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Political legitimacy, according to Jean-Marc Coicaud, “is defined as the governed recognizing the right of the governors to lead and, to a certain extent, their entitlement to the perks of power.” Put simply, a government is legitimate when it is morally justified in the eyes of the people. It is not easy to measure legitimacy: do we use qualitative interviews with people from different social groups, survey data, or elections? And what counts as legitimate: the views of educated people or a majority of the people, or does everybody have to agree? What is clearer, perhaps, is when the governors lack legitimacy: they are overthrown in a revolution or must use brutal violence to put down popular uprisings. In fact, as Philippe Schmitter points out:
Legitimacy usually enters the analytical picture when it is missing or deficient. Only when a regime is being manifestly challenged by its citizens/subjects/beneficiaries do political scientists tend to invoke legitimacy as a cause for the crisis. When it is functioning well, legitimacy recedes into the background. Persons take it for granted that the actions of their authorities are “proper,” “normal” or “justified.”
Prior to the Arab Spring, few political scientists were writing about the “legitimacy crisis” in the Middle East. But now that regimes have been toppled and the voices of the people have been heard, it seems clear that the rulers of several Middle Eastern countries lacked legitimacy and that the people preferred to be governed by democratically elected leaders.
In the case of China, the study of legitimacy took off in the early 1990s. Again, the reason is political: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rulers used extreme violence to put down a popular demand for change on June 4, 1989, and it seemed clear that a regime with legitimacy would not have resorted to such means. The more a regime is legitimate – that is, seen as morally justified in the eyes of the people – the less it has to rely on coercion to get its way. It also seemed clear – especially to Western analysts – that the regime was doomed.
We present the results of an approximately 6 100 deg2 104–196 MHz radio sky survey performed with the Murchison Widefield Array during instrument commissioning between 2012 September and 2012 December: the MWACS. The data were taken as meridian drift scans with two different 32-antenna sub-arrays that were available during the commissioning period. The survey covers approximately 20.5 h < RA < 8.5 h, − 58° < Dec < −14°over three frequency bands centred on 119, 150 and 180 MHz, with image resolutions of 6–3 arcmin. The catalogue has 3 arcmin angular resolution and a typical noise level of 40 mJy beam− 1, with reduced sensitivity near the field boundaries and bright sources. We describe the data reduction strategy, based upon mosaicked snapshots, flux density calibration, and source-finding method. We present a catalogue of flux density and spectral index measurements for 14 110 sources, extracted from the mosaic, 1 247 of which are sub-components of complexes of sources.
We present results on the stellar population properties of massive galaxies at z = 0.7 based on deep, medium-resolution IMACS spectra for a sample of ~ 70 galaxies in the ECDFS with M* > 1010M⊙. The age–mass and stellar metallicity–mass relations for the population as a whole have a similar shape as the local relations over the probed mass range, but offset to ages younger by ~ 4 Gyr and metallicities lower by ~ 0.13 dex. Quiescent galaxies alone have stellar ages and metallicities consistent with passive evolution onto the local quiescent galaxies relations. The evolution in metallicity is driven by star-forming galaxies. However a significant fraction of massive star-forming galaxies have metallicities comparable to those of local quiescent galaxies. If quenched at z < 0.7 they can provide the necessary population to reproduce the scatter in age and metallicity of local quiescent galaxies.
It is difficult, arguably, for modern leftist thinkers to sympathize with Confucian values that seem best suited to old, boring and deadly serious defenders of conservative traditions. But this stereotypical image may be mistaken. Drawing on his own experience, the author argues that Confucians can and should have a sense of humour and engage in social and political criticism. He also questions the idea that Confucians need to be elderly gentlemen. The article ends with some reflections on Chineseness and Confucianism.
Hereby, we present a synthetic route for the production of wurtzite (WZ) CdSe nanocrystals (NCs), which are essential for further shell growing reaction (e.g. CdSe/CdS dot-in-rod (DRs) nanoheterostructures). Our continuous flow reactor set-up consists of a separate nucleation chamber and growth oven. Both components can be heated up to temperatures above 350 °C to guarantee WZ crystal structure.
Furthermore, we introduce DRs as the next powerful tool concerning biological imaging and assay detection. Using DRs in cell imaging results in an increased sensitivity due to the higher brightness compared to spherical core/shell/shell (CSS) nanocrystals.
In 1992, Francis Fukuyama famously proclaimed that liberal democracy's triumph over its rivals signifies the end of history. Needless to say, the brief moment of liberal euphoria that followed the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc soon gave way to a sober assessment of the difficulties of implementing liberal practices outside the Western world. Brutal ethnic warfare, crippling poverty, environmental degradation, and pervasive corruption, to name some of the more obvious troubles afflicting the developing world, pose serious obstacles to the successful establishment and consolidation of liberal democratic political arrangements. But these were seen as unfortunate (hopefully temporary) afflictions that might delay the end of history when liberal democracy has finally triumphed over its rivals. They were not meant to pose a challenge to the ideal of liberal democracy. It was widely assumed that liberal democracy is something that all rational individuals would want if they could get it.
The deeper challenge to liberal democracy has emerged from the East Asian region. In the 1990s, the debate revolved around the notion of “Asian values,” a term devised by several Asian officials and their supporters for the purpose of challenging Western-style civil and political freedoms. Asians, they claim, place special emphasis on family and social harmony, with the implication that those in the chaotic and crumbling societies of the West should think twice about intervening in Asia for the sake of promoting human rights and democracy. As Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew put it, Asians have “little doubt that a society where the interests of society take precedence over that of the individual suits them better than the individualism of America.” Such claims attracted international attention primarily because East Asian leaders seemed to be presiding over what a United Nations human development report called “the most sustained and widespread development miracle of the twentieth century, perhaps all history.”
The rise of China, along with problems of governance in democratic countries, has reinvigorated the theory of political meritocracy. But what is the theory of political meritocracy and how can it set standards for evaluating political progress (and regress)? To help answer these questions, this volume gathers a series of commissioned research papers from an interdisciplinary group of leading philosophers, historians and social scientists. The result is the first book in decades to examine the rise (or revival) of political meritocracy and what it will mean for political developments in China and the rest of the world. Despite its limitations, meritocracy has contributed much to human flourishing in East Asia and beyond and will continue to do so in the future. This book is essential reading for those who wish to further the debate and perhaps even help to implement desirable forms of political change.