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Our objective was to compare patterns of dental antibiotic prescribing in Australia, England, and North America (United States and British Columbia, Canada).
Population-level analysis of antibiotic prescription.
Outpatient prescribing by dentists in 2017.
Patients receiving an antibiotic dispensed by an outpatient pharmacy.
Prescription-based rates adjusted by population were compared overall and by antibiotic class. Contingency tables assessed differences in the proportion of antibiotic class by country.
In 2017, dentists in the United States had the highest antibiotic prescribing rate per 1,000 population and Australia had the lowest rate. The penicillin class, particularly amoxicillin, was the most frequently prescribed for all countries. The second most common agents prescribed were clindamycin in the United States and British Columbia (Canada) and metronidazole in Australia and England. Broad-spectrum agents, amoxicillin-clavulanic acid, and azithromycin were the highest in Australia and the United States, respectively.
Extreme differences exist in antibiotics prescribed by dentists in Australia, England, the United States, and British Columbia. The United States had twice the antibiotic prescription rate of Australia and the most frequently prescribed antibiotic in the US was clindamycin. Significant opportunities exist for the global dental community to update their prescribing behavior relating to second-line agents for penicillin allergic patients and to contribute to international efforts addressing antibiotic resistance. Patient safety improvements will result from optimizing dental antibiotic prescribing, especially for antibiotics associated with resistance (broad-spectrum agents) or C. difficile (clindamycin). Dental antibiotic stewardship programs are urgently needed worldwide.
Ecosystem modeling, a pillar of the systems ecology paradigm (SEP), addresses questions such as, how much carbon and nitrogen are cycled within ecological sites, landscapes, or indeed the earth system? Or how are human activities modifying these flows? Modeling, when coupled with field and laboratory studies, represents the essence of the SEP in that they embody accumulated knowledge and generate hypotheses to test understanding of ecosystem processes and behavior. Initially, ecosystem models were primarily used to improve our understanding about how biophysical aspects of ecosystems operate. However, current ecosystem models are widely used to make accurate predictions about how large-scale phenomena such as climate change and management practices impact ecosystem dynamics and assess potential effects of these changes on economic activity and policy making. In sum, ecosystem models embedded in the SEP remain our best mechanism to integrate diverse types of knowledge regarding how the earth system functions and to make quantitative predictions that can be confronted with observations of reality. Modeling efforts discussed are the Century ecosystem model, DayCent ecosystem model, Grassland Ecosystem Model ELM, food web models, Savanna model, agent-based and coupled systems modeling, and Bayesian modeling.
Ice wedges are ubiquitous periglacial features in permafrost terrain. This study investigates the timing of ice wedge formation in the Fosheim Peninsula (Ellesmere and Axel Heiberg Islands). In this region, ice wedge polygons occupy ~50% of the landscape, the majority occurring below the marine limit in the Eureka Sound Lowlands. Numerical simulations suggest that ice wedges may crack to depths of 2.7–3.6 m following a rapid cooling of the ground over mean winter surface temperatures of −18°C to −38°C, corresponding to the depth of ice wedges in the region. The dissolved organic carbon (DOC)/Cl molar ratios suggest that the DOC in the ice wedges is sourced from snowmelt and not from leaching of the active layer. Based on 32 14CDOC measurements from 15 ice wedges, the wedges were likely developing between 9000–2500 cal yr BP. This interval also corresponds to the period of peat accumulation in the region, a proxy of increased moisture. Considering that winter air temperatures remained favorable for ice wedge growth throughout the Holocene, the timing of ice wedge formation reflects changes in snowfall. Overall, this study provides the first reconstruction of ice wedge formation from a high Arctic polar desert environment.
It is commonly thought that disability is a harm or “bad difference” because having a disability restricts valuable options in life. In his recent essay “Disability, Options and Well-Being,” Thomas Crawley offers a novel defense of this style of reasoning (formulated as the Options Argument) and argues that we and like-minded critics of this brand of argument are guilty of an inconsistency. Our aim in this article is to explain why our view avoids inconsistency, to challenge Crawley's positive defense of the Options Argument, and to suggest that this general line of reasoning employs a double standard.
Shows that secularism is a dividing line between the parties, thus suggesting that the United States is moving toward a confessional party system, in which religiosity–secularity is a dividing line between the parties. The religious–secular divide between Republicans and Democrats is illustrated through the use of data from party convention delegates, as well as from the mass public.
Considers the likely future of secularism as a fault line in American politics. Secularism is gaining ground, which suggests that it will feed further political polarization, and perhaps even lead to a confessional party system based on religious–secular differences. We also speculate that the conditions may be right for the creation of a new political movement – a Secular Left to parallel the Religious Right. Such a movement is not a certainty, however. Will the strategic candidates seek to mobilize the growing secular population? The chapter, and thus the book, concludes by suggesting that growing secularism need not mean more polarization, as politicians could seek common ground between religionists and secularists.
Uses a set of experiments to explore how voters react to political candidates who describe themselves with varying degrees of secularity, from a hard-edged version such as “atheist” to a softer statement like “I’m not particularly religious.” The results show that while voters are averse to candidates who express disbelief in God, they are open to candidates who describe their secularity in other ways.
Establishes the political origins of the secular surge by demonstrating that the recent rise in nonreligiosity has been caused, at least in part, by a political backlash against the Religious Right, and the infusion of religion into conservative politics more generally. Using a series of experiments, we show that exposure to religion-infused politics causes people to drop their religious identity.
Examines how personal secularism shapes public opinion where we would expect it to matter: the line between church and state, or public secularism. We explore the nuances in Americans' attitudes on church–state separation, including how both personal secularism and nonreligiosity shape attitudes toward the twin religious protections guaranteed by the First Amendment, protection of religious free exercise and protection from government establishment of religion. Our analysis speaks directly to the current debate over the meaning of religious liberty.
Describes the rising tide of secularism within the United States, including but not limited to the growth of the “Nones” – people without a religious affiliation. Also introduces a key concept in the book: the difference between nonreligiosity and secularism. The former is defined by the absence of religion (what you are not) while the latter refers to an affirmative embrace of a secular worldview (what you are).
American society is rapidly secularizing–a radical departure from its historically high level of religiosity–and politics is a big part of the reason. Just as, forty years ago, the Religious Right arose as a new political movement, today secularism is gaining traction as a distinct and politically energized identity. This book examines the political causes and political consequences of this secular surge, drawing on a wealth of original data. The authors show that secular identity is in part a reaction to the Religious Right. However, while the political impact of secularism is profound, there may not yet be a Secular Left to counterbalance the Religious Right. Secularism has introduced new tensions within the Democratic Party while adding oxygen to political polarization between Democrats and Republicans. Still there may be opportunities to reach common ground if politicians seek to forge coalitions that encompass both secular and religious Americans.
Demonstrates, with original data, that Americans are more secular than they appear. We do so by contrasting conventional measures of nonreligiosity (the absence of religion) with our new and novel measures of personal secularism – or a secular worldview. We use a variety of methods, quantitative and qualitative, to validate these measures, which are then employed throughout the book.
Illustrates how secularism is a potent predictor of public opinion that has, heretofore, been undetected. The chapter then digs deeper into the relationship between secularism, nonreligiosity, and politics. By employing the panel version of the Secular America Study that ran from 2010 to 2012 we test whether political views are more likely to lead to secular orientations or the other way around. The results show a backlash: politics drives people away from religion. But they also show that secularism drives political views, even on issues far removed from questions related to church and state. Secularists are firmly planted in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party.
Examines how secularism affects the civic landscape. To what extent are Secularists civically engaged, including in nonpolitical activity such as community voluntarism and explicitly political action like working on a political campaign? When it comes to engagement outside of politics, Secularists pale in comparison to Religionists but shine next to Non-Religionists. Secularism, however, is a powerful predictor of political activity, and so Secularists are highly engaged in politics.