The tipping point for regime change arrives suddenly and is difficult to predict, even by those leading the revolution, as well as those leading the defense of the ruling regime. For example, at the time of regime collapse in Russia in 1917, Lenin was in Switzerland, Trotsky was in America, and Stalin was in Siberia. Like a dam that suddenly bursts as a result of the addition of a few more small drops of water, the exact moment of regime collapse is difficult to predict - even by leaders in the revolutionary movement and the forces defending the ruling regime. However, the destruction that follows the bursting of the dam is predictable. Three factors are proposed as preparing the ground for regime collapse. First, societal changes, which can be subtle, incremental, and long term. Second, changes in the ruling elite, particularly with respect to cohesion and fragmentation. Third, the emergence of a charismatic leader who takes charge of the revolutionary movement, often opportunistically putting themselves at the front of the movement.

The Illusion-Motivation Model of Revolution is presented in this chapter. The term “illusion” is not used here to suggest anything negative; it is simply referencing the normal human tendency to be influenced by illusions in everyday life. Five major illusions characterize the behavior of people engaged in a revolutionary movement. The supreme revolutionary illusion is the shared belief among those in a revolutionary movement that all of them will benefit in equal ways from the coming to power of the new revolutionary government. The illusion of unity results in differences within the revolutionary movement being overlooked. The illusion of rationality is in effect after regime change, and it is based on the assumption that a rational approach will yield the necessary positive results. The illusion of control characterizes the extremists who in the post-revolution period topple the moderates and come to power, believing that they can control and change mass behavior in line with their goals. Finally, the illusion of permanence is shared by extremist leaders and their regimes, in the belief that their revolutionary society will last forever.

This introductory chapter explains the central role of psychology in revolutions, as well as the psychological perspective for understanding revolutions. The central puzzles to be solved include the puzzle of why at a deep level so little changes after revolutions, and why so many revolutions against dictatorships result in new dictatorships coming into being. There are potentially thousands of revolutions that could be the focus of this book, and the selection of the French, Russian, Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian revolutions as the focus of this book is explained. The contents of the book are briefly explained: Two chapters focus on psychological theories relevant to revolutions, three chapters on regime change, and (very importantly) three chapters on what happens in the post-revolution period. It is during this post-revolution period that typically moderates get pushed aside and extremists take over. In the final part of the book, one chapter presents a new psychological model of revolution, and another chapter addresses the question: Does human nature doom revolutions? Finally, in the Afterword, revolutions are interpreted as acts of collective creativity.

This chapter examines the psychological factors that underlie behavioral continuity after revolution leads to regime change. Revolutions change the people in power, but they do not necessarily change the behavior of those who come to power after the revolution. All revolutionaries, irrespective of their particular ideologies, face the challenge of changing the behavior of people in their society – behavior that took shape over many years in the pre-revolution society. All revolutionaries are confronted with the stubborn resilience of how people think and act as it was shaped before the revolution – but how are behavioral changes to be achieved toward the ideal society that revolutionaries envisaged? Mao and some other revolutionaries proposed there should be “perpetual revolution,” because the possibility of backsliding to pre-revolution behaviors is too great. But perpetual revolution also means perpetual uncertainty and instability – and even chaos. Other extremist programs attempted by revolutionaries (to prevent continuity in behavior) are emptying cities (as practiced by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia) and emptying universities (as practiced by Mao in China and Khomeini in Iran).

This chapter addresses the limitations potentially placed on the success of revolutions by “human nature” - which in psychological terms are the hard-wired characteristics that limit change in behavior. It is argued that in the long term, even behaviors that we conceptualize as hardwired at present tend to change (particularly through changes in the environment). The avowed goals of the French, Russian, Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian revolutions are examined, and it is concluded that none of these revolutions achieved their goals. Despite failure, the regimes that survive in China, Cuba, and Iran continue to use the rhetoric of revolution. Four ways in which human nature seems to doom revolutions are considered: extremists come to power; an “ends justify the means” approach is adopted and corruption results; the style of leader–follower relations persist after revolutions, with the result that one dictatorship replaces another; and revolutionaries typically fail to set up the necessary conditions to achieve the behavioral changes necessary to reach their revolutionary goals (such as collectivization).

This analysis of the psychology of revolution has adopted a “from societies to cells” approach, where macro processes are given priority. However, micro-level factors such as individual-level personality traits also have an important role in revolutions. In this chapter, an assessment is made of the personality characteristics of revolutionary leaders, people who surround the revolutionary leader, the lay masses who follow and support the extremist revolutionary leader, and those who do not conform and obey according to the wishes of the revolutionary regime. The traditional research focus has been on the revolutionary leader, and in this analysis the key traits of these leaders are identified as Machaivellianism, pathological narcissism, craving for power, risk-taking, intolerance for ambiguity, illusions of control and grandeur, and charisma. The personality of the extremist revolutionary leader in particular shapes what happens after regime change. Typically, moderates get pushed aside and extremists take over, with radical programs such as the “Cultural Revolution” (as in China and Iran).

The process of mutual radicalization is used as a framework to examine relations between the ruling regime and the revolutionary opposition. Mutual radicalization involves a collective process, in which rational individuals are overwhelmed by collective movements and behaviors, which are often irrational. During phase one, group mobilization takes place and the revolutionary opposition comes to perceive the ruling regime as distinct and different from the rest of society, illegitimate and immoral, unstable, and also an obstacle to future progress. During phase two, the ruling regime and the revolutionary opposition develop extreme ingroup cohesion in opposition to one another. Intergroup aggression and hostility increases. Individuals can step outside the group and recognize that the collective is behaving incorrectly, but social forces pressure rational individuals to conform to irrational collective behavior. In phase three, the identities of the ruling regime and the revolutionary opposition are reconstructed in opposition to one another. Each side defines themselves in opposition to the other group, and extremists control relationships between the two sides.

The materialist theories of revolution are critically discussed in this chapter. These theories include realistic conflict theory, resource mobilization theory,social dominance theory, elite theory, system justification theory, and the Five-Stage Model of intergroup relations. On the surface, these theories place psychological science in the periphery and assume material factors to be the main drivers of revolutions. However, because the psychological interpretation of material conditions is given a central place, psychology does play an important role in materialist theories. Also, the father of materialist accounts, Karl Marx, gave importance to psychological factors through concepts such as false consciousness. Individuals experience false consciousness when they are unaware of their true group membership and collective interests. System justification theory is particularly influenced by the idea of false consciousness. Elite theory and the Five-Stage Model present a cyclical rather than linear model of historical development, suggesting that group-based inequalities tend to continue, even after revolutions.