The chapter presents respective views of Hobbes and Leibniz on the issue of universals and human cognition. This chapter represents a bridge between the chapter on space and the chapter on law. Hobbesian nominalism rejecting any universals but names can only be fully appreciated against his views on space, materiality of which emerges form the materiality of bodies. This focus on materiality determining his nominalism also defines his view of human cognition where truth is simply an able use of language. Leibniz’s space as a logical grounding, as an order of relationships determines his belief in the existence of universals as well as his insistence on the capacity of human mind to access eternal truths. Thus, if for Hobbes the main question becomes how to control discourse, for Leibniz the central issue is articulation of ways to discover and thus know eternal truths.

This is an intermediary chapter summarising and bringing together the analysis and arguments of previous chapters. It also prepares the ground for the analysis in the final chapter of the book.

Two main themes of the disicipline of international law, namley its theory of subjects of international law and the concept of sources of international law form the core of this chapter. Respective views of Hobbes and Leibniz on these two themes are analysed and compared. The continuing influence of Hobbesian and Leibnizian ideas on these two topics is also analysed. It is argued that the theory of subjects of international law with the central role of the state and the objective definitional approach to the concept of the state is fundamentally Hobbesian. The concept of sources of international law appears at the surface more Leibnizian. However, the Leibnizian heritage was striped of its foundation and thus distorted. As a result, international law in its contemporary articulation is an oxymoron. The trasformative future of international law lies in a rethinking of its normativity away from its Hobbesian heritage. However, to be sucessful, such a rethinking should be grounded in a reflection on possible alternative spatial-conceptual foundations one of which is offered by Leibniz.

The chapter describes the general background of science and law in the seventeenth century. It highlights main philosophical debates of this century and their link to religion. It highlights search for ’new philosophies’, as well as emergance of mechanical philosophies. The centrality of the geometrical method in this century is highlighted as well as its influence on both Leibniz and Hobbes. In relation to Leibniz this method was radically transformed and advanced into the project of scientia generalis and characteristica universalis. Political instability and search for peace are the main genral features of the period, which is still characterised by fragmented and multilayered legal landscape.

Summarising the main arguments of the book, the conclusions also put into relief the importance of spatial-conceptual approach to the study of international law. If from the Hobbesian perspective international order is not really law, Leibnizian concept of normativity grounded in the cognitive dimension underpined by the relational space as a logical grounding pushes international scholars to think the regulation at the global level in more divrse ways. However, the cognitive dimension of normativity remains yet to be fully explored.

This chapter critically examines Hobbes’s and Leibniz’s positions in relation to the concept of law and its role in regulating life of human communities. In line with his materialist stance and the controllability of space and discourse, Hobbes postulates the idea of the state and sovereign as central controlling devices able to create universality within a limited terriotry through control. Hobbes’s view of the state of nature and transition to the commonwealth are examined anew form this perspective. Leibniz’s concept of law is determined by the centrality of the concept of justice to his philosophy. Precepts of justice as eternal and universal truths discoverable by human beings shall inform accrding to Leibniz positive law within individuals human communities. However, he does not posit a particular form of life in common as determining but accepts diversity of political forms. Normativity of law in Leibniz derives not from its character of a command, like in Hobbes, but from a particular internal disposition of human beings, which in turn is determined by the internalisation of eternal truths as items constituting that logical grounding against which the human existence unfolds.

The introduction explains motivation for writing the book, briefly describes the arugment of the book as a whole and its progrssion in chapters. It justifies the choice of the focus on Leibniz and Hobbes. It also addresses some methodological questions.

The chapter presents concepts of space as developed by Hobbes and Leibniz respectively. It highlights commonalities and differences in their respective concepts of space. For Hobbes, the concept of space is articulated through ideas of imaginary and real space. Hobbesian space emerges as determined by the measurment of bodies, material and thus controllable. This view of space strongly resonates with the uses of space is contemporary spatial justice studies. For Leibniz, space is a logical grounding against which the materiality of the world unfolds but also the outcome of the activity of monads as simple substances. For Leibniz, space as an order of relationships is not controllable but knowable.