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This article focuses on the finite element modeling of toroidal microinductors, employing first-of-its-kind nanocomposite magnetic core material and superparamagnetic iron nanoparticles covalently cross-linked in an epoxy network. Energy loss mechanisms in existing inductor core materials are covered as well as discussions on how this novel core material eliminates them providing a path toward realizing these low form factor devices. Designs for both a 2 μH output and a 500 nH input microinductor are created via the model for a high-performance buck converter. Both modeled inductors have 50 wire turns, less than 1 cm3 form factors, less than 1 Ω AC resistance, and quality factors, Q’s, of 27 at 1 MHz. In addition, the output microinductor is calculated to have an average output power of 7 W and a power density of 3.9 kW/in3 by modeling with the 1st generation iron nanocomposite core material.
Psychiatric inpatient treatment is increasingly performed in settings with locked doors. However, locked wards have well-known disadvantages and are ethically problematic. In addition, recent data challenges the hypothesis that locked wards provide improved safety over open-door settings regarding suicide, absconding and aggression. Furthermore, there is evidence that the introduction of an open-door policy may lead to short-term reductions in involuntary measures. The aim of this study was to assess if the introduction of an open-door policy is associated with a long-term reduction of the frequency of seclusion and forced medication.
In this 6-year, hospital-wide, longitudinal, observational study, we examined the frequency of seclusion and forced medication in 17,359 inpatient cases admitted to the Department of Adult Psychiatry, Universitäre Psychiatrische Kliniken (UPK) Basel, University of Basel, Switzerland. In an approach to enable a less restrictive policy, six previously closed psychiatric wards were permanently opened beginning from August 2011. During this process, a systematic change towards a more patient-centered and recovery-oriented care was applied. Statistical analysis consisted of generalized estimating equations (GEE) models.
In multivariate analyses controlling for potential confounders, the implementation of an open-door policy was associated with a continuous reduction of seclusion (from 8.2 to 3.5%; ηp2 = 0.82; odds ratio: 0.88) and forced medication (from 2.4 to 1.2%; ηp2 = 0.70; odds ratio: 0.90).
This underlines the potential of the introduction of an open-door policy to attain a long-term reduction in involuntary measures.
Collaborations between community colleges, non-research centered universities and research universities can enrich the flow of students into Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) majors and careers. The nation is beginning to understand the importance of such interaction especially with under-represented minorities and those with disabilities. For over fifteen years our group has developed new ways to integrate these students and their faculty to the research culture. This will lead to increased diversity and inform research university faculty of the great talent that is latent in these underserved pools.
The ability of the aorta to buffer blood flow and provide diastolic perfusion (Windkessel function) is a determinant of cardiovascular health. We have reported cardiac dysfunction indicating downstream vascular abnormalities in young adult baboons who were intrauterine growth restricted (IUGR) at birth as a result of moderate maternal nutrient reduction. Using 3 T MRI, we examined IUGR offspring (eight male, eight female; 5.7 years; human equivalent 25 years) and age-matched controls (eight male, eight female; 5.6 years) to quantify distal descending aortic cross-section (AC) and distensibility (AD). ANOVA showed decreased IUGR AC/body surface area (0.9±0.05 cm2/m2v. 1.2±0.06 cm2/m2, M±s.e.m., P<0.005) and AD (1.7±0.2 v. 4.0±0.5×10−3/mmHg, P<0.005) without sex difference or group-sex interaction, suggesting intrinsic vascular pathology and impaired development persisting in adulthood. Future studies should evaluate potential consequences of these changes on coronary perfusion, afterload and blood pressure.
Chapter 7 presented evidence that when the conditions for class politics in the theoretical model are weak, so is the relationship between income and voting behavior. The theoretical argument also suggests, however, that when the conditions for class politics are weaker, the conditions for ethnic politics should be stronger. This chapter takes up this second implication of the argument. When the conditions for class politics are weak – and thus the conditions for ethnic politics are strong – is there evidence of a stronger role of ethnicity in voting? To address this question, I examine how the ethnic bases of support for political parties vary with the conditions for class and ethnic politics.
MEASURING ETHNIC VOTING BEHAVIOR
We can think of the ethnic basis of support for a given party as a function of the degree to which the ethnic composition of the party's supporters differs from the ethnic composition of support for other parties. Suppose there are two parties and two groups. If 70 percent of Party A's support comes from the Green group and 30 percent comes from the Blue group, is this party “ethnified”? We cannot answer this without knowing the support for Party B. If 70 percent of Party B's support also comes from the Green group and 30 percent comes from the Blue group, then both parties simply reflect the distribution of groups in society, and it would be odd to say either is particularly ethnified. But if 30 percent of Party B's support comes from the Green group and 70 percent comes from the Blue group, then both parties are relatively ethnified, and they would be even more ethnified if they each received 90 percent from their primary support group and 10 percent from the other group.
To test the theoretical argument about inequality, we need to use a measure of party-system ethnification that captures this basic idea of what it means for any given party to be “ethnified.” The goal of the test is to determine if such a measure is related to the interaction of income inequality and ethnic polarization.
Exclusion by Elections develops a theory about the circumstances under which 'class identities' as opposed to 'ethnic identities' become salient in democratic politics, and links this theory to issues of inequality and the propensity of governments to address it. The book argues that in societies with even modest levels of ethnic diversity, inequality invites ethnic politics, and ethnic politics results in less redistribution than class politics. Thus, contrary to existing workhorse models in social science, where democracies are expected to respond to inequality by increasing redistribution, the argument here is that inequality interacts with ethnic diversity to discourage redistribution. As a result, inequality often becomes reinforced by inequality itself. The author explores the argument empirically by examining cross-national patterns of voting behaviour, redistribution and democratic transitions, and he discusses the argument's implications for identifying strategies that can be used to address rising inequality in the world today.
The theoretical argument suggests that when the conditions for ethnic politics are met, some rich – those in the winning group – benefit from government distribution, and some poor – those in the losing group – are excluded from government redistribution. By contrast, when the conditions for class politics are met, all of the nonrich receive distributive benefits, while the rich all receive none. Thus, the extent to which electoral politics encourage government actions that reduce inequality should depend on the conditions that encourage ethnic and class politics, and thus on inequality, ethnic polarization, and their interaction.
Chapter 8 noted that the interaction between inequality and ethnic polarization could manifest itself in different ways that are consistent with the theoretical model. In the analysis of ethnic voting, which included a quite broad range of countries, I found that when ethnic diversity was low, there was a strong effect of inequality on ethnification of party systems. As ethnic diversity increased, the estimated effect of inequality on voting decreased. This is consistent with the idea that when it is possible to form a relatively small electoral majority based on ethnic groups, inequality has little effect on voting outcomes because there are incentives for ethnic politics at almost any level of inequality. As societies become more homogeneous, inequality should become more salient, with greater inequality tipping politics in the direction of ethnic rather than class coalitions. Thus, the effect of inequality on ethnic voting should be positive, but it should decline as the ethnic diversity of society increases, disappearing when society is sufficiently diverse that it's difficult for class politics to prevail at any level of inequality.
If patterns of redistribution reflect these voting patterns, then we should see the same type of interaction between inequality and ethnic diversity. When ethnic polarization is relatively low, inequality should have a relatively strong negative relationship with redistribution, with more inequality leading to less redistribution. As ethnic diversity increases, the relationship between inequality and redistribution should weaken.
A central emphasis in recent empirical social science research is that we should be skeptical of what we can learn from traditional regression-type approaches to analyzing observational data. This presents an obvious problem for me, as I hope the reader will take my evidence seriously, but I will be employing the sort of cross-national regressions that are often viewed as particularly unconvincing. The purpose of this chapter is to address this skepticism in two ways. First, I argue that the research tools that have been developed to address the shortcomings of traditional methods are much better suited for addressing some types of empirical questions than others. As a consequence, when we emphasize the use of these tools we bias our research agendas against exploring particular types of research questions. By thinking about the types of questions for which the methods are least well suited to study, it becomes clear why it would be essentially impossible to apply these methods to the questions central to this book. Thus, to test the theory I employ traditional methods.
But the fact that I must rely on the traditional methods does not obviate the concerns about them. My second response is to argue that we can learn the most from traditional methods if we carefully integrate theory and empirical work. Specifically, by developing theories that imply a range of related but conceptually distinct empirical relationships and by examining evidence for the range of these relationships, we can increase our confidence in the theory, even when evidence for specific relationships implied by the theory has the flaws of traditional approaches. And if we can increase our confidence in the theory, we should increase our confidence in the causal processes implied by the theory. A tighter integration of theory – as narrowly conceived here – and empirical evidence can therefore help us make progress on the types of questions that research methods focusing on causal identification are least well equipped to address. This is the approach I follow, and in this chapter, I develop these two responses in turn, beginning with the argument about biased agendas in research motivated by causal identification.
Democratic elections are notoriously complicated and noisy events about which it can be difficult to generalize. It is nonetheless important to develop theories that isolate particular aspects of electoral processes, and the goal of this chapter is to begin laying the groundwork for a theory that can describe how class and ethnic identities can influence electoral competition. The argument is based on the assumption that voters care only about maximizing their share of the “government pie,” and voters and candidates invoke “class” and “ethnic” identities instrumentally to this end. Although no one should deny that material considerations are important in elections, it should also go without saying that this assumption does not come close to fully describing the ways that voters and parties behave, or the role that class and ethnicity play in social interactions. The goal is simply to see if the assumption can aid the development of useful intuitions. To this end, I focus in particular on how social structure can impose limits on the types of promises that parties can make to voters motivated by material concerns.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the basic distributive politics model of elections and describes its limitations for generating intuitions about electoral politics. Section 3.2 then describes why it makes sense to consider how class and ethnicity can be used to make credible distributive promises to voters. Using the assumption that class and ethnicity constrain party promises, Section 3.3 explains how social structure – the distribution of voter incomes and ethnic identities – can shape which types of parties should be advantaged in electoral competition. The framework, however, raises important questions about the formation of party systems and the nature of party promises to voters. If social structure, for example, creates advantages for particular types of parties, why do parties that are not advantaged bother to form? And what types of platforms should advantaged parties offer to voters? I address such questions in Chapter 4, when I develop an explicit argument linking social structure to party competition.
The theoretical argument provides intuitions about how economic inequality and ethnic diversity interact to influence electoral politics. This chapter focuses on one micro-level empirical implication of the argument for electoral behavior, which is whether the relationship between income and vote choice differs with a country's level of inequality and ethnic polarization. When class politics is prevalent, voters should be more likely to sort themselves by income, with poorer individuals supporting more left-wing parties that favor economic redistribution and richer individuals supporting more right-wing parties that oppose such redistribution. Thus, when the conditions for class politics that are related to economic inequality and ethnic diversity are strong, income should play a stronger role in vote choice. Similarly, if the conditions for class politics lead to an emphasis on redistribution in electoral competition and electoral behavior, attitudes toward such redistribution should have the strongest relationship with individual income when the conditions for class politics are strongest. The empirical results provide consistent support for the theoretical argument. When the conditions for class politics are strong, there is a stronger relationship between income and voting behavior.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the data, and then Section 7.2 presents the analysis of the relationship between an individual's income and his or her voting behavior, as well as an analysis of the relationship between income and attitudes toward inequality. Finally, Section 7.3 explores these same types of relationships, but dividing up the data into countries that have recently democratized and countries that have a longer history with democracy.
Testing the micro-level implications of the argument about income and vote choice requires individual-level data on income and voting behavior across a large number of democratic countries that vary in their levels of inequality and ethnic diversity. In addition, it will be important to place parties on a left-right redistributive scale. To this end, I use the World Values Survey (WVS), which measures income, respondents' preferred party, attitudes toward redistribution, and a number of important control variables.
I develop the theoretical argument in three chapters. Chapter 3 describes the distributive framework that is central to what follows. A central feature of electoral politics is “distributive” promises – that is, electoral commitments by parties to voters regarding who should benefit from government policy. But in such a framework, without something like group identity, it is very difficult for parties to make commitments that voters will view as credible. Ethnic and class identities can be very useful in addressing this problem parties face: these identities create a pathway by which parties can make credible commitments about government distribution, though a pathway that also constrains the types of promises that parties can make. By focusing on the nature of these constraints, we can gain insights into how social structure – and in particular the distribution of ethnic and class identities – should advantage and disadvantage particular types of parties.
Chapter 4 takes up the question of how social structure should map onto party strategies and voting behavior. If social structure confers advantage on parties that represent particular types of groups, what should we expect with respect to party competition? In particular, why should disadvantaged parties form if they know they are going to lose? And what influences the nature of electoral promises that parties make to voters? The argument in Chapter 4 emphasizes the interaction of rent-seeking and policy incentives of party leaders, and describes how if party leaders have both such incentives, we can expect a clear mapping from social structure to electoral and policy outcomes. In addition, the chapter takes up the question of “theoretical robustness.” Are the central intuitions about social structure robust to different assumptions about electoral law, the source of government revenues, and the number of groups? The game theoretic model on which the argument is based is found in the appendix to the chapter.
Finally, Chapter 5 moves from the abstract model of group size to testable arguments about the interaction of inequality and ethnic diversity. I take up the issue of whether it makes sense to treat the number of nonrich as exogenous, when in fact we might expect the government to determine through policy who benefits from redistributive policy.