Book chapters will be unavailable on Saturday 24th August between 8am-12pm BST. This is for essential maintenance which will provide improved performance going forwards. Please accept our apologies for any inconvenience caused.
To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Albert the Great reveals the influence of Avicenna and Averroes in his psychology, though he certainly does not agree with them on all points. Although he maintains that sense as such is a material and passive power, Albert admits that after it has been actualised by the sensible form, it can make judgements. However, it appears to do so only through the common sense. Albert rejects the argument that just as there is in the soul an agent intellect which abstracts and thus actualises intelligible species so there must be an active sense which abstracts and thus actualises the sensible. He replies that it is something in the nature of the intellect which renders the potentially intelligible actually intelligible, but it is something in external reality, not anything in the powers of the soul, which renders material things actually sensible. However, what is in the sense is certainly not the form united in existence with matter as found in the external thing, but rather an intention (intentio) or species of the material thing which enables us to have sense knowledge of that thing. Since sense apprehends the sensible object through such an intention, the first grade of abstraction is found in sensation, namely, separation from the matter of the external thing. However, in so far as sensation is of actually existing sensible things, which are individuated by matter, there must remain in sense apprehension a reference to matter as present and to the individuating conditions of matter.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.