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In 2017 the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) made only procedural decisions, one on preliminary objections, one on counterclaims, and two on provisional measures. Three other new applications were made to the Court, all linked to earlier cases: Malaysia applied for the revision, and interpretation, of the judgment in the Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh case; and Costa Rica brought a case against Nicaragua concerning their land boundary in the area of Los Portillos, the latest in a long line of cases between the two states. Judges Ronny Abraham (France), Dalveer Bhandari (India), Antonio Cançado Trindade (Brazil), and Abdulqawi Yusuf (Somalia) were reelected to the Court, and one new judge, Nawaf Salam (Lebanon) was elected. The UK failed to secure the reelection of its judge, Christopher Greenwood. For the first time since the establishment of the ICJ, the UK will have no judge on the Court. This failure may be taken as an indication of its declining influence in international relations, arguably attributable in part to Brexit, and it marks the end of the convention that each permanent member of the Security Council will have a judge of its nationality on the Court. Nor was the UK able to prevent a request by the UN General Assembly (passed by ninety-four in favor to fifteen against, with sixty-five abstentions) for an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965—a sensitive issue for the UK, and one that has already been the subject of much litigation.
The goal of this study was to examine the mental health needs of children and youth who present to the emergency department (ED) for mental health care and to describe the type of, and satisfaction with, follow-up mental health services accessed.
A 6-month to 1.5-year prospective cohort study was conducted in three Canadian pediatric EDs and one general ED, with a 1-month follow-up post-ED discharge. Measures included 1) clinician rating of mental health needs, 2) patient and caregiver self-reports of follow-up services, and 3) interviews regarding follow-up satisfaction. Data analysis included descriptive statistics and the Fisher’s exact test to compare sites.
The cohort consisted of 373 children and youth (61.1% female; mean age 15.1 years, 1.5 standard deviation). The main reason for ED presentations was a mental health crisis. The three most frequent areas of need requiring action were mood (43.8%), suicide risk (37.4%), and parent-child relational problems (34.6%). During the ED visit, 21.6% of patients received medical clearance, 40.9% received a psychiatric consult, and 19.4% were admitted to inpatient psychiatric care. At the 1-month post-ED visit, 84.3% of patients/caregivers received mental health follow-up. Ratings of service recommendations were generally positive, as 60.9% of patients obtained the recommended follow-up care and 13.9% were wait-listed.
Children and youth and their families presenting to the ED with mental health needs had substantial clinical morbidity, were connected with services, were satisfied with their ED visit, and accessed follow-up care within 1-month with some variability.
Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in November 2013 and left a trail of destruction. As part of its emergency response, Médecins Sans Frontières distributed materials for reconstructing houses and boats as standardized kits to be shared between households. Community engagement was sought and communities were empowered in deciding how to make the distributions. We aimed to answer, Was this effective and what lessons were learned?
A cross-sectional survey using a semi-structured questionnaire was conducted in May 2014 and included all community leaders and 269 households in 22 barangays (community administrative areas).
All houses were affected by the typhoon, of which 182 (68%) were totally damaged. All households reported having received and used the housing material. However, in 238 (88%) house repair was incomplete because the materials provided were insufficient or inappropriate for the required repairs.
This experience of emergency mass distribution of reconstruction or repair materials of houses and boats led by the local community was encouraging. The use of “standardized kits” resulted in equity issues, because households were subjected to variable degrees of damage. A possible way out is to follow up the emergency distribution with a needs assessment and a tailored distribution. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2017;11:285–289)
The three disparate cases decided by the International Court of Justice (Court or ICJ) in 2014 may not contribute much to the development of substantive international law, but they are instructive about the operations of the Court. Perhaps the Court was not at its finest in terms of coherent legal reasoning in these three cases; it certainly avoided difficult questions in all of them. Yet each of the three cases had significant numbers of separate and dissenting opinions, which sometimes reveal more about the Court’s reasoning than is apparent from the judgment or order itself.
The role of the UN and the legitimacy of its collective security system have been seriously challenged in recent years. First, because of the Security Council.s failure to act in cases of genocide or other humanitarian disaster. There has been much criticism of the limited and delayed response of the Security Council to events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, somewhat unfairly in so far as it was the lack of political will on the part of the Member States rather than any institutional failure that was responsible for the failure to act. Secondly, the UN's central role in collective security has been undermined by unilateral use of force by States. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the UN was sidelined with regard to the forcible response against Afghanistan: in Operation Enduring Freedom the USA preferred not to act through the UN or even through NATO. Subsequently, the US National Security Strategy (September 2002) famously made no mention of the UN as a means of addressing perceived new threats from global terrorists. Most seriously, the US Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was undertaken unilaterally, that is, without express Security Council authorization.1 This was often portrayed as a crisis of legitimacy for the UN as much as for the USA and the States which participated in the invasion. As the Deputy Secretary-General put it recently:
Recent research has shown that biologically inspired approaches to materials synthesis and self-assembly, hold promise of unprecedented atomic level control of structure and interfaces. In particular, the use of organic molecules to control the production of inorganic technological materials has the potential for controlling grain structure to enhance material strength; controlling facet expression for enhanced catalytic activity; and controlling the shape of nanostructured materials to optimize optical, electrical and magnetic properties. In this work, we use organic molecules to modify silver crystal shapes towards understanding the metal-organic interactions that lead to nanoparticle shape control.
Using in situ electrochemical AFM (EC-AFM) as an in situ probe, we study the influence of a cationic surfactant cetyltrimethylamminobromide (CTAB) on Ag growth during electrochemical deposition on Ag(100). The results show that the organic surfactant leads to a unique crystal growth habit. With CTAB present in the growth solution, Ag islands grow in a truncated pyramidal shape. To understand the shape evolution of the Ag islands, we utilize electron backscatter diffraction (EBSD) in conjunction with microscopic ellipsometry to characterize the facet-specific binding of the organic molecules to large-grained polycrystalline Ag substrates.
There is evidence to suggest that GPs experience significant difficulties associated with lack of support from, and communication with, hospital and other specialists in palliative care. The establishment of cancer and palliative care facilitator schemes by Macmillan Cancer Relief reflects these current concerns very clearly. This paper presents some of the findings from the first phase of an evaluation of one such GP facilitator scheme in the Welsh county of Powys. It examines the perceptions and expectations of GP facilitator post-holders during the first year of the facilitator scheme, based upon data gathered from qualitive interviews conducted on three separate occasions. The picture that emerges from the first year of this facilitator project is broadly a positive one. Facilitators have tailored their roles to fit in with and augment the practices with which they deal. Attitudes vary, but their goals of facilitation and education appear similar. Themain challenges facing post-holders is that of being aware of the possible existence of professional rivalries whilst developing their role in ways which do not encroach upon the territories of long-established colleagues.
The duties, if any, of European states to participate in multilateral operations in Africa are currently a matter of some controversy. What are the obligations of European states with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa? How far is it legitimate for them to avoid the contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa? Does the reluctance of European and other developed states to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa have significant legal consequences? This article will consider these issues in three main sections. The first provides an overview of UN peacekeeping in recent years at a time when there has been a substantial surge in demand for peacekeeping troops. It discusses the problems that the UN has faced in securing troops from developed member states, particularly for operations in Africa. The second section describes the pattern which has emerged in recent practice with regard to peacekeeping and enforcement action in Africa. Although developed states have generally been reluctant to provide troops for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, they have undertaken Chapter VII operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Cote d'lvoire as ‘coalitions of the willing’. They have also provided assistance to certain African governments threatened with violent overthrow, such as the governments of Sierra Leone and Cote d'lvoire. They have turned to regional and sub-regional organisations to take the lead in certain conflicts: they have provided financial assistance, logistical support and military training for such organisations.
The duties, if any, of European states to participate in multilateral operations in Africa are currently a matter of some controversy. What are the obligations of European states with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa? How far is it legitimate for them to avoid the contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa? Does the reluctance of European and other developed states to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa have significant legal consequences? This article will consider these issues in three main sections. The first provides an overview of UN peacekeeping in recent years at a time when there has been a substantial surge in demand for peacekeeping troops. It discusses the problems that the UN has faced in securing troops from developed member states, particularly for operations in Africa. The second section describes the pattern which has emerged in recent practice with regard to peacekeeping and enforcement action in Africa. Although developed states have generally been reluctant to provide troops for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, they have undertaken Chapter VII operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire as ‘coalitions of the willing’. They have also provided assistance to certain African governments threatened with violent overthrow, such as the governments of Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. They have turned to regional and sub-regional organisations to take the lead in certain conflicts: they have provided financial assistance, logistical support and military training for such organisations.
This is a surprising-and disquieting-judgment which raises serious questions about the role of the Court. The Legality of Use of Force cases began in 1999 when the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY)2 first brought an action against ten NATOStates for their use of force in Kosovo.3 In December 2004 the Court decided unanimously that it had no jurisdiction to decide the cases. However, this unanimity masked a fundamental disagreement between the judges: it is apparent from the Joint Declaration of Judges Ranjeva, Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby that the judges were strongly divided, by eight to seven, on the reasoning which led them to agree that there was no jurisdiction.