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Research has shown that 20–30% of prisoners meet the diagnostic criteria for attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Methylphenidate reduces ADHD symptoms, but effects in prisoners are uncertain because of comorbid mental health and substance use disorders.
To estimate the efficacy of an osmotic-release oral system methylphenidate (OROS-methylphenidate) in reducing ADHD symptoms in young adult prisoners with ADHD.
We conducted an 8-week parallel-arm, double-blind, randomised placebo-controlled trial of OROS-methylphenidate versus placebo in male prisoners (aged 16–25 years) meeting the DSM-5 criteria for ADHD. Primary outcome was ADHD symptoms at 8 weeks, using the investigator-rated Connors Adult ADHD Rating Scale (CAARS-O). Thirteen secondary outcomes were measured, including emotional dysregulation, mind wandering, violent attitudes, mental health symptoms, and prison officer and educational staff ratings of behaviour and aggression.
In the OROS-methylphenidate arm, mean CAARS-O score at 8 weeks was estimated to be reduced by 0.57 points relative to the placebo arm (95% CI −2.41 to 3.56), and non-significant. The responder rate, defined as a 20% reduction in CAARS-O score, was 48.3% for the OROS-methylphenidate arm and 47.9% for the placebo arm. No statistically significant trial arm differences were detected for any of the secondary outcomes. Mean final titrated dose was 53.8 mg in the OROS-methylphenidate arm.
ADHD symptoms did not respond to OROS-methylphenidate in young adult prisoners. The findings do not support routine treatment with OROS-methylphenidate in this population. Further research is needed to evaluate effects of higher average dosing and adherence to treatment, multi-modal treatments and preventative interventions in the community.
In recent years, the volume and intensity of attacks on globalization have been steadily rising. It is frequently argued that the antiglobalization backlash stems from strains that have been placed on the compromise of embedded liberalism. We argue that existing research underemphasizes how technological change and the digital revolution have contributed to these strains. Global value chains facilitated by the digital revolution have linked technology in advanced industrial countries to low-cost labor in developing countries, precipitating distributional losses for low-skilled labor in the industrial world. Further, the digital revolution has led to regulatory challenges involving both capital and labor. We argue that, as a result, governments face both mounting opposition to globalization and heightened difficulty in supporting the programs and policies necessary to buffer the adverse domestic effects of globalization and maintain support for embedded liberalism.
We used a randomized crossover design with a washout period of 3–4 weeks to compare health literacy scores obtained using the computerized version with scores obtained using the standard interviewer-administered NVS. ANOVA models and McNemar’s tests assessed differences in outcomes assessed with each version of the NVS and order effects of the testing.
Participants were recruited from multicultural catchment areas in Ontario and Nova Scotia.
English- and French-speaking adults aged 18 years or older.
A total of 180 (81 %) of the 222 adults (112 English/110 French) initially recruited completed both the interviewer-NVS and computer-NVS. Scores for those who completed both assessments ranged from 0 to 6 with a mean of 3·63 (sd 2·11) for the computerized NVS and 3·41 (sd 2·21) for the interview-administered NVS. Few (n 18; seven English, eleven French) participants’ health literacy assessments differed between the two versions.
Overall, the computerized Canadian NVS performed as well as the interviewer-administered version for assessing health literacy levels of English- and French-speaking participants. This Canadian adaptation of the NVS provides Canadian researchers and public health practitioners with an easily administered health literacy assessment tool that can be used to address the needs of Canadians across health literacy levels and ultimately improve health outcomes.
There is evidence that some countries negotiate trade agreements during economic downturns. Why would a leader do this? We argue that political leaders can gain from such agreements because of the signals they send to their public. The public are less likely to blame leaders for adverse economic conditions when they have implemented sound economic policies, such as signing agreements designed to liberalize trade and prevent a slide into protectionism. In hard economic times, leaders – especially those in democratic environments – may find that trade agreements are a useful way to reassure the public. Since majorities in many countries around the world view trade favorably, leaders may see agreements that prevent them from adopting protectionism as a way to maintain support. We evaluate this argument by analyzing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) formed since 1962. We find that, on average, democratic countries are more likely to form PTAs during hard economic times. We also find that democratic leaders who sign PTAs during downturns enjoy a longer tenure than their counterparts who do not sign such agreements.
Did the American public become more protectionist during the Great Recession of 2007–09? If so, why? During this period, many observers expressed concern that rising unemployment would stimulate protectionist pressures. The results of this study indicate that although increased unemployment did not affect the trade preferences of most Americans, individuals working in import-competing industries who lost their jobs during the Great Recession did grow more hostile to trade. However, even greater hostility to trade stemmed from a variety of non-material factors. Increasing ethnocentrism and opposition to involvement in world affairs between 2007 and 2009 help account for growing antipathy toward trade. But most importantly, increasing anxiety that foreign commerce would harm people in the future, even if it had not done so thus far, contributed to mounting opposition to trade among the American public.
Why do countries join international human rights institutions, when membership often yields few material gains and constrains state sovereignty? This article argues that entering a human rights institution can yield substantial benefits for democratizing states. Emerging democracies can use the ‘sovereignty costs’ associated with membership to lock in liberal policies and signal their intent to consolidate democracy. It also argues, however, that the magnitude of these costs varies across different human rights institutions, which include both treaties and international organizations. Consistent with this argument, the study finds that democratizing states tend to join human rights institutions that impose greater constraints on state sovereignty.
Economists have argued that outsourcing is another form of international trade. However, based on a representative national survey of Americans conducted in 2007 and 2009, the distribution of preferences on these two issues appears to be quite different. This article examines the origins of attitudes toward outsourcing, focusing on the extent to which it reflects (1) the economic vulnerabilities of individuals; (2) the information they receive about outsourcing, including their subjective understanding of what constitutes outsourcing; and (3) noneconomic attitudes toward foreign people and foreign countries. The findings emphasize the importance of variations in understandings of the term, as well as the highly symbolic nature of attitudes toward this issue. Individuals who believe the US should distance itself from international affairs more generally, who are nationalistic, or who feel that members of other ethnic and racial groups within the US are less praiseworthy than their own group tend to have particularly hostile reactions to outsourcing. The informational cues people receive are also important influences on their understanding of and attitudes toward outsourcing. Experimental results further emphasize the symbolic nature of attitudes toward outsourcing. Taken together, the results strongly suggest that attitudes are shaped less by the economic consequences of outsourcing than by a sense of “us” versus “them.”
A total of sixty surgically castrated male pigs (Large White × Landrace) weighing 31·2 (sd 4·3) kg were used in a randomised block experiment to examine the effect of added dietary inulin (0, 20, 40 and 80 g/kg) on the occurrence of swine dysentery (SD) and on fermentation characteristics in the large intestine after experimental challenge with the causative spirochaete Brachyspira hyodysenteriae. The pigs were allowed to adapt to the diets for 2 weeks before each pig was challenged orally four times with a broth culture containing B. hyodysenteriae on consecutive days. Increasing dietary levels of inulin linearly (P = 0·001) reduced the risk of pigs developing SD; however, eight out of fifteen pigs fed the diet with 80 g/kg inulin still developed the disease. The pH values in the caecum (P = 0·072) tended to decrease, and in the upper colon, the pH values did decrease (P = 0·047) linearly with increasing inulin levels in the diets, most probably due to a linear increase in the concentration of total volatile fatty acids in the caecum (P = 0·018), upper colon (P = 0·001) and lower colon (P = 0·013). In addition, there was a linear reduction in the proportion of the branched-chain fatty acids isobutyric acid and isovaleric acid in the caecum (P = 0·015 and 0·026) and upper colon (P = 0·011 and 0·013) with increasing levels of dietary inulin. In conclusion, the present study showed that a diet supplemented with a high level of inulin (80 g/kg) but not lower levels reduced the risk of pigs developing SD, possibly acting through a modification of the microbial fermentation patterns in the large intestine.
An ultrafast laser irradiation method for the removal of corrosion from Daguerreotypes without detrimentally affecting image quality has been developed. Corrosion products such as silver oxide and silver sulfide may be removed by chemical cleaning but these reactions are hard to control and are often damaging to the underlying silver, ruining the image. The Ti:Sapphire 150 fs laser pulses used in this study are focused to a beam diameter of 60 μm and are normally incident to the Daguerreotype. It was found that the corrosion layer has a lower material removal threshold than silver allowing for removal of corrosion with minimal removal of vital information contained in the silver substrate.
Organized nanostructures are formed after irradiation of layers of randomly aligned single-wall carbon nanotube (SWNT)-polymer composites by a Ti:Sapphire 775 nm laser with a 150 fs pulse at fluences near 0.1 J/cm2. At varying peak fluences morphology is seen where the tubes are ejected from the substrate or formed into long, parallel structures of SWNT’s. These structures have been created on both glass substrates and carbon grids. Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) and Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) investigation of the structures reveal that they are composed of bundled nanotubes typically 400 nm – 1 micron long. Large-area laser patterning of the film allows for structuring of the film without detrimental decreases in conductivity.
Contrarians have been fascinated by the idea that war can lead to progress. In particular, there is a long tradition of viewing war as a midwife of democracy. For Americans raised on the history of the U.S. Revolutionary War, the idea of fighting for freedom seems intuitively plausible. More scholarly analyses note that prosecuting a war requires governments to raise armies and revenue, which places substantial demands on society. In exchange for meeting these demands, citizens in nondemocratic countries have sometimes pressed for an expansion of the franchise, stimulating democratic reforms.
An opposing school of thought, however, notes that in order to wage war countries often militarize society, centralize power, and restrict civil liberties, thereby promoting the rise of authoritarianism and the establishment of garrison states. Although scholars have advanced these competing claims for well over half a century, they have not been thoroughly or conclusively tested. The purpose of our chapter is to help fill this important gap in the literature.
We begin by conducting a statistical analysis of the influence of war on democratization spanning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We examine the effects of both interstate and other external wars on subsequent democratic transition, using four different measures of democratization. Our results provide no support for the view that war inhibits democratization; instead, they furnish some scattered support for the view that war promotes democratization.
In recent years, promoting democracy has become a cornerstone of United States foreign policy. In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Bill Clinton identified the absence of war among democracies as a principle reason to foster democratization throughout the world. President George W. Bush has pursued this goal even more forcefully, arguing that democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere will enhance the security of the United States. In many ways, these calls are hardly new. Early in the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson advanced the view that democracy and peace were mutually reinforcing. Near the end of the Cold War, Ronald Reagan echoed this claim. Equally, Western policy makers and various international institutions have argued that democratization should be encouraged because it yields economic reform and prosperity. Among the hopes expressed by these individuals is that democratization will prompt the liberalization of foreign commerce, thereby expanding and deepening the open international trading system.
There is ample reason to expect that, in the long run, political liberalization culminating in the establishment of stable, mature democracies will widen the zone of peace and prosperity. In the short run, however, democratic transitions frequently promote war and undermine economic reform. Of course, not all democratic transitions are tumultuous. Those that occur in the face of strong, stable domestic institutions are often peaceful and facilitate improved economic performance.
Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic. These studies have focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual's income. The factor endowments or Heckscher-Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person's skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works. We find little support for either of these models using two representative national surveys of Americans. The only potential exception involves the effects of education. Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, further analysis reveals that education's effects are less representative of skill than of individuals' anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U.S. economy as a whole is affected by trade.
We have argued in Electing to Fight and other writings that an incomplete democratic transition increases the risk of international and civil war in countries that lack the institutional capacity to sustain democratic politics. The combination of increasing mass political participation and weak political institutions creates the motive and the opportunity for both rising and declining elites to play the nationalist card in an attempt to rally popular support against domestic and foreign rivals.
During the past half-century, states have established a large number of international trade institutions, both multilateral and regional in scope. The existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce. Yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers, namely, reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows. Exposure to global markets increases the vulnerability of a country's output to terms of trade shocks. Governments seek to insulate their economies from such instability through membership in international trade institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO) and preferential trading arrangements (PTAs). We hypothesize that these institutions reduce the volatility of overseas commerce. We further hypothesize that, because market actors prefer price stability, trade institutions increase the volume of foreign commerce by reducing trade variability. This article conducts the first large-scale, multivariate statistical tests of these two hypotheses, using annual data on exports for all pairs of countries from 1951 through 2001. The tests provide strong support for our arguments. PTAs and the WTO regime significantly reduce export volatility. In so doing, these institutions also increase export levels.
Since the Second World War, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have become increasingly pervasive features of the international economic system. A great deal of research has addressed the economic consequences of these arrangements, but far less effort has been made to identify the political factors leading states to enter them. In this article, the domestic political factors affecting whether countries enter PTAs are investigated, placing particular emphasis on the number of veto players within a state. It is argued that the probability of forming a PTA declines as the number of such players rises. The results, covering 194 countries from 1950 to 1999, strongly support this argument. Holding various political and economic factors constant, increasing the number of veto players within a country significantly reduces the probability of signing a PTA.