ABSTRACT

Changing patterns of tooth wear have been used extensively to obtain information about the lifestyle and culture of pre-historic and modern humans. The assessment of tooth wear in previous anthropological studies has been largely based on quantitative analysis of wear indices and qualitative analysis of micrographs. Wear indices are simple to use and can be sensitive tools, but there is a lack of international standardization in their use. Micrographic assessment of pits and scratch marks on the worn surfaces of teeth can assist in dietary reconstruction of humans, but this approach has low reliability and high observer error. This review will provide an update on a new wear index and novel nano-techniques that hold promise for improving the analysis of tooth wear. Recently, a new wear index, termed the Basic Erosive Wear Examination index, has been proposed as a standardized universal tool for diagnosing erosive tooth wear. However, its value seems to be limited when assessing the dentitions of populations, in whom tooth wear occurs predominantly by attrition and abrasion. Optical techniques involving scanning confocal microscopy combined with fractal analysis can provide an objective assessment of the worn surface. Other nanotechnology-based methods, such as nanohardness measurements, nano-computed tomography and mass spectrometry, can be also useful in physical and chemical characterization of both sound and worn teeth, but these techniques are limited to use in vitro. A combined assessment of the worn dentition using all of these techniques promises to provide the best holistic approach to analyse tooth wear.

Empirical evidence of altruism discovered by the Batson researchers will not convince sociobiologists. Their initial reaction is apt to be that it is not altruism in the ordinary sense that they are concerned with, but altruism in the biological sense. It is not a matter of actions that reflect concern for others, but of actions that threaten the reproductive prospects of the actor, while enhancing the reproductive prospects of others. However, we have seen this concern escalate into a vendetta against all semblance of altruism. Clearly the ordinary sense is at stake. Part of what is involved is the nature of understanding itself. The biological is supposed to provide a factual description of the way life actually is. References to selfishness, or to selfish genes for that matter, are only metaphors drawn from the ordinary meaning of selfishness and altruism. They are not to be taken literally. What the literal reality is, or whether it makes sense even to think in such terms, is an issue that is not normally considered. However, this issue of the nature and role of metaphor is crucial for unraveling what is at stake in treatments of altruism.

THE METAPHORIC NATURE OF THE SELFISH GENE

The power of Dawkins' portrayal of the selfish gene is due in large measure to the skill with which he develops this metaphor. His “biography of the selfish gene” represents a highly literate and imaginative account of reality.

Few themes enjoy such prominence in so many varied areas of contemporary life and thought as the subject of altruism. To popular perception, the ills of contemporary life are largely traceable to a deficiency of altruism. The greed and self-seeking of consumer culture are seen to be indicative of the erosion of social bonds that kept life more humane in earlier ages. This prominent view is directly contradicted by much contemporary scholarship, which sees altruism, and the assumptions that underlie it, as detractions from our most positive possibilities. Altruism is seen to represent an ideal of self-sacrifice that really reflects a domineering and condescending attitude on the part of the altruist, in contrast to the possibilities for mutual growth that a more egalitarian social vision would encourage. This critique of altruism extends to the religious domain, as traditional notions of divine grace, represented in the understanding of God in terms of agape, for instance, are challenged in the name of a life-seeking eros and the humane mutuality of philia.

The thesis defended here is that altruism is a modern secular concept that betrays theological overtones, and that dismissal of the notion endangers the lingering theological sensibility it echoes. The origin of the concept is generally attributed to the pioneer of sociology, Auguste Comte. For him, it designated the prospects for socially enlightened humanity, now that the restrictions of theology were being outgrown. Although theology was consigned to the past, religion enjoyed a much more positive status with Comte.

Thomas Nagel's Kantian exploration of the prospects for altruism in The Possibility of Altruism, has its counterpart in a description and promotion of a more immediate version of altruism by Lawrence Blum in Friendship, Altruism and Morality. “Impartiality, fairness, and justice are personal virtues, but they are merely some virtues among others,” Blum contends. “They are not definitive of moral virtue altogether.” To equate these qualities with moral virtue is to see morality in abstract terms. This overlooks two central dimensions of morality in particular. It does not consider the actual situation in which the moral agent operates, and so is deficient in accounting for motivation for moral action in general, and for altruism in particular. Moral issues emerge not by standing back and reflecting on reality in impersonal terms, but through claims that are made on us directly by people to whom we are connected and with whom we come into contact. Failure to consider the moral agent's real situation points to the other basic defect in the rational approach to altruism, the neglect of the emotions. “Our feelings and emotions are as much a part of our moral self as are the actions we perform and the moral views to which we give assent.” Rational deliberation, on its own, is not only ungrounded in human life, but also unmotivated for human beings. As well as being rational beings, we are also constituted by emotions and the attachments that trigger these.

While altruism has come to be treated with suspicion in some academic circles, either because it is taken to be basically contrary to human nature for some or because it is seen to be detrimental to human prospects as an ideal for others, the general perception of altruism seems not only to regard it as good, but as so obviously good that it is inconceivable that there could ever be too much of it. The significance of these academic and popular perceptions will be considered, in conclusion, by relating what we have seen about the nature of altruism to central issues at stake in it: the “truism” of altruism, the question of how far the assumption of the obvious goodness of altruism is justified; the “ism” of altruism, the question of the merits and liabilities of the prominent ways in which altruism has been assessed; and the “alter” of altruism, the question of the significance of otherness that is most characteristic of the focus of altruism.

THE TRUISM OF ALTRUISM

In spite of the high moral tone the term tends to evoke, “altruism” is not without its difficulties, as we have seen.

The self-interest perspective reflected in sociobiology is one that has come to be taken for granted as conventional wisdom that is too obvious to be noticed, much less questioned. At least, this has been the case until relatively recently. Over the past couple of decades the obviousness of the self-interest dogma has been questioned from several quarters where it had tended to be all but totally presupposed. In each of the social sciences, rebels have emerged, suggesting that humanity may not be as uniformly and thoroughly characterized by self-interest as had been assumed. In addition to self-interest, there would seem to be indications of genuine altruism that resist transposition into selfishness, except through machinations prompted by the self-interest dogma itself. In fact, in light of this recent simultaneous questioning from several quarters, it is difficult to determine which is the more surprising phenomenon, the tenacity and thoroughness of the grip that this perspective has held on modern consciousness or the variety and extent of the questioning to which it has rather suddenly become subjected. Consideration of one of the most impressive exhibits of the recent interest in altruism, C. Daniel Batson's experiments purporting to provide empirical evidence of the existence of altruism, provides a striking contrast to the treatment of altruism by sociobiology.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE BIAS AGAINST ALTRUISM

The ubiquity of the self-interest assumption in social science makes it difficult to document.