INTRODUCTION

While the history of active coral reef research stretches back over 100 years, the concern for the declining status of coral reefs is relatively recent, probably less than 25 years. The first major attempt to alert the global coral reef science community to the threats posed to coral reefs was in 1981 by Edgardo Gomez, who subtitled the 4th International Coral Reef Symposium in Manila, May 1981, as The Reef and Man (Gomez, 1982). Similarly Bernard Salvat and David Stoddart raised the alarm in 1982 (Salvat, 1980, 1982; Stoddart, 1982). At this time, most coral reef researchers worked from field stations during vacations; field stations specifically chosen that were adjacent to healthy and flourishing coral reefs seemingly not affected by human impacts. There was a small group of coral reef scientists who were working in developing countries, however, who were aware of an impending crisis for coral reefs.

Since that 1981 Symposium, there has been a steady increase in the involvement of coral reef scientists in the applied aspects of coral reef management (summarized in Knowlton, this volume). A paper published by Don Kinsey in 1988succinctly summarized the stresses to coral reefs (Kinsey, 1988). Similarly there were other reports of localized damage to coral reefs by coral reef scientists (Brown, 1987; Gomez, 1988; Pauly and Chua, 1988; Grigg and Dollar, 1990), but it was not until 1992 that global attention was alerted to the threats facing coral reefs.

When John Montague, Earl of Sandwich, left the Admiralty at the end of March 1782, the war with America was lost. Cornwallis had surrendered his army the previous October and, in the following spring, the North administration collapsed. With the colonies lost, Britain turned her undivided attention to the defeat of America’s allies. This was now a maritime war with no distraction of fighting on the American continent. On 17 April 1782, in the very month that Augustus Keppel took over as the First Lord of the Admiralty, George Rodney crushed the French at the Battle of the Saintes in the West Indies. Britain had been defeated in America but at much the same time had been at war with France, Spain and the Netherlands and faced the hostile neutrality of the Baltic powers. Britain’s European enemies gained virtually nothing from the war. Once the issue of American independence was decided, a strong Navy ensured success in Britain’s maritime war. Despite being a political liability and discredited, Sandwich must be acknowledged for producing a strong Navy at the end of this unpopular and disappointing conflict.

Sandwich’s administration suffered from being the focus of political discontent against the North government and the dispute with the American colonies. In previous decades the Admiralty would have been allowed to get on with its work with little interference from Parliament. Sandwich suffered unprecedented probing into the affairs of the Navy. He was expected to account for his every action and was blamed for matters that were beyond his control or not within his responsibilities. Some of the criticism was justified but in the later stages of his administration, particularly after the entry of France into the war in 1778, the criticism was entirely politically motivated. Sandwich had inherited the stewardship of a strong Navy in 1771. Sandwich called it a ‘paper fleet’ and this defence was to some extent political rhetoric on his part. He did, however, inherit a fleet facing a new stage in a recurrent problem.

The fleet began to deteriorate during the early 1770s. There were also many very old and unserviceable vessels that needed to be disposed of. The combination of these two factors caused consternation and alarm among some naval officers.

The end of the Seven Years’ War provided a set of unique opportunities as well as a set of serious problems to George III and his ministers. The opportunities lay in the possibilities of administrative and financial reforms long contemplated by the King and his first minister, Lord Bute. The problems left from the war were closely related to these opportunities but apparently irreconcilable with them. The huge burden of war debt had to be reduced but the King also wanted to reduce the high level of taxation. Continuing confidence in the financial credit of the country largely depended on this. The dilemma for the armed forces, the most expensive arm of the state, was that if both the debt and taxation were reduced, it might not be possible to afford an adequate peacetime military and naval establishment. This was particularly relevant to the Navy as much of the fleet was worn out by long service and in need of repair or rebuilding. This was going to prove a long and expensive task. What was needed was a careful balancing of security and economy.

This and the following chapter will examine the Navy’s administration from the Peace of Paris in 1763 to the Falkland Islands crisis in 1770. It will focus on the fiscal and logistical problems of demobilization, the establishment of the peacetime Navy, and the various reforms and innovations introduced at this time. In particular it will be clearly demonstrated that despite the appearance of strict economy, security was always the first priority and the Navy was never starved of cash. It will also be shown that, despite smaller grants for naval supplies and a substantial reduction in the Navy’s debt, expenditure on the repair of the fleet was carried on at a high level. It will also be demonstrated that the demobilization and laying up of the fleet was a carefully managed process and that no charge of neglect or incompetence can be levelled at the naval administrations between 1763 and the Falkland Islands incident in 1770.

The process by which both security and economy was achieved was by an ingenious blend of established procedures, new innovations and careful management.

When France joined the American Revolutionary War in 1778 the British Navy was far from ready. A year later Spain joined the contest, rendering the situation truly grim because both Bourbon powers had been strenuously building up their navies. Lord Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, told Parliament in early December 1777 that the fleet was more than a match for the Bourbon combination, but this declaration stood in marked contrast to his private assessment. For more than a year he had been beseeching Lord North for authorization to increase the number of British ships in commission. Reliable intelligence indicated that France was preparing new warships at such a pace that she would enjoy a substantial initial advantage if war came. The North administration had been hoping to knock the American rebellion off its feet by a massive military assault and had chosen not to augment the British fleet at home both to save money and to avoid antagonizing France. This strategy failed, and at the beginning of 1778, seeing that France would probably take advantage of the situation, North wanted to resign and proposed that the British government should settle its differences with the Americans. By then the Americans knew that France intended war, and when it was declared Britain faced a naval crisis.

It had two aspects. Most immediately, there was the amount of time required to mobilize, that is to make the ships in reserve ready for active service and find men for them. In the opening phase of every war the manning problem posed enormous difficulties for the British Navy while the French Navy, thanks to a registry system, was able to get its ships manned faster. The other aspect concerned the condition of the ships in reserve. In truth, the Navy list contained many which would require major repairs or should be replaced by new construction. Although new ships could be, and were, ordered to be built in merchants’ yards, two or three years would pass before they could sail and fight. In the meantime the shortage would prevent the Admiralty from adopting optimum modes of naval strategy. To the consternation of the British public, French naval operations proceeded with little hindrance.

This book concerns the second problem, the lack of ships. How could such inferiority have been allowed to develop?