The E-Z Reader 7 model is powerful but incomplete. When programming the saccade to the next word, we take into account the familiarity of the letter sequences at the beginning of that word. This landing position effect is well established, but is neglected in the model. A possible locus for the effect is suggested within the E-Z Reader framework.

Two experiments examine the view that the variation in bilingual short-term memory capacity is determined by differential rates of subvocal rehearsal between the languages. Auditory memory span and articulation time were measured for three bilingual groups who spoke Finnish at home and Swedish at school (FS), and either Finnish (FF) or Swedish (SS) in both the home and the school. The results of Experiment 1 indicate that memory span for words varied in a lawful manner as a function of both articulation time and language dominance for SS and FF. For FS, however, an equivalent memory span between the languages was noted despite a shorter articulation time in Finnish than Swedish. Experiment 2 found that for items with no pre-existing lexical representations (nonwords), articulation time was a more reliable predictor of memory span than language dominance for all three groups. The finding that within-language memory span was greater for short items than long items shows that, ceteris paribus, bilingual short-term memory capacity is sensitive to the effects of word length in both the dominant and non-dominant language. Taken together, these findings moderate the view that bilingual short-term memory capacity is mediated exclusively by subvocal rehearsal and indicate an influential contribution from factors related to language fluency and the strength of lexico-semantic representations.

Relatively poor memory for dreams is important evidence for Hobson et al.'s model of conscious states. We describe the time-gap experience as evidence that everyday memory for waking states may not be as good as they assume. As well as being surprisingly sparse, everyday memories may themselves be systematically distorted in the same manner that Revonsuo attributes uniquely to dreams.

[Hobson et al.; Revonsuo]

Dienes & Perner argue that volitional control in artificial grammar learning is best understood in terms of the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge representations. We maintain that direct, explicit access to knowledge organised in a hierarchy of implicitness/explicitness is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain volitional control. People can invoke volitional control when their knowledge is implicit, as in the case of artificial grammar learning, and they can invoke volitional control when any part of their knowledge representation is implicit, as can be seen by examining “feeling of knowing” phenomena.

Removing attention from the saccade generation system should also remove the paradoxical loops that can occur with attention terminology. At least one such loop is still apparent in the current model, however. The benefits of an attention-free approach are assessed through comparison with a recent theory of attention (Logan 1996).