To systematically assess enhanced personal protective equipment (PPE) doffing safety risks.

We employed a 3-part approach to this study: (1) hierarchical task analysis (HTA) of the PPE doffing process; (2) human factors-informed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA); and (3) focus group sessions with a convenience sample of infection prevention (IP) subject matter experts.

A large academic US hospital with a regional Special Pathogens Treatment Center and enhanced PPE doffing protocol experience.

Eight IP experts.

The HTA was conducted jointly by 2 human-factors experts based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention PPE guidelines. The findings were used as a guide in 7 focus group sessions with IP experts to assess PPE doffing safety risks. For each HTA task step, IP experts identified failure mode(s), assigned priority risk scores, identified contributing factors and potential consequences, and identified potential risk mitigation strategies. Data were recorded in a tabular format during the sessions.

Of 103 identified failure modes, the highest priority scores were associated with team members moving between clean and contaminated areas, glove removal, apron removal, and self-inspection while preparing to doff. Contributing factors related to the individual (eg, technical/ teamwork competency), task (eg, undetected PPE contamination), tools/technology (eg, PPE design characteristics), environment (eg, inadequate space), and organizational aspects (eg, training) were identified. Participants identified 86 types of risk mitigation strategies targeting the failure modes.

Despite detailed guidelines, our study revealed 103 enhanced PPE doffing failure modes. Analysis of the failure modes suggests potential mitigation strategies to decrease self-contamination risk during enhanced PPE doffing.

Individually packaged sterile supply items may become contaminated and act as vectors for nosocomial transmission of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs). Thus, many hospitals have a policy to dispose of these unused, packaged supply items at patient discharge from the hospital, which has considerable cost implications. We evaluated the frequency of contamination of these items, the efficacy of hydrogen peroxide vapor (HPV) in disinfecting them, and costs associated with discarded supplies.

Before-after study.

A pilot study was performed in the rooms of 20 patients known to be colonized or infected with vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), and a follow-up study was performed in an additional 20 rooms of patients under precautions for various MDROs in 6 high-risk units. Five pairs of supply items were selected. One item of each pair was sampled without exposure to HPV, and the other was sampled after HPV exposure. The cost of discarded supplies was calculated by examining stock lists of supplies stored on the study units.

Seven (7%) of 100 items were contaminated with VRE in the pilot study, and 9 (9%) of 100 items were contaminated with MDROs in the follow-up study. None of the items were contaminated after exposure to HPV (P < .02 in both the pilot and the follow-up study). The annual cost of supplies discarded at patient hospital discharge was $387,055. This figure does not include the cost of waste disposal and is therefore likely to be an underestimation of the financial burden.

HPV effectively disinfected the packaging of supply items, which could generate considerable financial and environmental benefits.

To describe a pseudo-outbreak associated with loose bronchoscope biopsy ports caused by inadequate bronchoscope repair practices by third-party vendors and to alert healthcare personnel to assess bronchoscope repair practices.

Outbreak investigation.

A 925-bed tertiary care hospital in Baltimore, Maryland.

Patients who underwent bronchoscopy with certain bronchoscopes after they had been repaired by a third-party vendor.

An epidemiologic investigation was conducted to determine the cause of Pseudomonas putida growth in 4 bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) specimens within a 3-day period in May 2008. All bronchoscopes were inspected, and cultures were obtained from bronchoscopes and the environment. Bronchoscope cleaning and maintenance practices were reviewed. Microbiologic results from BAL specimens and medical records were reviewed to find additional cases.

All 4 case patients had undergone bronchoscopy with one of 2 bronchoscopes, both of which had loose biopsy ports. Bronchoscope cultures grew P. putida, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and Stenotrophomonas. The P. putida strains from the bronchoscopes matched those from the patients. Specimens from 12 additional patients who underwent bronchoscopy with these bronchoscopes grew P. putida, P. aeruginosa, or Stenotrophomonas. No patients developed clinical signs or symptoms of infection, but 7 were treated with antibiotics. Investigation revealed that the implicated bronchoscopes had been sent to an external vendor for repair; examination by the manufacturer revealed irregularities in repairs and nonstandard part replacements.

Third-party vendors without access to proprietary information may contribute to mechanical malfunction of medical devices, which can lead to contamination and incomplete disinfection.

Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2012;33(3):224-229