To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In view of the increasing complexity of both cardiovascular implantable electronic devices (CIEDs) and patients in the current era, practice guidelines, by necessity, have become increasingly specific. This document is an expert consensus statement that has been developed to update and further delineate indications and management of CIEDs in pediatric patients, defined as ≤21 years of age, and is intended to focus primarily on the indications for CIEDs in the setting of specific disease categories. The document also highlights variations between previously published adult and pediatric CIED recommendations and provides rationale for underlying important differences. The document addresses some of the deterrents to CIED access in low- and middle-income countries and strategies to circumvent them. The document sections were divided up and drafted by the writing committee members according to their expertise. The recommendations represent the consensus opinion of the entire writing committee, graded by class of recommendation and level of evidence. Several questions addressed in this document either do not lend themselves to clinical trials or are rare disease entities, and in these instances recommendations are based on consensus expert opinion. Furthermore, specific recommendations, even when supported by substantial data, do not replace the need for clinical judgment and patient-specific decision-making. The recommendations were opened for public comment to Pediatric and Congenital Electrophysiology Society (PACES) members and underwent external review by the scientific and clinical document committee of the Heart Rhythm Society (HRS), the science advisory and coordinating committee of the American Heart Association (AHA), the American College of Cardiology (ACC), and the Association for European Paediatric and Congenital Cardiology (AEPC). The document received endorsement by all the collaborators and the Asia Pacific Heart Rhythm Society (APHRS), the Indian Heart Rhythm Society (IHRS), and the Latin American Heart Rhythm Society (LAHRS). This document is expected to provide support for clinicians and patients to allow for appropriate CIED use, appropriate CIED management, and appropriate CIED follow-up in pediatric patients.
Statutory interpretation is a problem that is of crucial importance for legal practice and theory, political discussions, ethical issues, and public information. A substantial majority of the US Supreme Court’s case load involves statutory construction, nearly two-thirds of its docket by one recent estimate, and in the years ahead, courts will be asked to construe the meaning of thousands of sections of legislation. However, as Katzmann (2014, 3–10) emphasized, the interpretation of legal texts affects not only daily rulings in the courts at all levels, but even what have become political issues vital to the legal system such as televised confirmation hearings for US Supreme Court nominees. Statutes affect all aspects of our daily lives, including the most pressing public policy issues at a given time. However, although ideally the language of the statute should be clear, the texts passed by legislative bodies, such as the US Congress, can be vague, ambiguous, structurally complex in expression, or even apparently logically inconsistent. Fundamental values of our societies, emerging in the controversies on the issues of freedom of speech, abortion, marriage, or self-defense, are primarily debated as matters of interpretation.
In our previous chapter on ambiguity, we underscored how the logical form of a legal statement does not provide the proposition expressed. The meaning of an utterance – the product of a verbal act performed in a specific context (Leech 1983, 14) – cannot be the simple output of a decoding process (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 182; Recanati 2003, 56), or “semantic interpretation” (Leech 1983, 5). The logical form (also called “semantic representation”) that can be recovered through the mere decoding of an utterance through the application of the rules of grammar (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 9–10) does not deliver complete propositions, but only “semantic schemata” (Recanati 2003, 56).
For many readers the paradigm of argumentation in a legal setting is that of the trial, an instance of the type of dialogue called the persuasion dialogue or critical discussion in the argumentation literature (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992; Walton, 1999; Prakken, 2009). This setting is an adversarial one. For example, in a criminal case the prosecution’s role is not only to support its claim that the defendant committed the crime by bringing forward evidence, but also to attack the arguments of the other side, defend its own arguments against these attacks, and prove its own claim to the standard required, that of beyond reasonable doubt in the common law system. With this paradigm in mind, it is easy to jump to the generalization that legal argumentation is a kind of persuasion dialogue in which each side is trying to persuade the trier of fact to accept its view of the matter (Feteris, 1999, 171–174; Kloosterhuis, 2013).
In our previous chapters, we underscored the role of interpretative arguments in the justification of the passage from a legal text to a legal rule (Hage, 1996, 214; Tarello, 1980), where the latter is intended as a normative premise under which an individual case can be “subsumed” or classified (Moreso & Chilovi, 2018). Legal interpretation can be compared to the common understanding and processing of utterances in ordinary conversation (Smolka & Pirker, 2016), in which semantic content is only a vehicle for getting to the “speaker’s meaning,” i.e., what is communicated – a richer content to which semantic “meaning and obvious background assumptions have both contributed” (Soames, 2008, 411; see also Butler, 2016; Carston, 2013; Horn, 1995; Miller, 1990).
This definition is only apparently clear and simple. In fact, in order to understand what it means exactly, it is necessary to analyze first the concept of [§1.1] interpretation and then the related concepts of [§1.2] ambiguity, [§1.3] ordinary meaning, and [§1.4] vagueness.
As shown in the previous chapters, interpretation is at the crossroad between linguistics – and in particular pragmatics – and legal theory. When we analyzed the relationship between the Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatic frameworks and the instruments used in legal interpretation, we pointed out the role of presumptions and defeasibility in assessing the strength of an interpretation. In this perspective, pragmatic maxims and interpretative canons are both useful tools for justifying an interpretation, but alone do not provide any criteria for establishing the superiority of an argument – and consequently of a justified interpretation – over another. In our previous chapter, we pointed out how a hierarchy of presumptions based on their defeasibility conditions can guide the process of assessment. In this view, the less defeasible arguments are those that are based on specific presumptions, namely defeasible generalizations linking an interpretation to specific features of a text or co-text.
The English word “interpretation” comes from Latin interpretatio, from interpres, originally meaning an intermediary, broker, or agent, and then also an explainer or translator (De Vaan 2008, 307). In its turn interpres seems to have resulted from the fusion of inter (between) and praes, a word that possibly shares the same root with the Latin pretium (price), thus being linked to the idea of an economic exchange (lending, buying, or selling). The semantic area of “interpretation” is also covered by terms of Greek origin, such as “exegesis” and “hermeneutics,” often used in religious contexts.
Statutory interpretation involves the reconstruction of the meaning of a legal statement when it cannot be considered as accepted or granted. This phenomenon needs to be considered not only from the legal and linguistic perspective, but also from the argumentative one - which focuses on the strategies for defending a controversial or doubtful viewpoint. This book draws upon linguistics, legal theory, computing, and dialectics to present an argumentation-based approach to statutory interpretation. By translating and summarizing the existing legal interpretative canons into eleven patterns of natural arguments - called argumentation schemes - the authors offer a system of argumentation strategies for developing, defending, assessing, and attacking an interpretation. Illustrated through major cases from both common and civil law, this methodology is summarized in diagrams and maps for application to computer sciences. These visuals help make the structures, strategies, and vulnerabilities of legal reasoning accessible to both legal professionals and laypeople.
In ‘Can and Might’ (this Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, September, 1971, pp. 87–92), Professor K. W. Rankin has presented three arguments that purport to refute the equivalence (E), ‘A (an action) is causally possible for P (a person) if and only if A is within P's power’. The first two arguments are attributed to Richard Taylor (Action and Purpose, Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 53–59), and the third is Professor Rankin's own. I will argue that none of these three arguments effectively refutes the above equivalence. My arguments are not to be construed as simply a rebuttal of Professor Rankin's paper since (a) he also appears to have some doubts about Taylor's arguments and (b) I refrain from comment on other aspects of his paper except these three arguments. I conclude with some general remarks on (E).
Can an omnipotent being create a stone too heavy for him to lift? If not, he is not omnipotent. But if so, he is not omnipotent either, since there is something he cannot lift. Hence there can be no omnipotent being. J .L. Cowan's recent reformulation of this paradox of omnipotence (this Journal, vol. III, no. 3, March, 1974) has been sharpened through a number of objections and clarifications, and, in its final form, constitutes a significant problem for the analysis of the concept of an omnipotent agent. I will develop fragments of two systems in which the problem can be defined more exactly, and try to indicate some formal guidelines within which constructive steps towards a solution may be possible. I will argue that the paradox shows the need for a special kind of restriction on omnipotence that can be distinguished from some related restrictions.
If one looks to the current textbook lore for reliable taxonomic and analytical information about the petitio principii, one is met with conceptual disarray and much too much nonsense. The present writers have recently attempted to furnish the beginnings of a theoretical reconstruction of this fallacy which is at once faithful to its formidable complexity yet useful as guide for its detection and avoidance. The fact is that the petitio has had a lengthy and interesting history, and in this paper we shall want to explore certain features of its development, such as it may have been. The principal origins of the concept of circular argument are to be found in Aristotle. The Aristotelian doctrine recurs with variations in the sophismata literature of the middle ages and in logic texts and manuals right up to the present day.
Increased substitution of marine ingredients by terrestrial plant products in aquafeeds has been proven to be suitable for Atlantic salmon farming. However, a reduction in n-3 long-chain PUFA is a consequence of this substitution. In contrast, relatively little attention has been paid to the effects of fishmeal and oil substitution on levels of micronutrients such as Se, considering fish are major sources of this mineral for human consumers. To evaluate the effects of dietary marine ingredient substitution on tissue Se distribution and the expression of Se metabolism and antioxidant enzyme genes, Atlantic salmons were fed three feeds based on commercial formulations with increasing levels of plant proteins (PP) and vegetable oil. Lipid content in flesh did not vary at any sampling point, but it was higher in the liver of 1 kg of fish fed higher PP. Fatty acid content reflected dietary input and was related to oxidation levels (thiobarbituric acid-reactive substances). Liver had the highest Se levels, followed by head kidney, whereas the lowest contents were found in brain and gill. The Se concentration of flesh decreased considerably with high levels of substitution, reducing the added value of fish consumption. Only the brain showed significant differences in glutathione peroxidase, transfer RNA selenocysteine 1-associated protein 1b and superoxide dismutase expression, whereas no significant regulation of Se-related genes was found in liver. Although Se levels in the diets satisfied the essential requirements of salmon, high PP levels led to a reduction in the supply of this essential micronutrient.