To describe the course and management of a protracted outbreak after intercontinental transfer of 2 patients colonized with multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (MDRAB).

An 18-month outbreak investigation.

An 860-bed university hospital in France.

Case patients (ie, carriers) were those colonized or infected with an MDRAB isolate.

During the epidemic period, all intensive care unit (ICU) patients and contacts of carriers who were transferred to wards were screened for MDRAB carriage. Contact precautions, environmental screening, and auditing of healthcare worker (HCW) practices were implemented; rooms were cleaned with hydrogen peroxide mist disinfection. One ICU, in which most of the cases occurred, was closed on 4 occasions for thorough cleaning and disinfection.

The 2 index case patients were identified as 2 patients who carried the same MDRAB strain and who were admitted to the hospital after repatriation from Tahiti 5 months apart. During an 18-month period, a total of 84 secondary cases occurred. Reintroduction of MDRAB into the ICUs occurred from patients previously colonized or from healthcare personnel. Termination of the outbreak was only achieved when all carriers from wards or the ICU were cohorted to an isolation unit with dedicated healthcare personnel.

Intercontinental transfer of carriers of MDRAB can result in extensive outbreaks and serious disruption of the hospital's organization. Transmission from carriers most likely occurred via the hands of HCWs, poor cleaning protocols, airborne spread, and contaminated water from sink traps. This protracted outbreak was controlled only after implementation of an extensive control program and eventual cohorting of all carriers in an isolation unit with dedicated healthcare personnel.

To compare two strategies for screening methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) carriers in a high-risk dermatology ward: systematic screening of all admitted patients versus selective screening of patients at risk.

The two strategies were applied prospectively during two consecutive periods. In period A (8.5 months), only patients transferred from other wards, or with a history of prior hospitalization, or presenting chronic wounds or disease with denuded skin were considered at high risk of MRSA carriage and sampled. In period B (7.5 months), all admitted patients were systematically screened. End-points were the number of patients having a MRSA-positive screening sample on admission during period B and having none of the risk factors used in period A, the rate of imported MRSA cases, and the rate of acquired cases.

A 1,032-bed university hospital with a 19-bed inpatient dermatology ward, a referral center for toxic epidermal necrolysis and severe extensive dermatoses.

The study included 729 dermatology inpatients (370 in period A and 359 in period B).

During period A, screening samples were obtained on admission for 30% of patients (77% of the patients at risk) and identified 25 MRSA carriers. During period B, 90.5% of admitted patients were screened, and 26 MRSA carriers were detected on admission; all of these patients belonged to at least one predefined category at risk for carriage. Overall rates of imported and acquired cases were similar between the two periods (6.8% vs 7.5%, and 2.9% vs 2.4%, respectively).

A screening strategy targeted to patients at risk of harboring MRSA has similar sensitivity and is more cost-effective than a strategy of systematic screening to identify MRSA carriers on admission.