A conscientious reading of the rich historical literature on the American Legal Realist movement would provide no suggestion that any of the academic writers and other commentators in that movement ever gave the slightest attention to international law.1 It is entirely understandable that the Realists should be remembered as having been concerned exclusively with the analysis and reform of domestic jurisprudence and legal process; for there was only one exception, in this regard, and this was the Stanford law professor Joseph Walter Bingham. Bingham (1878-1973) is a figure who has been almost entirely neglected by historians of legal thought.2 And yet he was one of the earliest American legal commentators to promote an iconoclastic, reformist approach to the common law and American constitutional law. His writings in the 1910s and 1920s, as will be discussed further here, were important early-day contributions to the development of what would become the central canon of Legal Realism. His uniqueness among the Realists rests in the fact that he would go on to play a prominent part in contending for a basic reform in international law during the decades that followed.

“The more important any legal theme is in United States history,” Willard Hurst once wrote, “the more likely it is that it has been significantly affected by the coexistence and interplay of the national and the state governments.” That federalism and its impact on legal development should have been of central importance to Hurst's interpretations of American history is by no means surprising, yet the subject seldom finds a place in the growing literature on Hurst's seminal research contributions. His estimate of federalism's importance may no doubt be explained in part by the close relationship that he had with Felix Frankfurter as the research assistant in 1935–36 for Frankfurter's book of lectures on the Commerce Clause in the nineteenth century. This was a study animated, one can be certain, by Frankfurter's interest in finding ample room within the constitutional order for giving the states adequate space to pursue their varied individual policy preferences in response to the challenges posed by economic and social change. Indeed, Frankfurter had long been struggling with the issue of what authority was left, by a proper interpretation of constitutional federalism, to the state legislatures and courts; and he must have been pleased when Hurst wrote to him in 1938 that he was thinking about undertaking a historical study of diversity jurisdiction as a way of getting “a slant on the business of making federalism work.”

The California Marine Research Committee was established by the state legislature in 1947 in response to the catastrophic failure of the Pacific Coast sardine fishery. Scientists, state and federal resource-managment officials, and industry leaders put aside long–standing differences of viewpoint to launch a uniquely comprehensive, multidisciplinary research effort. This paper, based on newly opened archival materials, analyzes the founding and early work of the agency. How a stalemate occurred that delayed a consensus on policy recommendations and had the practical effect of continuing virtually unregulated sardine fishing is explained. The article illustrates the institutional development of post–war “Big Science” as a major actor in the policy process and analyzes the mobilization of public agencies to cope with complex environmental issues in resource–extractive industries.

This article identifies four problems in the recent interdisciplinary studies of property rights, law, and economic development in the nineteenth-century United States. First, recent studies stress too exclusively the positive functions of law in either the “release of entrepreneurial energy” or the exploitative allocation of advantages (by courts and legislatures) to the business interests leading industrialization. Second, the dichotomy between alleged “instrumentalism” as the prevailing judicial style before 1860 and “formalism” after 1865 has been exaggerated. Third, generalizations have been based too much on the eastern states and Wisconsin. Fourth, there has been a failure to identify accurately the winners and losers in the struggle over regulation and the definition of property rights. Thus, although rediscovery of the importance of institutions by economists and the renaissance of legal history among historians and legal scholars constitute welcome (converging) developments in recent scholarship, much more research is needed on these main themes in the literature.

Whether federalism is more than a legal fiction is a question that generates considerable controversy among scholars in law and the social sciences. Historians of nineteenth-century American federalism have differed about the workings of the federal system in the era characterized as “dual federalism.” This article provides an analysis of these controversies and offers a theoretical position on the problem of real power under federalism. The historical literature, it is argued, provides legal scholars and social scientists with abundant data on the reach, diversity, and effects of governmental action in the different historical epochs of American federalism. The relationship of federalism in the United States to political freedom, governmental performance and efficiency, and the formation of public policy all receive attention.

“All books are dead in twenty-five years,” Mr. Justice Holmes wrote to Sir Frederick Pollock. An example of Holmes’ mastery of the art of over-statement, the dictum has its notable exceptions, as even a relatively young discipline such as economic and business history reveals. Professors Scheiber and Salsbury make the case for the permanent impact of one such exception. At the Editor's discretion, communications like the following may be published in the future about other milestones.

From the beginning of nationhood under the Constitution to the present day, the federal system of American government— what Madison termed “a novelty and a compound,” and what Hamilton declared was “necessarily a compromise of dissimilar interests and inclinations”—has been of profound importance in shaping the nation's economic order. Power has shifted over time between the national government and the constituent state governments; and these structural shifts have had an impact upon policy process and outcomes, as well as upon the economy's institutional framework. The study of federalism has long been, of course, a concern of scholarship in constitutional law, political science, and history. Moreover, historians of American politics have lavished much attention upon the great conflicts of interest groups, parties, and ideologies, from 1787 to the New Deal and after, over the basic question of the extent to which power ought to be centralized in our federal system. And yet no scholarly studies have been specifically devoted to the analysis of federalism as an institutional variable both influencing the development of enterprise in the private sector and influencing economicpolicy processes and the substance of public economic policy. This paper attempts such an analysis. Part I reviews the recent literature on law and economic history, and Part II considers some theoretical issues. Parts III and IV examine historic American federalism in relation to governmental institutions and power, public economic policies, and the dynamics of the economy's private sector.

Expropriation of private property by government is seldom found on the list of policies which have influenced the course of economic development in American history. To be sure, the once-vigorous myth of antebellum laisser-faire has been discarded; and it is no longer taken as a startling proposition that governmental interventions to promote and regulate the economy occurred regularly throughout the nineteenth century. But for two reasons, I think, expropriation as an instrument of conscious resource allocation has failed to receive from historians the attention it deserves.