the prime movers of financial capitalism. Civil liberties seem compromised, so great is the influence of the world of finance as it creeps insidiously into a venal press, into the heart of a corrupt parliament, and even into the very core of governments whose ministers maintain too close links with financial spheres. Thus ‘crises’ break out repeatedly, substantiating these myths as half-political, half-financial scandals reveal the interpenetration of the networks of influence and decision-making. Fact thus confirms belief as ‘hidden money’ (J. N. Jeanneney) is brought to light. Faced with such an assumption of guilt, historical analysis must pursue its course with care. Research into the world of finance remains fragmentary, the controllers of wealth remain in charge of the preservation of archives, of their accessibility, of selecting which files should be made public and to which readers.

A financial community

It is difficult to isolate the major paths of influence of the world of finance, for it remains an undefined community. If, in the case of industrialists, centres of power and cores of pressure groups have long been identified, in the case of bankers and financiers, structures of collective organization are difficult to uncover.