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Bog bodies are among the best-known archaeological finds worldwide. Much of the work on these often extremely well-preserved human remains has focused on forensics, whereas the environmental setting of the finds has been largely overlooked. This applies to both the ‘physical’ and ‘cultural’ landscape and constitutes a significant problem since the vast spatial and temporal scales over which the practice appeared demonstrate that contextual assessments are of the utmost importance for our explanatory frameworks. In this article we develop best practice guidelines for the contextual analysis of bog bodies, after assessing the current state of research and presenting the results of three recent case studies including the well-known finds of Lindow Man in the United Kingdom, Bjældskovdal (Tollund Man and Elling Woman) in Denmark, and Yde Girl in the Netherlands. Three spatial and chronological scales are distinguished and linked to specific research questions and methods. This provides a basis for further discussion and a starting point for developing approaches to bog body finds and future discoveries, while facilitating and optimizing the re-analysis of previous studies, making it possible to compare deposition sites across time and space.
To determine whether nut intake is associated with the prevalence of metabolic syndrome in US adolescents.
A cross-sectional analysis of data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) years 2003–2012. Anthropometric measurements, blood tests, 24 h diet recalls and demographic data were retrieved for participating adolescents. Metabolic syndrome was defined according to paediatric-modified Adult Treatment Panel III criteria. The exposure was defined as a nut intake ≥5 g/d.
Individuals aged 12–19 years (n 2805).
Nut consumption was associated with lower odds for metabolic syndrome (crude OR=0·25; 95 % CI 0·11, 0·55; P≤0·001). This effect was independent of age, sex, race/ethnicity and family income:poverty ratio (adjusted OR=0·27; 95 % CI 0·12, 0·61; P=0·002), and was stable after controlling for nutritional covariates including intake of sugar and total energy consumption (OR=0·36; 95 % CI 0·16, 0·81; P=0·014).
Nut consumption of ≥5 g/d is independently associated with lower odds for metabolic syndrome in US adolescents.
The isotopic and chemical signatures for ice-age and Holocene ice from Summit, Greenland, and Penny Ice Cap, Baffin Island, Canada, are compared. the usual pattern of low δ18O, high Ca2+ and high Cl– is presented in the Summit records, but Penny Ice Cap has lower than present Cl– in its ice-age ice. A simple extension of the Hansson model (Hansson, 1994) is developed and used to simulate these signatures. the low ice-age Cl– from Penny Ice Cap is explained by having the ice-age ice originating many thousands of km inland near the centre of the Laurentide ice sheet and much further from the marine sources. Summit’s flowlines all start close to the present site. the Penny Ice Cap early-Holocene δ18O’s had to be corrected to offset the Laurentide meltwater distortion. the analysis suggests that presently the Summit and Penny Ice Cap marine impurity originates about 500 km away, and that presently Penny Ice Cap receives a significant amount of local continental impurity.
In the past, several empirical firn-densification models have been developed fitted to measured density–depth profiles from Greenland and Antarctica. These models do not specifically deal with refreezing of meltwater in the firn. Ice lenses are usually indirectly taken into account by choosing a suitable value of the surface snow density. In the present study, a simple densification model is developed that specifically accounts for the content of ice lenses in the snowpack. An annual layer is considered to be composed of an ice fraction and a firn fraction. It is assumed that all meltwater formed at the surface in one year will refreeze in the corresponding annual layer, and that no additional melting or refreezing occurs in deeper layers. With this assumption, further densification is solely controlled by compaction of the firn fraction of the annual layer. Comparison of modelled and observed depth–density profiles from Canadian Arctic ice-core sites with large melting–refreezing percentages shows good agreement. The model is also used to estimate the long-term surface elevation change in interior Greenland that will result from temperature-driven changes of density–depth profiles. These surface elevation changes reflect a volume change of the ice sheet with no corresponding change of mass, i.e. a volume change that does not influence global sea level.
In order to reconstruct climatic and environmental changes in the Canadian Arctic, an 85 m deep ice core drilled in 1995 on Penny Ice Cap, Baffin Island, was analyzed for ions and δ18O. In addition to the core, snow-pit samples collected in 1994 and 1995 were also analyzed. Elution of ions caused by summer melting was observed in the pits. Due to the heavy summer melting on this ice cap, seasonal variations of ion chemistry and δ18O were not always present in the core. Comparisons of this core with a previously reported core drilled 2.5 maway show that the noise contained in single annual time series is 40–50% for ions and 25% for δ18O. the ice-core data, however, provide us with a reasonable proxy record of climatic and environmental changes during the last two centuries on better than a decadal basis. Sulfate and nitrate concentrations started to increase around 1900 and 1960, respectively, due to anthropogenic influx transported from the industrialized regions in North America. Sea-salt concentrations began to increase around the mid-19th century and were elevated throughout the 20th century. This trend of sea-salt concentrations is similar to that of melt percentage, which is a measure of summer temperature. Warming after the Little Ice Age would have reduced the sea-ice extent and led to the elevated sea-salt concentrations on Penny Ice Cap.
An early study of the various components of the Greenland, Antarctic and Canadian Arctic ice-cap cores (Koerner, 1989) suggested that during the last interglacial period, the Greenland ice sheet suffered massive retreat and Canadian ice caps melted completely. Since then, modeling has helped support this interpretation (Cuffey and Marshall, 2000). Ice-core records of stable isotopes, melt layering and chemistry from the same Canadian ice cores, and others from the Russian Arctic islands, Svalbard and Greenland are presented as evidence for a more modest, but still substantial, retreat in the early Holocene. the sections representing the first half of the Holocene in many cores have less negative δ18O values (d values) and a higher percentage of melt layers than recently deposited ice, suggesting that temperatures were 1.3–3.5˚C warmer than today. Given that glacier balances are slightly negative today, they must have been substantially more negative during the early-Holocene thermal maximum, leading to retreat of the circumpolar ice caps. Evidence is presented to suggest that, with the exception of Academii Nauk ice cap, the ice in the Russian Arctic islands and Svalbard must have almost disappeared. In the Canadian Arctic, the larger Canadian ice caps retreated but survived. the cooling trend that followed this thermal maximum promoted re-expansion and new growth of most of the ice caps in the Russian Arctic islands and Svalbard.
Intramammary infection (IMI) treatment and prevention at drying-off is one of the leading causes for using antimicrobials on dairy farms. The objective of the current paper is to describe the protocol used for conducting a systematic review of the literature on non-antibiotic strategies that can be used on dairy cows at dry off to treat and prevent IMI. Relevant literature will be identified using a combination of database search strategies and iterative screening of references. To be included in the review, articles will have to: (1) be published after 1969; (2) be written in English, French, or Spanish; (3) use a study design such as a controlled trial, an observational study, or an experimental study conducted in vivo; (4) be conducted on commercial dairy cows; (5) investigate a non-antibiotic intervention used at dry off; and finally, (6) report on a relevant mastitis outcome. Titles and abstracts, then full articles will be reviewed for inclusion. Specific data will be extracted and risk of bias will be assessed for all included articles. The planned systematic review will be the first to colligate, in a coherent whole, studies investigating non-antibiotic strategies for treating and preventing IMI at drying-off.
Choices made at the Paris climate change conference in December 2015 and actions after that will determine if Bangladeshis can keep their heads above water, or must flee to high ground. But the real impact of the decisions will only be felt in 50 to 100 years because the fossil fuels we use today and in the near future create ‘greenhouse gases’, which persist in the atmosphere for decades, continuing to warm the planet and having an impact on future generations.
Emission limits proposed by Bangladesh and most developing countries would cause global warming to peak in the middle of this century, followed by a slow fall in temperatures. Bangladesh could cope with those changes. But the industrialized countries, and China and India, do not accept these limits, and the Paris conference accepted voluntary limits that will allow temperatures to rise well into the twenty-second century. In Bangladesh, this would cause flooding and migration, disrupted weather patterns and more severe storms, and possible food shortages. Protecting Bangladesh from climate change will require much more ambitious commitments from the industrialized – and industrializing – nations.
Perhaps the worst problem is that elected politicians are being asked to make hard choices that will only benefit their great-grandchildren but will impose cost on presentday taxpayers. In 2015, British prime minister David Cameron made sweeping cuts to programmes to reduce greenhouse gases, arguing that cutting immediate government spending was more important, while a leading US presidential candidate did not even accept the existence of human-created climate change. For decades to come, Bangladesh will keep its head above water only if it can be part of an international coalition maintaining enough pressure on global politicians to keep their initial very limited promises, and to make further commitments to cut emissions.
Predicting the future is hard, but the past decade has seen huge amounts of scientific research and major improvements in the models used to make projections of the impact of global warming. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established jointly by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), has been collating the research and provides the most widely accepted and clearest scientific view on what is known – and not known – about climate change.
‘Climate Change Makes Refugees in Bangladesh – Bangladesh and Countries like It Are on the Frontline of Mass Migrations as a Result of Global Warming’ headlined Scientific American in 2009. However most of the people interviewed by author Lisa Friedman came from the southwest and had been forced to migrate due to waterlogging caused by the construction of dykes and polders (see Chapter 4) or due to cyclone Sidr.
There are no ‘climate change refugees’ in Bangladesh, because climate change has not yet had a noticeable impact and because the Bangladesh climate is so variable. There is a whole book reporting on temperature and rainfall change which finds that over 50 years there had been a slight decrease in winter temperatures in the northwest, and elsewhere there had been a slight increase. These changes are real but not yet noticeable. For example, in the northwest the year-to-year variation in the maximum winter temperature can be 2ºC or more; long-term data shows there is a decline in the maximum winter temperature in the northwest of 0.01– 0.03ºC per year, which is too small to be noticed.
Scientists and statisticians can already see the effects of climate change, but ordinary people do not, and it does not have any effect on a decision to migrate. Yet. But this country's hugely variable climate means the norm is cyclones, floods, heavy rain and droughts. As discussed in Chapter 2, climate change will have major impacts. The national census shows that 80 per cent of those who migrate to Dhaka do so to look for work or because of poverty; only 8 per cent move directly for environmental reasons (see Box 8.1). However, poverty and unemployment is often caused indirectly by environmental factors – floods and cyclones destroy houses, productive assets and jobs; when these cannot be replaced, people migrate. We use the term ‘environmental migrants’ for people who move, directly or indirectly, due to cyclone, flood, erosion and waterlogging. Bangladesh has had environmental migrants for centuries, although the number is probably rising as population growth pushes people to live in more marginal areas.
It took only an hour and a half to go the 7 km from the hotel to Dhaka University – normal in Dhaka. But it rained during our interview. Not an unusual rain – a normal Dhaka shower. But when we left, many roads were flooded and the city was grid-locked. Most traffic is private cars, but there are many cycle rickshaws and three-wheel taxis called CNGs (after their fuel – compressed natural gas) as well as a few buses and lorries.
Legally or illegally, formally or informally, almost all spaces in this city are private. Even public space is informally privatized. We may be caught in a traffic jam but we each have our own private bit of road space, according to class. The poor sit in their rickshaws, a few mini buses and buses carry those going longer distances, office workers are in the CNGs, some ride motorcycles and the better off are in their cars. Caught in the traffic, people still work. Those in cars with drivers are on their mobile telephones; the woman in the CNG next to us is editing a report. But we are caught in a jam. At one point there were four ambulances with sirens screaming caught in the jam with us. Rich and poor, well and sick all move at the same speed.
Dhaka is the 11th largest city in the world and the densest megacity (see Box 9.1) but it is largely without mass transport. The national bus company has only 263 buses running city services in Dhaka; after more than a decade of discussions, work on a first Japanese-aid-funded metro line began in 2016, as did work on a bus rapid transit line. A 2012 survey at ten major road junctions found 61 per cent of vehicles were motorized personal transport, serving only the best off 7 per cent of the city's population. Yet in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the government of Bangladesh concentrated on constructing $100 mn worth of flyovers in Dhaka, hoping to improve the movement of private cars.
As the motorcade of the local member of parliament, Abdul Wahab, passed through Kalishakul village, it was attacked by several thousand angry villagers. Twelve vehicles were burned. Wahab escaped, but a water board engineer, the sub-district chairman and a police superintendent were injured in the 2 June 2012 incident. The motorcade was on its way to launch construction of a dam in Kapila Beel, which many local people opposed. It was one of the most violent incidents in a 50-year struggle of local people to reverse a system of dykes and polders built in the 1960s and 1970s, which caused thousands of hectares to become permanently flooded and waterlogged, with hugely detrimental effects on local agriculture and livelihoods. Local people want an updated version of a system that dates back at least to the seventeenth century and involves using the silt deposited by annual flooding to raise the level of the land. When people launched their campaign, they had never heard of climate change, but they have won broad support from leading political and technical figures who realize it is an important response to rising sea levels.
Less than a year later, on 14 March 2013, the people of Chalan Beel formed a 220 km human chain along the banks of the dying Boral River. ‘We demand removal of all sluice gates and cross dams on the river,’ said Dr Matin, the spokesperson for the four groups that organized the demonstration. In both cases the demand was for changes to structures – dams and embankments – and to combine ancient knowledge with modern technology to work with nature and not against it. In both cases the problem is large earthworks imposed by engineers and international agencies, without taking into account the very complex structure of the Bengal delta and without paying attention to local knowledge.
For centuries Bengalis have been building embankments and canals to try to manage this ever-changing delta, to try to increase agricultural production while controlling floods and defending against cyclones. But not all of these interventions have been successful. In particular, some embankments and dams built in the colonial era and after independence disrupted water flows in ways that did considerable harm.
Because climate change accentuates existing environmental problems in Bangladesh, its scientists could see clearly what was coming, and they have taken a leading role in the annual climate change negotiations, the COP talks, and in putting pressure on the industrialized countries. Their stress has been on two issues, pressing for the least possible temperature rise and putting on to the agenda the industrialized countries’ responsibility for the damage they have already caused. As a new country but with an ancient culture that honours learning, Bangladesh put together knowledgeable, dedicated and hard-working negotiating teams. They played a key role in the interminable backroom negotiations, forcing the industrialized nations to take seriously the expertise from developing countries and pushing into agreements the key phrases that mean industrialized countries must recognize their responsibility for global warming.
Annual COP meetings are presented by the media in binary terms, as a failure or as a breakthrough. And to some extent they are. Meetings run all night and into extra days as world leaders struggle to reach compromises to curb climate change while protecting their national interests. But in this very technical arena, it is expert teams who lay the groundwork for the final compromises. And the agenda is set in the permanent, ongoing technical meetings where, very quietly, opinion is changed – ideas that seemed impossible a few years earlier come to be seen as reasonable and normal. This reflects better science and modelling, making clear the dangers of unabated climate change, as well as improved understanding of how emissions can be cut. The Bangladeshi expert negotiators have taken a major role and added significantly to this incremental progress.
Making an International Mark
In 1986 Saleemul Huq and others set up the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies, in part to research the environment, and were joined by Professor Atiq Rahman. Major floods in 1987 and 1988 hit Bangladesh just as pioneering research on sea level rise was being published by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Massachusetts, US. Huq and Rahman realized just how serious the impact on Bangladesh might be – ‘all of Bangladesh might be under water, and we had better worry’, Rahman said. A first book discussing this was published in 1990.
Police in riot gear accompanied the bulldozers as they knocked down the houses in Pora Basti section of the Kallyanpur slum, Dhaka, on 21 January 2016. By mid-day, a High Court judge ordered the demolition to stop, saying that a ten-year old High Court order against demolition was still in force. Local people reported that the next day, after most residents – mainly rickshaw pullers, domestic help, street sellers or day labourers – had gone to work, a team of 50 ‘goons’ with iron bars and knives arrived and poured petrol on houses and set them on fire, and then held off the fire service until police arrived to support the fire fighters. An estimated 600 shanties and 125 shops were destroyed. The daily New Age said residents demonstrated against the local MP, Aslamul Haque, whom they blamed for the evictions. ‘Aslam's men torched our houses pouring petrol to evict us by force, because High Court has ruled against our eviction,’ said Nadim Mohammad, a slum leader. Aslam denied the allegation. Aslam is what is locally called an ‘influential person’. As well as being a member of parliament, he is founder and chair of Maisha Property, which bills itself as a ‘pre-eminent developer of land in the Dhaka metropolitan area’. Its website says ‘When we purchase land, it's always based on strategic location so that we can extend urbanization and create potential sector for real estate and industrial development.’ Kallyanpur has become a ‘strategic location’ because one route of the proposed bus rapid transit system will have a station there, raising the value of the land; Maisha Group wants to build the line and has made a presentation to the prime minister.
The Centre for Urban Studies notes that Dhaka has one of the highest prices of residential land in the world – more than $12,000 per m2 in Gulshan, the most expensive part of the city. In Dhaka two-thirds of the cost of a new apartment is the cost of the land. Thus land grabbing can be hugely profitable.
Living in a low-lying and densely populated country on the front line of climate change, Bangladeshis are taking a lead in adapting to rising temperatures and campaigning to limit climate change. Global warming will worsen this country's existing environmental problems – causing a rise in sea level, more flooding and stronger, more damaging cyclones.
Bangladeshis know what is coming, and how to respond, because they are already effectively combating environmental and social challenges. Cyclone shelters and warning systems have cut the fatality rate dramatically; new varieties of rice have raised nutrition levels; women's education has slowed population growth; land is being raised to respond to sea level rise. Bangladeshis will keep their heads above water, but at huge costs. Will the industrialised countries curb their greenhouse gas emissions and pay for the damage they have already done?