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The rocky shores of the north-east Atlantic have been long studied. Our focus is from Gibraltar to Norway plus the Azores and Iceland. Phylogeographic processes shape biogeographic patterns of biodiversity. Long-term and broadscale studies have shown the responses of biota to past climate fluctuations and more recent anthropogenic climate change. Inter- and intra-specific species interactions along sharp local environmental gradients shape distributions and community structure and hence ecosystem functioning. Shifts in domination by fucoids in shelter to barnacles/mussels in exposure are mediated by grazing by patellid limpets. Further south fucoids become increasingly rare, with species disappearing or restricted to estuarine refuges, caused by greater desiccation and grazing pressure. Mesoscale processes influence bottom-up nutrient forcing and larval supply, hence affecting species abundance and distribution, and can be proximate factors setting range edges (e.g., the English Channel, the Iberian Peninsula). Impacts of invasive non-native species are reviewed. Knowledge gaps such as the work on rockpools and host–parasite dynamics are also outlined.
England's Time To Change (TTC) social marketing campaign emphasised social contact between people with and without mental health problems to reduce stigma and discrimination.
We aimed to assess the effectiveness of the mass media component and also that of the mass social contact events.
Online interviews were performed before and after each burst of mass media social marketing to evaluate changes in knowledge, attitudes and behaviour and associations between campaign awareness and outcomes. Participants at social contact events were asked about the occurrence and quality of contact, attitudes, readiness to discuss mental health and intended behaviour towards people with mental health problems.
Prompted campaign awareness was 38-64%. A longitudinal improvement was noted for one intended behaviour item but not for knowledge or attitudes. Campaign awareness was positively associated with greater knowledge (β = 0.80, 95% CI 0.52-1.08) and more favourable attitudes (commonality OR 1.37, 95% CI 1.10-1.70; dangerousness OR 1.41, 95% CI 1.22-1.63) and intended behaviour (β = 0.75, 95% CI 0.53-0.96). Social contact at events demonstrated a positive impact (M=2.68) v. no contact (M = 2.42) on perceived attitude change; t(211)= 3.30, P=0.001. Contact quality predicted more positive attitude change (r=0.33, P<0.01) and greater confidence to challenge stigma (r=0.38, P<0.01).
The favourable short-term consequences of the social marketing campaign suggest that social contact can be used by anti-stigma programmes to reduce stigma.
Little is known about the preferences and experiences of people with mental illness in relation to residential alternatives to hospital.
To explore patients' subjective experiences of traditional hospital services and residential alternatives to hospital.
In-depth interviews were conducted with 40 purposively selected patients in residential alternative services who had previously experienced hospital in-patient stays. Transcripts were coded and analysed for thematic content.
Patients reported an overall preference for residential alternatives. These were identified as treating patients with lower levels of disturbance, being safer, having more freedom and decreased coercion, and having less paternalistic staff compared with traditional in-patient services. However, patients identified no substantial difference between their relationships with staff overall and the care provided between the two types of services.
For patients who have acute mental illness but lower levels of disturbance, residential alternatives offer a preferable environment to traditional hospital services: they minimise coercion and maximise freedom, safety and opportunities for peer support.
At one time, the House Committee on Appropriations was one of the two or three most powerful committees in Congress. Evans provides an insightful analysis of the declining power of the committee over federal spending during the period 1995 to 2000, years of Republican control of the House. Discretionary spending increased greatly during the period, as did the use of earmarks to target the favored projects of individual legislators.
The appropriations process in Congress has undergone significant change in the past twelve years. The Republican era, especially in the House of Representatives, transformed the politics of appropriations from its traditional bipartisanship to a far more partisan, even rancorous politics than was depicted by Richard F. Fenno in his classic study of the appropriations committees in the 1950s and 1960s, The Power of the Purse. Fenno found a highly unified House Appropriations Committee in which partisanship was played down in favor of intracommittee integration, expertise, professionalism, and compromise; the shared policy goal was guardianship of the Treasury.
This relatively peaceful state of affairs was not to last forever; indeed, it began to slip within a few years. Both the congressional budget process instituted in 1974 and the growing polarization of the congressional parties contributed to the shift. Not surprisingly, scholars found an increase in partisanship on both the House and Senate appropriations committees in the post-reform era. Nevertheless, the House Appropriations Committee in particular continued to exhibit a degree of bipartisanship and independence unusual on the Hill in the 1980s.
In this excerpt, Evans considers the nature of coalition building for individualistic or “pork barrel” projects in Congress. She argues that party leaders use pork projects to gain votes on other general interest legislation.
[My] argument is that one important strategy by which policy coalition leaders create legislative majorities for controversial general interest legislation is to buy legislators' votes, one by one, favor by favor. Doing so not only helps leaders to unite their party, but it also can draw members of the other party away from their own caucus. Where attainment of a secure majority on the merits seems doubtful, distributive benefits provide the extra margin of support to compensate for pressures that otherwise might persuade members not to vote for such a bill. This strategy is particularly interesting for its use of the sort of policy that is most reviled by observers of Congress – pork barrel policy – to pass the type that is most admired – general interest policy.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the process of acquiring votes with distributive benefits, it is worthwhile to elaborate on the definition of general interest legislation. I define such legislation as broad-based measures that affect the whole nation or a large segment thereof. This definition of general interest legislation is somewhat similar to Douglas Arnold's definition of general benefits. Arnold requires that in order to be general in their impact, policies must “fall uniformly on members of society.”
The argument of this book is that one important strategy by which policy coalition leaders create legislative majorities for controversial general interest legislation is to buy legislators' votes, one by one, favor by favor. Doing so not only helps leaders to unite their party; it also can draw members of the other party away from their own caucus. Where attainment of a secure majority on the merits seems doubtful, distributive benefits provide the extra margin of support to compensate for pressures that otherwise might persuade members not to vote for such a bill. This strategy is particularly interesting for its use of the sort of policy that is most reviled by observers of Congress – pork barrel policy – to pass the type that is most admired – general interest policy.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the process of acquiring votes with distributive benefits, it is worthwhile to elaborate on the definition of general interest legislation. In Chapter 1, I defined such legislation as broad-based measures that affect the whole nation or a large segment thereof. This definition of general interest legislation is somewhat similar to Douglas Arnold's definition of general benefits. Arnold requires that in order to be general in their impact, policies must “fall uniformly on members of society” (Arnold 1990, p. 26). Subsumed by this definition is breadth of impact: Such policies obviously affect everyone.
Pork barrel projects would surely rank near the top of most observers' lists of Congress's most widely despised products. Yet, political leaders in Congress and the President often trade pork for votes to pass legislation that serves broad national purposes, giving members of Congress pork barrel projects in return for their votes on general interest legislation. It is a practice that succeeds at a cost, but it is a cost that many political leaders are willing to pay in order to enact the broader public policies that they favor. There is an irony in this: pork barrel benefits, the most reviled of Congress's legislative products, are used by policy coalition leaders to produce the type of policy that is most admired - general interest legislation. This book makes the case that buying votes with pork is one way in which Congress solves its well-known collective action problem.
The argument of this book is that vote buying with pork barrel projects is useful, even essential, under some conditions for passing general interest legislation in a legislative body whose majority party leaders lack powerful sanctions for enforcing party discipline on each and every issue. The U.S. Congress is certainly such a body, despite its increasing partisanship. In his influential analysis of the role of parties in the House of Representatives in assembling majority voting coalitions, David Rohde (1991) describes a system of “conditional party government,” in which the party caucuses expect their leaders to use the tools in their possession to enforce discipline, but only on those issues on which broad intraparty agreement exists. Rohde explicitly recognizes that there are issues on which no such agreement exists (pp. 31–32); in such cases or where policy coalition leaders wish to buck the party leadership, they must use other resources to assemble a majority. Pork is one such resource. The preceding chapters show that it is one that is often effective at winning votes.
There are many potential opportunities for leaders to use this method of forming coalitions, despite the fact that the proportion of votes that is counted as party unity votes has risen over the past twenty-five years (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2002, p. 172). The standard scoring system for a party unity vote requires only that a simple majority of one party vote in opposition to a simple majority of the other.
Previous chapters have focused on vote buying in the House of Representatives on three bills between 1986 and 1993, all years of Democratic control. In all of those cases, policy coalition leaders were able to win House members' votes for the leaders' policy preferences by giving out distributive benefits. In this chapter, we shift the focus to the Senate, examining distributive politics first under a Democratic majority, then under Republican control. This allows us to address the two questions posed at the end of Chapter 5: First, do policy coalition leaders in the Senate, like those in the House, use pork barrel benefits to buy votes for general interest legislation? If so, are Republicans as inclined as Democrats to use pork barrel projects as a coalition-building technique?
There is some reason to doubt that either would be the case. With respect to partisan differences, the Democrats, as the party of government, have fewer doubts than Republicans about the legitimacy of using federal resources to solve problems, whether that solution comes from national policy or distributive benefits to their districts. As a consequence, Democrats are more likely to see vote buying with pork barrel projects as a fairly benign practice. On the other hand, Republicans, with their ideological commitment to economy in government and the free market as the best way to sort out problems, could be expected to take a different approach.
In 1985 and 1986, Congress undertook the largest reform of the U.S. tax code since World War II. The goal of the reformers, particularly President Ronald Reagan, was to reduce personal income tax rates by raising corporate tax rates and closing most loopholes for wealthy individuals and businesses (Birnbaum and Murray 1987, p. 22). One of the key players in that process was former Representative Dan Rostenkowski of Chicago, chair of the House Ways and Means Committee. To pass the legislation in the committee required both political skill and resources, and his were considerable. The New York Times described how he did it:
On a Friday morning in November …, hours before the Ways and Means Committee was to vote …, Mr. Rostenkowski sat with a list in the committee's library and began calling other members to tell them of special tax breaks he had sneaked into the bill just for them. They included favorable tax treatment for stadiums in Cleveland, Miami and the Meadowlands in New Jersey, for waste-treatment plants in New York City and on Long Island, for a convention center in Miami, for parking garages in Memphis and Charleston, S. C., for St. Luke's Hospital and New York University in Manhattan, and, not surprisingly, for a savings and loan association in Chicago. Members who planned to vote against the bill got nothing for their districts.
Rostenkowski's horse trading is part of the tradition commonly known as pork barrel politics.
The previous chapter examined how Public Works and Transportation Committee leaders distributed highway demonstration projects, with a focus on which members they targeted with projects in their efforts to influence those members' votes later, when the highway bills came to the floor of the House. In statistical terms, the dependent variable was project awards to members. We established that leaders distributed projects strategically in an effort to secure the votes not only of rank-and-file members, but also members whose support would be especially valuable: their own committee members and other leaders.
This chapter assesses the effectiveness of leaders' attempts to influence members with pork barrel benefits. It addresses the following questions: Did members who received projects then respond as the leaders hoped, voting to support the leaders' positions? Did the leaders who used this strategy succeed in undermining the cohesion of the opposing party? This chapter answers those questions for highway demonstration projects. Chapter 5 answers them for the president's efforts to get congressional approval of NAFTA in the House; and Chapter 6 examines the Senate's use of appropriations earmarks to win votes for Appropriations subcommittee chairs' versions of particular appropriations bills. In all of those analyses, the dependent variable is the member's roll call vote.
While it seems obvious that project recipients would vote for final passage of a bill that provides them with benefits, controversial legislation must typically overcome numerous obstacles before the final vote.