The Cambrian fauna of Massachusetts, characterized by Paradoxides (Hydrocephalus) harlani, is poorly preserved. Better-preserved specimens, occurring within the stratigraphic range of this trilobite in southeastern Newfoundland and Morocco, provide a better understanding of such taxa to widen the scope of correlation. The paradoxidid-bearing Braintree Formation has revealed three trilobite species to add to those recently recorded. They represent Ellipsocephaloidea not previously recognized in this Massachusetts sequence, namely Protoleninae by Hamatolenus (H.) aff. H. (H.) marocanus and H. (Myopsolenus) aff. H. (M.) magnus and Ellipsocephalidae by Holocephalina aff. H. levis, thus strengthening faunal relationships with midshelf Cambrian sequences in Morocco and Spain. Reinterpretations of Agnostida, based on Newfoundland material associated with P. (Hydrocephalus) harlani, indicate that Condylopyge eli and Kiskinella cf. K. cristata signify a stratigraphic position for part of the Massachusetts sequence a little above the first appearance of Ovatoryctocara granulata. Appearance of this latter species is under review as the basal boundary of a global Cambrian stage, and is below the sequence break within the Chamberlain's Brook Formation in Newfoundland marked by the Easter Cove Blister Bed. The problem of differentiating species with numerous variable growth stages is highlighted in the ontogenies and stratigraphic ranges of P. (H.) harlani and P. (Plutonides) haywardi and emphasizes the importance of cephalic morphology in paradoxidid classification. Details of the holotypes of Agraulos quadrangularis and Braintreella rogersi and Czech topotypes of Agraulos ceticephalus supplement generic and specific characters poorly understood, especially those involving proportional differences between tectonically/taphonomically flattened examples and undistorted high-relief specimens.

Thank you, Albin Eser. I was very pleased to note in the Program that I am listed as a member of the Israeli delegation. This is an honor, but I would also would like to think that I am treated as an honorary member of the Max Planck delegation. I first studied the theory of criminal law at the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg and my work there has had a lasting influence on my thought.

My subject is complicity, which in general terms refers to the liability of one person for the act of another. I begin with an example to render clear the different approaches to this problem of derivative liability. The perpetrator Paul plans the robbery of a gas station and he offers part of the expected bounty to Alex for driving him to and from the scene of the crime. Carrying out this task, Alex knows of the criminal purpose and therefore it seems clear that in some way he should be held criminally liable. The problem is identifying the form of his liability.

Intellectual work on the law of war suffers from chronic isolation. The commentators on the Rome Statute are international lawyers who pay no attention to the work either of theoretical criminal lawyers or of the philosophers. The philosophers—Jeff McMahan as an outstanding example—ignore the legal details that dominate the books of the international lawyers. Criminal lawyers have much to contribute to the discussion of international law but they seem not to be interested, and so it goes. Writers with limited audiences, living in closed worlds, are unaware of what they have to learn from those with a different take on the field.

These days, American politicians are loath to cite biblical passages for fear of being charged with breaching the wall between church and state. There was a time when a presidential candidate could claim that a certain monetary policy would “crucify us on a cross of gold.” This kind of rhetoric is now taboo. America's national leaders even avoid quoting the religious phrases from the Declaration of Independence, particularly its references to the “Creator” or “Nature's God.” Although in the past some of the greatest American political oratory—Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg (1863) or Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Lincoln Memorial (1963)—relied unashamedly on biblical sources and imagery, it is no longer considered acceptable to argue publicly in the language of either the Hebrew or Christian Bibles. However religious American society might still be today, political rhetoric is noticeably nonreligious.

For people to live together in pluralistic communities, they must find someway to cope with the practices of others that they abhor. For that reason, tolerance has always seemed an appealing medium of accommodation. But tolerance also has its critics. One wing charges that the tolerant are too easygoing. They are insensitive to evil in their midst. At the same time, another wing attacks the (merely) tolerant for being too weak in their sentimentsof respect. “The Christian does not wish to be tolerated,” as T. S. Eliot said; and by this he meant to claim, presumably, that the Christian desires respect and acceptance, and not merely the forbearance suggested by “tolerance.”

To make the case for tolerance, we must engage in a three-front campaign: first, against intolerance; second, against the moral failing of indifference; and third, against the desirability of respecting and accepting everyone. The central claim in making this case will be that unlike these three competing sentiments, tolerance is a complex attitude toward the behavior and beliefs of others. Its complexity consists in both moral disapproval (or atleast cultural rejection) and the avoidance of interference. If there is a case to be made for tolerance, it must derive from this peculiar complexity. After surveying its alternatives, I will argue that the complex sentimentof tolerance is more readily praised than its alternatives.

Some twenty years ago my imaginary character the “psychotic aggressor” made his debut in the pages of the Israel Law Review. Of all the hypothetical cases I have devised over the years, the story of the psychotic aggressor in the elevator, attacking someone who must defend herself, has become one of the most vigorous and long-lasting. This unlikely case has proven to be a useful medium for understanding the difference between claims of justification and claims of excuse in structuring criminal liability. Everyone assumes that the person attacked should be able to defend herself; the problem is whether the defense is right and proper (justified) or whether it is simply the human response and therefore free from blame (excused). This classification has implications, in turn, for whether third parties may come to the aid of the person attacked and whether the psychotic aggressor, in turn, has a right to defend himself against efforts to kill him. These issues have given rise to considerable debate over the last two decades, and much of it can be traced to the conundrum whether resisting a psychotic but purposeful aggressor should be treated as right in itself or, alternatively, wrong but free from blame.

Jewish law takes an approach to self-defense that differs dramatically from the conventional assumptions of Western secular legal systems. The central theme of Talmudic jurisprudence is that self-defense rests on a duty not to stand idly by while one's neighbor suffers. “Do not stand on the blood of one's neighbor,” as the point is cryptically put in Leviticus 19:16. This way of thinking about self-defense departs in two significant ways from common Western assumptions. First, it stresses that the roots of self-defense are a duty rather than a right to act; second, it treats the case of third-party defense (defense of others) as logically prior to the first-party case of self-defense.

Western legal systems diverge radically in their approaches to setting limits on the privilege of self-defence. Some systems incline to the view that a person defending his or another life or property may use all the force necessary to stifle an aggressive attack. Taken to the extreme, this means that if there is no other way to apprehend a thief escaping with a petty bounty, one may shoot him—if necessary, shoot to kill. In contrast to this approach, which is adverse to limits on the use of necessary force, another set of Western jurisdictions insists that the degree of force meet two desiderata: it must be both necessary and proportional to the interest protected. The requirement of proportionality or reasonableness means that there are some cases, like petty thievery, where the cost of protecting a threatened interest may be so great that one must surrender the interest rather than inflict grievous harm on the aggressor.