Introduction

Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a Saudi Arabian businessman, is the most prominent case of what happens when one has been declared a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ (SDGT). In 1999 and 2000, the United Nations (UN) suspected Kadi to be an associate of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and placed sanctions against him under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1267 and 1333 (discussed later). In October 2001, the US declared him an SDGT, which caused the blocking of all his property and interests subject to US jurisdiction. The European Union (EU) followed suit, as did Saudi Arabia, Kadi's home country. Kadi has repeatedly claimed that he has given no support to terrorism. Mired in limbo over the accusations, Kadi was forced to stay in Saudi Arabia without ever having been informed of the reasons for his listing and – before the EU endorsed the UN listing – without possibility of appeal.

While the human rights concerns are striking, the case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi draws attention to two points requiring closer scrutiny for scholars of inter-organizational relations (IOR) and world order. First, lists have been frequently used by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and states alike as a means in counterterrorism (Goody, 1977). For IGOs, lists are a way of governing their own remit, the IOR and an organization's environment, as lists are increasingly operating globally and across multiple jurisdictions (De Goede and Sullivan, 2016; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Lists represent the ways in which the external environment of IGOs is observed and internally processed. While IGOs strive to navigate this environment, they aim to reduce uncertainty by using lists that help to make the environment more predictable by explicitly naming those that are considered a threat. The second point resides in how IGOs make sense of their environment, and thereby, govern and shape this very environment – for their own further decision-making as well as for other state and non-state actors.