Did colonial policies in India deliver excessive returns to British investors? We answer this question using annual data on Indian securities trading on the London Stock Exchange. We present new series on market capitalization, capital gains, dividend yields, and total returns of railway securities from 1880 to 1929. The average annual total return on the largest and most important Indian railway securities was 3.7%. These returns were not excessive by any financial standard. Indeed, they were lower than the return on railway securities in North America, Latin America, and Asia. We also undertake an event study analysis to assess whether Indian railways significantly benefited British investors. When the Government of India purchased large positions in the private railway companies between 1880 and 1910, there were opportunities for profit making. However, we find no evidence of abnormal investor returns in the years leading to the purchase of railway companies. Broadly our findings call into question the extractive nature of colonial railway policy.

The Whig and Tory parties played an important role in British politics in the decades following the Glorious Revolution. This article introduces new data on the political affiliation of all Members of Parliament in England and Wales between 1690 and 1747. The data have numerous applications for research. The focus here is on majority party representation and the electoral politics of constituencies. I show that the Whigs had stronger representation in municipal boroughs with small and narrow electorates, whereas the Tories were stronger in county constituencies and in boroughs with large and more democratic electorates. The Whigs were stronger in the Southeast region and the Tories in Wales and the West Midlands. After the Whig leader, Robert Walpole, became prime minister in 1721 the Whigs lost some presence in their traditional strongholds including counties where the Dissenter population was large. Finally, I incorporate data on electoral contests and show that the majority party generally lost strength in constituencies following contests.

Railways were integral to the development of the Indian economy before World War I. This article presents new estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) for railways from 1874 to 1912, which highlight the strong performance of this key industrial sector. Railway-industry TFP growth was substantial averaging 2.3 percent per year and generating a 2.7 percent social savings for the Indian economy. A combination of factors contributed to TFP growth including greater capacity utilization, technological change, and improvements in organization and governance. Railways had higher TFP growth than most sectors in India and compared favorably with TFP growth in other countries.

Between 1660 and 1830, Parliament passed thousands of Acts restructuring rights to real and equitable estates. These estate Acts enabled individuals and families to sell, mortgage, lease, exchange and improve land previously bound by inheritance rules and other legal legacies. The loosening of these legal constraints facilitated the reallocation of land and resources towards higher-value uses. Data reveal correlations between estate Acts, urbanization and economic development during the decades surrounding the Industrial Revolution.

Many states nationalized portions of their railroad network between 1860 and 1912. This article uses new cross-country data to examine which factors contributed to nationalizations and how nationalizations influenced network expansion. I find evidence that nationalizations were greater in countries with low constraints on the executive branch, with French and German civil law systems, and where neighboring countries had higher military capability. I also find evidence that nationalizations reduced mileage growth. The results suggest that external military threats increased the appeal of nationalizations, while legal and political institutions influenced their costs. They also suggest that nationalizations reduced investment incentives.

Turnpike trusts were private organizations that financed road improvements by levying tolls and issuing mortgage debt. They were established by Acts of Parliament throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. The acts transferred authority from parishes to a body of trustees, composed of local landowners and merchants. Parishes financed road improvements with local property taxes; but they could not levy tolls. This article uses a new data set to show that turnpike trusts increased road expenditure, rather than replacing existing or forthcoming parish expenditure. It also illustrates how institutional changes contributed to the process of economic development in England.