Insurance is a kind of game in which one needs to be extremely cautious.
Chance must be analyzed, and players be skilled in the science of calculating probabilities;
they need to foresee hazards at sea, and hazards wrought by bad faith;
they must not fail to keep watch for exceptional and bizarre events;
they must combine all together, compare with premium rates,
and assess the final result.
Such speculation is the work of genius.
However, if theory, guided by experience, is only too often fault,
what of the fate of tradesmen who, lured by the prospect of gain,
sign policies presented to them without due consideration
for the dangers into which blind fortune
and their own recklessness may lead them?– B. M. Emerigon, Treatise on Insurances, 1783
Part III of this book examined the protection of critical infrastructure and services by the development of more resilient technological and organizational systems. In Part IV, we highlighted the growing interdependent nature of economic and social activities, which lead to more global and interdependent risks: the failure of one organization is more likely to have an effect on others. This new reality needs to be letter understood and worked out quite specifically, something we addressed in the previous part and for which we suggested some strategies and policies to better respond to these challenges.
Whereas the suggested actions should limit the occurrence and/or the impacts of major catastrophes, the possibility that such extreme events will occur anyway cannot be disregarded.