Introduces the concept of freedom of speech and the legal and social constraints on speech. Free speech is often framed as absolute, but in practice our speech is limited by laws – bans on obscenity, threats, even entire languages. Other social forces hedge our speech as well: parents and teachers attempt to steer our speech; employers tell us what to say and what not to say; and groups of friends set norms and exact punishments for speech behavior in social settings. In all, as speakers and writers we contend with explicit and implicit rules about what we can and cannot say.

Today three forces threaten to limit speech. The first pits guns against words, creating a showdown between the Second Amendment and the First. The second sees powerful speakers invoking their right to speak in order to silence other people’s speech. Third, and perhaps the most subtle, the monitoring of our digital speech by government and business chills our ability to say what we want online. Free speech will survive provided we remain vigilant in defending the speech rights of the minority against what has been called the tyranny of the majority.

Obscene speech is always unprotected speech. When states ratified the First Amendment, many already criminalized obscene speech. They saw no conflict between the amendment's speech protection and bans on obscenity and profanity. Obscenity law, as intially defined in R. v. Hicklin, assumed that one bad word could render an entire work obscene. Over time, courts tempered obscenity bans by considering a work as a whole, and whether any questionable language was offset by the work's scientific, artistic, or social importance.We look at Hicklin; the obscenity trials in the UK of Henry Vizetelly for publishing translations of Emile Zola novels; the US Senate debates in 1929–30 on an obscenity clause in a new tariff bill; and the regulation of obscenity in film, and on radio and later, TV. Although the definition of obscene language remains difficult to pin down, courts assume "you'll know it when you see it." In practice, although obscenity remains outside the law, defining what counts as obscene has swept more and more language that was once considered obscene into the category of protected speech.

The First Amendment protects speech, and it protects speakers from compelled speech. Generally, you can't be forced to say or sign anything – a prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, a loyalty oath, that goes against your deeply held beliefs. But all speech protections are contingent: just as some speech has no constitutional protection, governments and in some cases, employers, may compel certain types of speech. Laws may dictate the content of product labels or other aspects of advertising; employers may require workers to follow scripts or repeat certain formulas; some loyalty oaths may be required; and federal law requires English as the language of air traffic control. We look at three examples of compelled speech in this chapter: the presidential oath of office, prescribed in the US Constitution; the Miranda warning, the caution that police must give to anyone under arrest before they may question them. And statutes that define their own words. Such definitions require us to accept a particular meaning and reject alternatives, and as such, they constitute compelled speech. We see the problems that ensued when the US government enacted a law defining "marriage" as the "union of one man and one woman," a law that was ultimately ruled unconstitution by the US Supreme Court in Windsor v. US.

After the US entered WWI, federal and state governments took action to suppress or even ban the use of languages other than English through the mails, in schools, and in various public settings. Moves to require English targeted nonanglophones, whether they were born in the US or had immigrated from elsewhere, and official English became a rallying cry for those bent on reducing or eliminating immigration. But such laws have little impact on the acquisition of English, as newcomers to the US continue to acquire English at rates equal to or better than those in previous generations. Without official language legislation at the federal level, the US manages to have more monolingual speakers of the majority language than many nations that do impose language bans on their residents.

Political speech, now one of the most highly-protected forms of speech in the United States, wasn't always protected. In times of stress, particularly times of war, free speech has been curtailed: Congress passed the Sedition Act of 1798 to silence critics of the Adams administration, and it passed the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917/18 to silence critics of US participation in WW I. Both laws openly flouted constitutional free-speech guarantees. In a series of high-profiile cases over the course of the twentieth century, the US Supreme Court developed a First Amendment doctrine that gave more and more types of speech First Amendment protection. Starting with the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris in 2015, this chapter looks at increasing protections for political speech from 1791 to the present, including free speech for students. We assess the continuing impact of the doctrine that might be called "free speech, but." Yes, speech is protected, but there is still some speech considered outside the framework of legal protection.

Threats are not protected speech, but defining what constitutes a threat has been problematic, particularly when it comes to online speech. We start with a look at threats against the US president, beginning with a 1798 prosecution for threatening John Adams, and leading up to the passage in 1917 of the first federal legislation against threatening the president. We will look at WW I-era prosecutions for threatening the president, leading up to a 1969 Supreme Court decision, Watts v. US, distinguishing true threats from protected political speech. And we conclude with two cases of online threats: the prosecution of Anthony Elonis for posting threats on Facebook, and a case where two tourists were denied entry to the US because of joking tweets that were treated as threats by US Border Agents. We conclude that threats, like obscenity, remain unprotected speech, but defining what is and what is not a threat in any particular case remains a problematic, subjective decision.

Beginning with a look at the January 6 riots at the US Capitol, and concluding with neo-Nazi rallies in support of "white free speech" in Charlottesville, VA, and earlier in Skokie, IL, we discusses how groups are weaponizing free speech to suppress the speech of others.

The clash between the First and Second amendments in the US Constitution – the First guaranteeing free speech and the Second guaranteeing the right to bear arms – leads into a discussion of legal interpretations of the Second Amendment from 1791, when the states ratified the Bill of Rights, to the present. Using a corpus linguistic analysis of the Second Amendment, with a focus on "the right to keep and bear arms," and an examination of the US Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), we see that, just like any other text, whether a literary work, a sacred book, or an everyday communication like a memo or shopping list, legal interpretation is always contingent, always subjective, and and always subject to reinterpretation.