This comparison of institutions of science advice during COVID-19 between the Westminster systems of England/UK and Ontario/Canada focuses on the role of science in informing public policy in two central components of the response to the pandemic: the adoption of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and the procuring of vaccines. It compares and contrasts established and purpose-built bodies with varying degrees of independence from the political executive, and shows how each attempted to manage the tensions between scientific and governmental logics of accountability as they negotiated the boundary between science and policy. It uses the comparison to suggest potential lessons about the relative merits and drawbacks of different institutional arrangements for science advice to governments in an emergency.

This paper explores what motivates improved health care performance. Previously, many have thought that performance would either improve via choice and competition or by relying on trust and altruism. But neither assumption is supported by available evidence. So instead we explore a third approach of reciprocal altruism with sanctions for unacceptably poor performance and rewards for high performance. These rewards and sanctions, however, are not monetary, but in the form of reputational effects through public reporting of benchmarking of performance. Drawing on natural experiments in Italy and the United Kingdom, we illustrate how public benchmarking can improve poor performance at the national level through ‘naming and shaming’ and enhance good performance at the sub-national level through ‘competitive benchmarking’ and peer learning. Ethnographic research in Zambia also showed how reputations count. Policy-makers could use these effects in different ways to improve public services.

This short commentary on Oliver’s review of incentives relates that review to four models of governance: Trust and Altruism (T&A), Choice and Competition (C&C), Naming and Shaming (N&S) and Targets and Terror (T&T).

This article considers how the ‘accidental logics’ of political settlements for the English National Health Service (NHS) and the Medicare and Medicaid programmes in the United States have resulted in different institutional arrangements and different implicit social contracts for rationing, which we define to be the denial of health care that is beneficial but is deemed to be too costly. This article argues that rationing is designed into the English NHS and designed out of US Medicare; and compares rationing for the elderly in the United States and in England for acute care, care at the end of life, and chronic care.

In a relatively short time, regulation has become a significant and distinct feature of how modern states wish to govern and steer their economy and society. Whereas the former ‘dirigiste’ state used to be closely related to public ownership (e.g. hospitals), planning (volume and capacity planning) and centralised administration (e.g. fixed prices and budgets), the new regulatory state relies mainly on the instrument of regulation to achieve its objectives. In this paper, we wish to relate the rise of the ‘regulatory state’ to the path-dependent trajectories and institutional legacies of discrete European health-care systems. For this purpose, we compared the Dutch corporatist social health insurance system, the strongly centralised National Health Service (NHS) of England and federal regionalised NHS system of Italy. Comparing these three different health-care systems suggests that it is indeed possible to identify a general trend towards the rise of the regulatory state in health care in the last two decades. However, although the three countries examined in this paper face similar problems of multilevel governance of networks of third-party payers and providers, each system also gives rise to its own distinct regulatory challenges.

Although choice may be seen as an end in itself, the papers included in this special issue of Health Economics, Policy and Law, examine choice policies in European systems of health care, which aim to be effective instruments for ameliorating the systemic pressures from the iron triangle of equity, efficiency, and cost. Three papers consider the nature of differences between and within countries following the Beveridge and Bismarck models of financing and organising the delivery of care, and how choices are changing within different systems. Within countries following the Beveridge model, current policies in England, Denmark and Sweden emphasise increasing patient choice of provider. Within countries following the Bismarck model, current policies in France and Germany seek to restrict choice of specialists by introducing ‘soft’ gatekeeping; and in the Netherlands there is a system of managed competition with choice of insurer that, in principle, allows insurers to contract selectively with providers. A fourth paper considers how government policies that seek to restrict choice within systems of universal coverage have been subject to challenges in the courts. A commentary explores the implications of the fraught and complex nature of choices between insurers and providers of health care for designing effective choice policies.

In the 1990s, countries experimented with two models of health care reforms based on choice of provider and insurer. The governments of the UK, Italy, Sweden and New Zealand introduced relatively quickly ‘internal market’ models into their single-payer systems, to transform hierarchies into markets by separating ‘purchasers’ from ‘providers’, and enabling ‘purchasers’ to contract selectively with competing public and private providers so that ‘money followed the patient’. This model has largely been abandoned where it has been tried. England, however, has implemented a modified ‘internal market’ model emphasising patient choice, which has so far had disappointing results. In the Netherlands, it took nearly 20 years to implement successfully the model in which enrollees choose among multiple insurers; but these insurers have so far only realised in part their potential to contract selectively with competing providers. The paper discusses the difficulties of implementing these different models and what England and the Netherlands can learn from each other. This includes exploration, as a thought experiment, of how choice of purchaser might be introduced into the English National Health Service based on lessons from the Netherlands.

Industrialised countries face similar challenges for improving the performance of their health system. Nevertheless, the nature and intensity of the reforms required are largely determined by each country’s basic social security model. Most reforms in Beveridge-type systems have sought to increase choice and reduce waiting times while those in major Bismarck-type systems have focused on cost control by constraining the choice of providers. This paper looks at the main differences in performance of five countries and reviews their recent reform experience, focusing on three questions: Are there systematic differences in performance of Beveridge and Bismarck-type systems? What are the key parameters of healthcare system, which underlie these differences? Have recent reforms been effective?

Our results do not suggest that one system-type performs consistently better than the other. In part, this may be explained by the heterogeneity in organisational design and governance both within and across these systems. Insufficient attention to those structural differences may explain the limited success of a number of recent reforms. Thus, while countries may share similar problems in terms of improving healthcare performance, adopting a ‘copy-and-paste’ approach to healthcare reform is likely to be ineffective.

The current government has given priority to two different objectives in reorganizing the National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales. The first objective is to create a primary care-led NHS by organizing commissioning of hospital and community health services by new primary care organizations. The second objective is to improve quality and performance in the NHS and to assess this using evidence in various ways. Previous research has suggested that the changes GPs wish to make to services are often not based on published evidence. This suggests a conflict between the two principal objectives intended to drive the reorganization of the NHS. The aim of this study was therefore to explore these issues further. An interviewer-administered questionnaire survey was conducted on one general practitioner and one public health physician from each of four total purchasing pilots (TPPs) in Wales and their four host health authorities, respectively. The main outcome measures were the types of evidence used, and the extent to which evidence impacted on decisions. Access to evidence and views about its usefulness are also reported. It was found that more high-quality evidence was used in support of disease-specific than in support of non-disease-specific changes to care. Evidence played a greater role in decisions to change services that were purchased by health authorities, or provided by TPPs, than it did in changes to services purchased by TPPs. Similarly, higher quality of evidence was used when making decisions to change services that were purchased by health authorities or provided by TPPs, than for services that were purchased by TPPs. It is concluded that there is a mismatch between the availability of conventional, disease-specific evidence directed at the delivery of care, and the need for other kinds of evidence for commissioning changes in the organization of care. This means that we need research and development to develop new methods and new types of evidence so that we can assess the benefits of commissioning in a primary care-led NHS.

The Labour Government elected in 1997 faced similar problems in health care to those faced by the Conservative Government in schools in the early 1990s. And the policies developed for health care in the late 1990s echoed those that had been implemented for schools. This paper considers one of those common policies, namely the creation of new central inspectorates required to visit all organizations over a four-year period: the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) to inspect the quality of teaching in schools, and the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) to review the implementation of the systems and processes of clinical governance in every organization in the National Health Service (NHS). At its creation, CHI was described as an OFSTED for the NHS. This paper compares these two inspectorates; describes origins of policies and institutions; considers their rhetoric and practices; describes the processes the two organizations used and considers their impacts. It argues that structural differences meant that CHI could never have been an OFSTED for the NHS; relational distance is a key aspect of inspection/regulation; and that the key to effective regulation in the case of the NHS was the relational proximity between CHI and the NHS, with the added weight of a strong performance management regime.

This paper examines problems of setting targets for health care performance in which the centre sets a uniform set of targets and levels of performance. The case study examined by the paper is from the system of performance assessment of ‘star ratings’ that was introduced from 2001 by the Department of Health to give each organisation in the NHS in England a single summary score from zero rating to three stars. Star ratings were directed at holding trusts' chief executives to account for the local delivery of national priorities through a process of ‘naming and shaming’, in which Chief Executives of zero-rated organisations were at risk of losing their jobs. This paper outlines the underlying model and its three underlying assumptions: the centre can determine a scoring system to prioritise what matters; failures of performance that are not reflected in the scoring system do not matter; and the advantages of a system of scoring on accountable targets outweigh the disadvantages of various types of gaming responses. This paper examines the application of the model of star ratings to a case study of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), which are complex organisations with three diverse sets of responsibilities: delivering primary care, commissioning secondary care, and supervising public health. It outlines an alternative model and the issues this raises for governance of health care performance.