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Analysis of human remains and a copper band found in the center of a Late Archaic (ca. 5000–3000 cal BP) shell ring demonstrate an exchange network between the Great Lakes and the coastal southeast United States. Similarities in mortuary practices suggest that the movement of objects between these two regions was more direct and unmediated than archaeologists previously assumed based on “down-the-line” models of exchange. These findings challenge prevalent notions that view preagricultural Native American communities as relatively isolated from one another and suggest instead that wide social networks spanned much of North America thousands of years before the advent of domestication.
A diverse millipede (diplopod) fauna has been recovered from the earliest Carboniferous (Tournaisian) Ballagan Formation of the Scottish Borders, discovered by the late Stan Wood. The material is generally fragmentary; however, six different taxa are present based on seven specimens. Only one displays enough characters for formal description and is named Woodesmus sheari Ross, Edgecombe & Clark gen. & sp. nov. The absence of paranota justifies the erection of Woodesmidae fam. nov. within the Archipolypoda. The diverse fauna supports the theory that an apparent lack of terrestrial animal fossils from ‘Romer's Gap' was due to a lack of collecting and suitable deposits, rather than to low oxygen levels as previously suggested.
In current practice, children with anatomically normal hearts routinely undergo fluoroscopy-free ablations. Infants and children with congenital heart disease (CHD) represent the most difficult population to perform catheter ablation without fluoroscopy. We report two neonatal patients with CHD in whom cardiac ablations were performed without fluoroscopy. The first infant had pulmonary atresia with intact ventricular septum with refractory supraventricular tachycardia, and the second infant presented with Ebstein’s anomaly of the tricuspid valve along with persistent supraventricular tachycardia. Both patients underwent uncomplicated, successful ablation without recurrence of arrhythmias. These cases suggest that current approaches to minimising fluoroscopy may be useful even in challenging patients such as neonates with CHD.
Recent papers have suggested that the Industrial Revolution in Europe ultimately derives from the labor scarce economy of northwest Europe, which some trace back to the Black Death [Voigtländer and Voth (2013a) and Allen (2011)]. This paper examines the effects of the Black Death in England. Specifically, did it merely change relative factor prices, or did it lead to lasting gains in the efficiency of the economy after 1348? Extensive wage and price data from England 1210–1800 suggest that the population losses of the Black Death were associated with a surprising increase in economic efficiency, despite the decline in the scale of the economy. But this efficiency gain disappeared when population rose again in the 16th century. There is no sign of a connection between a labor scarce economy, and a switch to faster long run economic growth through technological advance.
This chapter examines the effects of the industrial revolution on social mobility rates and inequality, as England experienced the onset of modern economic growth. It has previously been impossible to measure social mobility rates before the end of the industrial revolution, because population censuses showing family relationships only become available in 1851. However, we show how, using information on surname distributions, inter-generational social mobility rates back to 1700 can be calculated. These show that social mobility has always been low in England and was surprisingly unaffected by the industrial revolution. Modern growth did not speed up the process of inter-generational mobility. In addition we show that the industrial revolution era was probably one of declining inequality in England. While we do not have information on the individual distribution of income and wealth, we can show that the share of wages in national income increased in industrial revolution England. Since wages are distributed in all societies much more equally than income from property, this would have been a force for greater income equality within industrial society.
Was the industrial revolution associated with a period of enhanced social mobility? And how did social mobility rates then compare with those of modern Britain? We might expect that the industrial revolution would have disrupted the old social classes and created a period of enhanced mobility, compared to what came before, both upwards and downwards. Change and disruption would favour mobility. Stasis and continuity would embed immobility.
Change there certainly was in Britain after 1760. There was the creation of new industries and new occupations. The old landed aristocracy began to be replaced by a new industrial, commercial and technical class, affording opportunities for mobility to those who had heretofore lived as agricultural labourers in semi-feudal dependence. At the same time large numbers of relatively prosperous handicraft producers were displaced by the arrival of factory production. The hand-loom weavers, often owners of their looms and cottages, were displaced by low paid factory weavers.
Innovation and technological change are integral to the energy system transformations described in the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) pathways. Energy technology innovations range from incremental improvements to radical breakthroughs and from technologies and infrastructure to social institutions and individual behaviors. This Executive Summary synthesizes the main policy-relevant findings of Chapter 24. Specific positive policy examples or key takehome messages are highlighted in italics.
The innovation process involves many stages – from research through to incubation, demonstration, (niche) market creation, and ultimately, widespread diffusion. Feedbacks between these stages influence progress and likely success, yet innovation outcomes are unavoidably uncertain. Innovations do not happen in isolation; interdependence and complexity are the rule under an increasingly globalized innovation system. Any emphasis on particular technologies or parts of the energy system, or technology policy that emphasizes only particular innovation stages or processes (e.g., an exclusive focus on energy supply from renewables, or an exclusive focus on Research and Development [R&D], or feed-in tariffs) is inadequate given the magnitude and multitude of challenges represented by the GEA objectives.
A first, even if incomplete, assessment of the entire global resource mobilization (investments) in both energy supply and demand-side technologies and across different innovation stages suggests current annual Research, Development & Demonstration (RD&D) investments of some US$50 billion, market formation investments (which rely on directed public policy support) of some US$150 billion, and an estimated US$1 trillion to US$5 trillion investments in mature energy supply and end-use technologies (technology diffusion).
Gregory Clark argued in A Farewell to Alms that preindustrial societies, including England, were Malthusian. Day wages show incomes were trendless: as high in Europe in the medieval era as in 1800, even in England. The opposed view is that England and the Netherlands grew substantially from 1200 to 1800. Early day wages overestimate living standards. Here we show that preindustrial farm employment shares can be estimated from probate occupation reports. These imply only 60 percent employed in farming in England in 1560–1579 and 1653–1660, consistent with the high incomes indicated by wages. Day wages do measure preindustrial living standards.
In 1700 four features characterized all of Europe: high fertility, modest educational attainment, the dominance of physical over human capital, and low rates of economic growth. By 1870 in much of Europe modern economic growth was under way. Fertility levels had begun their decline to modern levels, education levels were rising, and human capital was becoming an important income source. These conjunctions suggest that there must be a connection between modern economic growth, fertility decline, and rising human capital. The nature of that connection, however, is disputed. What triggered the switch to the modern demographic regime, with few children despite high incomes? Was this another independent innovation, as significant as the Industrial Revolution? Or was it just a delayed echo of the Industrial Revolution?
The Industrial Revolution and the demographic transition are the two great forces that explain the upward march of modern incomes. So far they have stood independently, the Industrial Revolution preceding the decline in fertility in Europe by more than 100 years. Our instincts suggest that there is some underlying connection. The difficulty is to connect them in a way that also explains fertility differences across countries in the pre-industrial world, the transition period, and the modern world.
The pre-industrial demographic regime
All European societies had high fertility in 1700, but matched by high mortality so that population growth rates remained modest.