During the establishment of alfalfa, POST applications of imazethapyr at 50 g/ha, following PPI applications of trifluralin at 1,100 g/ha, consistently provided ≥ 80% control of wild oat, volunteer canola, and shepherd's-purse with no crop injury. POST applications of the same rate of imazethapyr without PPI applications of trifluralin provided similar volunteer canola and shepherd's-purse control, but ≥ 80% wild oat control was achieved only 25% of the time. Imazethapyr, alone or following trifluralin, did not control common groundsel. Broadleaf weed control from imazethapyr at 50 g/ha tank mixed with fluazifop-P at 125 g/ha or sethoxydim at 200 g/ha was not reduced compared to imazethapyr alone. However, the probability of controlling wild oat by ≥ 90% was reduced from 83% to 0 when the same rate of imazethapyr was tank mixed with fluazifop-P, compared to fluazifop-P alone. Tank mixtures of imazethapyr at 50 g/ha and sethoxydim controlled wild oat only slightly less than sethoxydim alone. First cut and total herbage yields, obtained 1 yr after alfalfa establishment, increased where treatments effectively controlled broadleaf weeds and wild oat, compared to check plots. Second cut herbage and seed yields, also obtained 1 yr after alfalfa establishment, were not affected by any of the treatments.

We describe the use of a multi-aperture Hartmann mask coupled to a slightly out-of-focus focal plane array imager to monitor atmospheric turbulence (‘seeing’) produced by refractive index fluctuations. The imager (a CCD) is located inside or outside the focal surface of the imaging system so that each sub-aperture of the Hartmann mask produces an image well separated from all of the other images produced by the mask. Since the depth of focus of the sub-apertures is an order of magnitude larger than that of the parent optical system, the individual images are still diffraction-limited. We obtain short (10 to 100 msec) exposures and monitor the position fluctuations of the images. Analysis of the position and intensity fluctuations of the images can be used to determine the atmospheric parameter r0, the wind direction and velocity, and, under some circumstances, the distance of the turbulent layer from the observing site.

The information processing that constitutes accessconsciousness is not sufficient to make a representational state conscious in any sense. Standard examples of computation without consciousness undermine A-consciousness, and Block's cases seem to derive their plausibility from a lurking phenomenal awareness. That is, people and other minded systems seem to have access-consciousness only insofar as the state accessed is a phenomenal one, or the state resulting from access is phenomenal, or both.

Thus does Denis Diderot express his skepticism about whether it was actually the Marquis de Croismare, an Ostensibly Innocent player in the machinations leading to the composition of La religieuse, who replied to letters to him by Diderot and company or whether Frédéric Grimm and friends tricked Diderot into believing it was Croismare. Counterbalancing the philosophe's questioning volley is Grimm's assertion in the “Préface”:

The “Gestalt Bubble” model of Lehar is not supported by the evidence offered. The author invalidly concludes that spatial properties in experience entail an explicit volumetric spatial representation in the brain. The article also exaggerates the extent to which phenomenology reveals a completely three-dimensional scene in perception.

Because lesions usually affect contiguous areas of the brain, cognitive neuropsychology has generally posited modularity of brain function, assuming that specific regions of the brain have specific dedicated functions. However, a review of 36 published functional neuroimaging studies suggests that functions are distributed over multiple regions. Or, in other words, specific brain regions are usually multifunctional. By a technique of “virtual lesions,” I measure the contribution that regions of the brain make to tasks imaged in 36 PET experiments, and propose a new and more detailed interlink between neuropsychology and functional neuroimaging. (JINS, 2000, 6, 627–635.)

O'Brien & Opie's vehicle hypothesis is an attractive framework for the study of consciousness. To fully embrace the hypothesis, however, two of the authors' claims should be extended: first, since phenomenal content is entirely dependent on occurrent brain events and only contingently correlated with external events, it is no longer necessary to regard states of consciousness as representations. Second, the authors' insistence that only stable states of a neural network are conscious seems ad hoc.